Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

Some insights from a case study in Duduza

by
Hugo van der Merwe

In Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Final Report, Vol. 5, Chapter 9, pp. 423-429.

Hugo van der Merwe is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

130 It would be wrong to make broad generalisations from a case study of a specific community where the Commission held a single human rights violations hearing. However, this work by an independent researcher does contain a number of important signposts for other communities on the road to reconciliation.

Duduza is a black township that is part of the Greater Nigel Area. Nigel is a town on the East Rand (Gauteng) with neighbouring African, Indian and Coloured townships. The total population of the town is approximately 150 200 000. Over half of these people live in Duduza.
The publicity around the establishment and functioning of the Commission, as well as its operation within Duduza has, at the very least, forced people to examine their own understanding of what reconciliation and forgiveness means to them and their community. For some, this may be primarily an intellectual exercise looking at existing divisions and formulating some ideas about what should be changed, at what a reconciled community would look like. For others, it is a much more personal reflection, involving feelings of hatred, guilt and fear. Thinking about reconciliation means thinking about a process of overcoming the psychological barriers that they have been living with, often for many years.
The messages projected by the Commission and the support it was given by religious leaders and local politicians brought about some change in the way people viewed the idea of reconciliation. Many declared themselves committed to a process of reconciliation contrasting this to their previous feelings of hatred and the desire for vengeance, the main response to their victimisation. For some, the main reason behind this change in attitude was the election of a new government. For others, it was simply the passage of time. Some victims, however, attribute their change of heart to the work of the Commission.
While some victims still find the idea of reconciliation, and especially forgiveness, insulting, it appears that for most the Commission has contributed to a greater commitment to the process of reconciliation. It has also created the space to pursue reconciliation. It is seen as a forum that provides a platform for storytelling, for revealing the truth, for holding the perpetrator accountable, for reparations, remorse and forgiveness. These are steps in a process that people now understand and accept as legitimate. They are steps that involve an exchange between victim and perpetrator, between individual and state. People have developed a fairly clear idea of what would constitute a fair exchange for them as individuals, involving both give and take.
Most of the conflict of the past was between community residents (particularly activist youth) and the security forces (police who were locally based, security police based in the regional head quarters, and the SADF). The mistrust between the community and the police has been changing, thanks in large part to the police-community forum that has been operating for a number of years. Many of the police who were seen as responsible for past abuses no longer work or live in Duduza and a new police station was built in the township. Nobody was aware of any amnesty applications that may have been submitted by members of the security forces in the area. There are also no pending court cases. It appears that few further details of the police atrocities in the community will be uncovered by the Commission.
The dynamics of the apartheid era conflicts had many spin-offs. The conflict environment led to a range of other associated divisions and intra-community dynamics. There were divisions arising from suspicions regarding police informers, collaborators and internal power struggles among ANC supporters. Interpersonal conflicts were drawn into the political vortex and the dividing line between politics, criminal activity and interpersonal disputes became very indistinct.
These divisions are not resolved. People still mistrust each other. Victims still wonder if their neighbour or their councillor was the one who informed on them, or who spread the rumour about them being informers. People still wonder what secrets were still buried and how these secrets shape the operation of local politics. One example was a police officer, who is seen by many as implicated in past abuses, who is now a senior council employee. Many suspect that blackmail or other underhand deals are behind arrangements like these.
The political culture is also not liberated from the violent past. There is an increased sense of political tolerance, with people feeling more comfortable expressing support for opposition parties (rather than challenging the ANC internally). The present political leadership in the ANC is, however, alleged to have used intimidation in their fight for internal party control. New divisions are eclipsing those of the past, but they are still interwoven with the past. The emergence of new political parties (such as the United Democratic Movement) in the township draws on (and fans) suspicions that arose regarding past deeds in order to build a support base. Allegations of complicity with past abuses (both in terms of spying for the police or the use of violence directed at internal opposition) are common weapons in undermining support for one's political opponents.
Blacks and whites still live very separate lives. Some blacks have moved into the white suburbs of Nigel, but many don't feel particularly welcome. Racial incidents such as being barred from the health club or (as is commonly alleged) white Afrikaans schools still seem commonplace. Interaction between black and white councillors seems to have built a certain level of mutual trust and a sense of partnership, and this has been broadened through the operation of various council sub-committees. These initiatives have, however, only reached a very limited component of the respective communities. They are also seen as somewhat tentative gains that may easily be undermined by political campaigning before the next elections. They are relationships built on (and limited to) common interests in the social and economic development of the area. The parties have not talked openly about the past.
The attitudes of whites on the council towards reconciliation are built around the idea of a partnership between two communities. We are all in the same boat we simply need to understand each other better and be more respectful of each other's culture. They see themselves as advocates of reconciliation among their own community which has to be coaxed into accepting the new status quo.
The Commission hearing was not attended by local whites. It can be assumed that many whites in the town (a traditionally conservative stronghold) saw some Duduza victims testifying at public hearings broadcast on television. Their attitudes, like most whites in South Africa, are a mixture of "we did not know how can you blame us" or the common "let us rather forget about the past". Some see the Commission as an ANC witch-hunt that is trying to destroy the credibility of the previous government.
Reconciliation is not an event. People cannot simply one day decide that they want to forgive and forget. Most of the victims in this community are committed to a process of reconciliation. They are not necessarily demanding vengeance. They are, at the same time, not simply willing to move ahead as if nothing happened. They demand to hear the truth and to be given time to consider it. They are often not willing to forgive unless the perpetrators show remorse and some form of reparation is offered.
Many victims were understandably bitter about their suffering while many are willing to engage in a process of reconciliation. The [Commission] has played a part in engaging victims in examining and articulating their needs within a reconciliation process. It has however not done enough in meeting these needs or in facilitating a process through which these needs could be met.
Being promised some form of reparation and being given the opportunity to go on stage and tell their stories was a very powerful experience for many victims. They felt that they now had a voice. But this momentum has to be sustained. The organisational base for them to continue to be heard has only materialised in very few areas. For the reconciliation process to be carried through to some conclusion requires a victim engagement process that gives them space to articulate and voice their concerns. The [Commission] provided for a moment of opportunity, rather than sustained mobilisation. Other processes that allow for victims' (and perpetrators') concerns and interests to be articulated and addressed need to be developed and sustained at community level. Khulumani, which was initially active in the community, was not able to sustain its activities due to financial constraints.
The violence experienced in this community had a wide range of dimensions, and inflicted deep damage on numerous social relations. While the main dimension of the conflict may have been between the black oppressed population and the state, this conflict was fought in various covert ways which undermined and co-opted sections of the population and created internal divisions that require dedicated attention. The young and the old, neighbours, different ethnic groups have been turned against each other. Different forms of suffering are given different levels of recognition and priority by the [Commission]. People were victimised in different ways and thus have different needs in terms of reparations and social and physical reconstruction. These different interests often compete with one another and can lead to new conflicts within the community.
One important division is that between the population and the political structures. Victims particularly seem to feel alienated from the political system. They don't feel that their needs are taken seriously by any of the political leaders. In extreme cases, victims see the political structures as perpetrator structures (representing the interests of amnesty applicants within their ranks). Thus, when the [Commission] consults with the community via the political structures it means (from this perspective) that they are consulting with the perpetrators and not the victims.
A longer-term reconciliation initiative would need to take the consultation process two steps further. It needs to engage with less developed community structures or networks that do not have a formal voice. Particularly in a community with a history of intense conflict, certain interest groups may not have organised and mobilised, because of fear and/or because of lack of resources. Unless there is assistance for the articulation of these interests, the process will not reach all sectors of the community.
Past conflicts have not disappeared. They have simply taken a new form. In some cases, the conflict entails almost exactly the same issues as in the past; it is simply the way that people pursue their incompatible goals that has changed. This leads to new alliances and new forms of mobilisation of support. Problems in leadership-follower relations have emerged as political leaders attempt to build a support base that is not simply geared at protest politics and which is not sustained by mass mobilisation. The ability of leaders to facilitate public participation processes is limited in this new era, and the public consequently feels that their elected leaders are out of touch or leave them in the dark.
New frustrations have thus emerged regarding old forms of representation, providing space for new political entrepreneurs to challenge the newly dominant political elite. Political entrepreneurs fan the resentments of the past to encourage suspicion and resentment of the existing local leadership. They draw in victims of past abuses (who generally feel neglected) as one element of their constituency.
The [Commission] process assisted in clarifying past conflicts characterising a limited period of our history. Future reconciliation initiatives must make the links between these divisions of the past and current community dynamics.
Victims are individuals with unique experiences and needs. Each victim has to go through a personal journey of dealing with the past. Similarly, each community has a unique history of conflict. There were common dimensions that happened all over the country, but the particular shape and intra-community dynamics took on many different forms. A reconciliation process needs to address these individual and community-specific histories.
One uniform national process is only capable of sketching a skeletal picture in broad terms. If left at that, it, in fact, is in danger of minimising the importance of dealing with particular issues when trying to squeeze the history of the community into [Commission] categories of meaning. A national process can draw attention to some of the dynamics and pressures that impact on a local community, but does not "explain" the local history.
Communities need to be engaged in creating their own agenda for reconciliation, and designing processes that allow local stakeholders to drive the process. The role of the [Commission] can help provide general models to communities regarding how the issue of past human rights abuses can be pursued in much greater depth.
Victims are not ready to engage in a reconciliation process unless they know more about what happened. They often say they are willing to forgive, but they need to know who to forgive and what they are forgiving them for. A willingness to reconcile is dependent on people's ability to cope with and process their knowledge of what had happened. While the past remains hidden, a reconciliation process proceeds on very shaky foundations. The [Commission] has contributed to some of this revealing, but many individual victims are still in the dark about the details of their specific cases.
Victims need to feel that they are no longer in the vulnerable position that they found themselves in at the time of the victimisation. They need to feel that they are now safe from abuses and that if the threat of re-victimisation arises, their pleas for protection will be attended to. These fears are often shaped by local community circumstances rather than the national political situation.
Victims need to have done some personal work in working through what happened to them before they are ready to engage in a reconciliation process. They need to have stopped trying to run away from their memories and accept them as part of who they are. They should feel that their lives are no longer completely dominated by this experience. The availability of local, accessible mental health support services and victim support structures is crucial in facilitating this step.
Victims also need to perceive that there is a possibility that things could be different. They need to be able to imagine that society could change for the better, that the divisions of the past can be overcome, that people can co-exist without constant fear and hatred. A vision of a society that is based on different values of human interaction is essential in motivating people to take the risk of engaging in a reconciliation process.
Some of these issues (truth, empowerment, healing, and a vision of a new society) will never be completely resolved, and some will be extensively addressed by a reconciliation process. Before such a process starts, however, there needs to be some substantial progress in meeting some of these pre-conditions.
Reconciliation involves various stages of development and change. One essential step is dialogue between adversaries. The victim-oriented and perpetrator-oriented aspects of the Commission's work are broken into separate functions. Victims tell their stories in one forum and perpetrators in another. The interaction is thus often mediated purely by the media coverage of these events. While this may have been useful in providing safe space to engage them, or to maximise information gathering, the subsequent step of facilitating more direct dialogue still needs to be addressed.
For victims there is often a need to have personal interaction with the perpetrator. They want to be able to call that person(s) to account personally. They want to be able to relate their suffering and demand an explanation. Victims in other communities have reported a great sense of empowerment that goes with the ability to stand up to one's victimiser. Some perpetrators have also expressed a need to apologise to their victims. There is also a need to be able to humanise the relationship; to deny the categories and stereotypes that allowed the divisions of the past. The actual dialogue in Duduza has, however, not yet started.
Note:
Abridged version of work undertaken by Hugo van der Merwe, Project Manager in the Transition and Reconciliation Unit at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, with funding provided by the United States Institute of Peace.

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