The real results behind the referendum roundabout
Graeme Simpson
There can be little doubt that President F W de Klerk's victory in the referendum on Tuesday March 17 elicited a huge sigh of relief from political interest groups across the board to the left of those he defeated. For many whites, in the image of his February 2, 1990 speech, Mr de Klerk once again appears to have offered the prospect of a negotiated peace.
Yet there is a real danger that, as in February 1990, this flatters to deceive. Indeed, these danger signals were sounded most alarmingly by the terms in which the referendum itself was fought.
Much of the escalating violence which has dominated our society since February 1990, was clearly the product of pervasive fear and insecurity in a dramatically changing society. Indeed, it has been precisely this fear that has been traded on by those right-wing and "third force" elements in generating seemingly arbitrary violence aimed so clearly at disrupting the negotiation process and black political organisations.
South Africans, forced to confront the hostile, racially-based stereotypes generated by decades of apartheid ideology, faced in the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and the SACP, not the removal of "the enemy" of old, but its apparent relocation within the borders of the country. Forty years of ideology do not simply disappear overnight – instead, the "external enemy" has merely become the "enemy within".
Regsgevaar
This was evident from the type of referendum campaigns fought, not only by the extreme right-wing groups, but by the National Party as well. Gevaar tactics dominated the referendum with both sides doing as much as possible to distance themselves from the ANC, communism and the prospect of black majority rule.
Indeed, this was one of the great ironies of the referendum campaign – as one Nationalist after another was confronted by quotations of theirs in the not-too-distant past, invoking as they did so well the rhetoric of swart gevaar and "total onslaught". The Nats ultimately could not create the distance between themselves and this "enemy within" that the ultra-right was so easily able to achieve. The result was possibly the only innovative strategy to emerge from white South African politics in the course of the referendum – Regsgevaar!
In the final analysis, however, two key factors remained disturbingly consistent: firstly, the "fear factor", one way or another, dominated the process and the outcome of the white referendum; and secondly, the introverted nature and focus of white politics continued to reduce the real social problems of the day which confronted black South Africans, to little more than a vehicle for generating the fear necessary to grab votes.
The way in which escalating political and criminal violence was used in the referendum is perfectly demonstrative of these trends. Both sides claimed that a vote for them was the only secure bastion against the increasing violence.
Yet neither side came even remotely close to offering practical solutions to this dominant social problem, beyond the limited confines of the white suburbs. This quite simply is not where the problems of criminals of political violence originate. Nor is it where the devastating consequences are most harshly experienced.
A perfect example of this was the timely mid-referendum announcement by Minister Kriel of yet another crime-busting plan. By now it is common knowledge that no law enforcement agency can operate effectively without sound police/community liaison and communication. This has proved to be the central problem confronting the South African Police due to the absence of community trust and lack of accountability by the SAP to the black township community.
Yet in his proposal, Minister Kriel ministers almost exclusively to the white community on this issue. With regard to community participation he identifies three central groups whose participation is viewed as essential to the success of his strategy: business – specifically the business watch system; farmers' associations; and the neighbourhood watch system.
Frustration
In short, the problem of burgeoning violence and crime is either viewed as a problem of the white suburbs alone, or Minister Kriel was merely playing the referendum roundabout. The tragedy is that this issue of policing in this transitional phase, dependent as it is on winning the trust of the black township communities, is central to the prospect for peace.
Another factor that has dramatically escalated the levels of violence in our society has been the frustration of raised expectations and false hopes created by the prospect of rapid and fundamental change. The danger here is that this referendum victory may once again raise false hopes, not only of a more rapid process of change, but also that the levels of violence in our society will miraculously dissipate of their own accord.
If anything, an increasingly cornered and excessively militarised right-wing movement, if not dealt with effectively, is even more likely to live up to its threats to escalate its violent attacks.
Even more importantly, if this limited victory within the narrow confines of fear-based white South African politics is allowed to do any more than it already has to eclipse the central social problems of impoverished and disempowered black township communities, we are all doomed to escalating social and political violence.
The onus remains firmly on Mr de Klerk. He has now to prove himself, given his mandate to do so, by taking direct action against those elements determined to disrupt the negotiation process.
If we are to remove the fear and political insecurity that gives rise to escalating violence, then there is no better starting point that to move towards a rapid political settlement and a new interim government. It is therein, and not in the victory in the white referendum, that our salvation lies.
Graeme Simpson is a founder and former Executive Director of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
In the Sunday Star, 22 March 1992.
© Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
