Internal Police Systems for Officer Control: A Strategic Focus Area for Improving Civilian Oversight and Police Accountability in South Africa
by
Gareth Newham
Gareth Newham is a former Project Manager in the Criminal Justice Programme at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
1. Introduction
Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. My argument this afternoon is that there is a particular shortcoming in relation to the current oversight architecture of the police that if focused upon will provide the biggest impact on solving some of the challenges facing all our policing agencies.1 Essentially, the area that requires greater focus is that of the internal police systems of control and accountability of individual police officers. While such systems typically will also include performance management and public complaints systems, for the purposes of this presentation I will focus specifically on the internal disciplinary system of the South African Police Service.
2. A Framework for Civilian Oversight of the Police
Police accountability is a complex and often difficult concept to engage with whether one focuses on ensuring internal accountability of police officials or external accountability of police agencies through civilian oversight mechanisms. Indeed, ensuring effective civilian oversight of the police as a means toward enhancing police accountability remains an ongoing challenge internationally and most democracies will at some point try to strengthen it – usually after a particular public scandal involving police abuse of power has erupted. However, given the large and often complex domain that is modern policing, civilian oversight structures will typically find themselves at sea in terms of how to effectively hold the police accountable unless they are given a very focused mandate. In recent times a number of analysts have tried to assist various police agencies and civilian oversight structures by proposing a basic conceptual framework for police accountability.2 This model has emerged following the recognition of two key realities facing policing everywhere in the world.
Firstly, police officials are often the most visible face of government and are given special powers and weapons to enforce the law, investigate crimes, arrest criminal suspects and maintain social order. The failure to do this effectively and legally will undermine many citizens respect both for the rule of law and the government. This will serve to strengthen the confidence and position of those who already have no respect for the rule of law or the government.
Secondly, as many decades experience and research internationally has demonstrated, the special powers granted to police officials are easily abused by individuals and groups in the police service who are more interested in self gain than working towards the goals of the police agency and serving the community. This happens to some extent in every police agency in the world and appears to be particularly problematic in countries undergoing democratic transitions as old systems of control are weakened while new systems are still in the process of being developed.
Consequently it has been proposed that effective police accountability requires a particular focus on how the policy, procedures, practices and structure of a police agency affects:
- Police performance: police activities and the direct impact of these activities;
- Police conduct: police behaviour such as ill-discipline, misconduct, brutality and corruption.
While police performance is an important element of any police reform initiative, weak internal controls governing police conduct will ultimately undermine the extent to which the police can perform effectively and efficiently. Indeed, the need for strong internal disciplinary systems has been recognised internationally. As Rachel Neild has argued following an analysis of police reform of Latin America
The early establishment of functioning internal controls is all the more important for police reform processes where a large number of personnel are retained from the former [security structures]. In these cases, there is a clearly increased risk that old and abusive practices will continue. It is undoubtedly important, if the reform process is to be at all credible that police leadership clearly demonstrate that abuse will not be tolerated by developing the mechanisms to confront it.3
It is necessary to recognise that civilian oversight can never be the primary mechanism for holding individual police officials accountable. Indeed, the argument has been repeatedly made that "It is clear that [external mechanisms of police accountability] can only be effective if they complement well developed internal forms of control."4 Consequently, the success of civilian oversight of the police really depends on the strength and nature of internal police systems. However, internal systems are more likely to become strengthened if external oversight bodies start to focus on these systems to ensure that they indeed are adequate and working as effectively as possible.
3. Indicators of Police Conduct in South Africa
In South Africa, one of the primary challenges facing our policing agencies (both the SAPS and municipal police services) is that of effective internal control. This is not to say that there is an absence of internal control. Certainly there are internal disciplinary and performance management systems with positive developments over the past few years. Indeed, many police officials are disciplined and dismissed each year. Moreover, from my experience working with the police agencies most police officials are honest and dedicated people. However, it is apparent that there are still a significant numbers of officials whose conduct has a severely negative impact on the effectiveness and public respect of our police organisations. The next section will briefly focus on some of the information that partly reveals the extent of this challenge.
Police corruption and crime
Fortunately, the SAPS has recognised the challenge of police corruption and in combating it has been identified as one of the national priority areas since 1996. Recently, a National Prevention of Corruption Strategy has been finalised and this should be implemented during the course of 2005. Moreover, many localized initiatives have been taken at various levels within the SAPS to deal with the problem. However, currently our municipal police agencies have yet to develop strategies to deal with the problem effectively.
The first indication of the extent of the problem within the SAPS emerged from the work of the previous SAPS Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU). Given that police corruption is accepted as an under-reported phenomenon, the figures that were provided by the ACU are astounding. Apart from the sheer numbers of cases reported, what is striking is the extent to which these numbers increased consistently over the life span of the unit. Whereas 2 300 cases were reported during 1996, this figure had almost tripled to 6 480 for the year 2000. The most recent figures released by the SAPS reveal that between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2003, a total of 2 370 corruption related cases were investigated of which 1 332 resulted in criminal prosecution and 641 in internal disciplinary hearings.5
Recent data from national surveys suggests that the problem is still significant. In the latest South African National Victims of Crime Survey undertaken in 2003, police officials asking for bribes was mentioned as the second most common experience by almost one fifth of respondents (19%). Traffic officials taking bribes was the most common form of public sector corruption experienced by almost one third of respondents (29%).6 A recent survey undertaken by the CSVR reveals that 92% of police officials agreed with the statement, "Police corruption is a serious challenge facing the SAPS" while a majority of 54% thought that police corruption was increasing, with only 23% of the opinion it was decreasing and 19% thinking that it was "staying the same."7
Apart from corruption, other forms of criminality committed by some police officials are also cause for concern. The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) latest annual report for 2004 states that "there was a substantial 47% increase in reports of serious criminal offences allegedly committed by SAPS members" from the previous year.8
Public Complaints and Police Misconduct
From the SAPS records it shows that complaints against the police have continued to increase since 1994. While in 1994 a total of 11 651 complaints were laid against members of the SAPS, this figure had risen to 17 526 cases in 1997. In the most recent 2004 SAPS annual report, 19 253 complaints were recorded by the national complaints hotline and a further 2 030 by the "National Complaints Investigations" telephone line. It must be noted that these 21 283 complaints are only those recorded by these two mechanisms. A vast number of public complaints received against police officials at station level are not officially recorded.9
While the SAPS do not provide a breakdown in their annual reports as to the nature of the public complaints that it received, the ICD states in its latest 2004 report that it received a 27% increase in allegations of police misconduct on the previous year.10
The activities of these police officials certainly have an impact on the public perceptions of the police. The National Victims of Crime Survey found that 45% of all respondents thought that police were doing a "bad job in their area". While "failure to respond on time" was cited as the most common reason for dissatisfaction, a number of conduct related problems such as "corruption", "laziness" and "harshness to victims" also featured prominently. An earlier 2002 study of 44 priority stations around the country found similar results.11
4. Indicators of Police Discipline
It is clear that the disciplinary system in the SAPS is being used to some effect. Between April 2002 and March 2003 a total of 4 623 disciplinary hearings were instituted of which 7.8% (362) resulted in dismissal, 25% (1 176) were withdrawn, 19% (880) were found not guilty and a further 25% (1181) ended in a verbal warning.12 During this year almost half or 44% of disciplinary hearings instituted resulted in no sanction being taken against the officer concerned.
More recently between April 2003 and March 2004, the number of disciplinary hearings almost doubled to 9 117. Interestingly however, a far smaller number of 260, or only 2% resulted in a dismissal. A greater proportion of 28% (2 596) were withdrawn, 18% (1677) were not guilty and 22% (2 022) ended in a verbal warning. During this year almost half (46%) of disciplinary hearings resulted in no action being taken against the subject officer.
While it is not expected that all disciplinary hearings will result in action being taken against officers facing allegations, it is of concern that such a high proportion result in very light or no sanctions what so ever. This should be of particular concern, especially given the substantial amounts of time, energy and resources that are required in setting up and running such hearings. The general perception that is likely to occur within the police is that disciplinary hearings are not really a threat as only a small proportion of the time will they actually result in any serious sanction.
Other research amongst police officials on the internal disciplinary systems suggest that the current system does not pose much of a concern to police members. In a 2003 study conducted amongst three large police stations in Johannesburg, the question was asked as to what type of disciplinary sanction a police member would receive if caught taking a R100 bribe in order not to make an arrest. Six choices were given to the respondents of the survey and the results were as follows:13
None - 5.9% Verbal warning - 15.5% Written warning - 32.2% Suspension, no pay - 21.7% Demotion - 6.7% Dismissed - 18%
The large variation between expectations of what the likely outcome of a disciplinary procedure would be reveals that there is no common perception of the SAPS response to corruption. More worrying is the high proportion (82%) of police officials who thought that even if they were caught taking a bribe, they would not be dismissed following disciplinary procedures. Clearly, for many police officers the risk in taking a bribe is worth it as most do not believe it will threaten their continued employment in the SAPS.
In 2001 a climate survey of station based police officials at a priority station found that 45% thought that discipline in the SAPS had generally worsened since 1997. A small proportion of 16% thought that discipline had remained the same while 39% thought that discipline had improved.14 In a more recent police survey a substantial proportion of 32% disagreed with the statement, "Most police members are disciplined and follow the rules and procedures of the SAPS."15
The qualitative research that has been conducted into the functioning of the internal disciplinary system of the SAPS reveals that there are a number of ongoing challenges including:16
- A reluctance by supervisors and commanders to take disciplinary steps against members;
- Disciplinary procedures take too long to finalise;
- Inconsistent application of disciplinary procedures;
- Inadequate recording of disciplinary steps;
- Inadequate experience of station based presiding officers;
- Inadequate training of police managers in the practical application of the disciplinary system,
- A general perception from lower level supervisors that discipline is the responsibility of senior officers.
5. Conclusion
While much has been achieved by the SAPS in the past ten years of organisational reform, it is clear that the most important management tool to ensure control and accountability of individual police officials, namely the disciplinary system, is not working effectively enough to deal with the extent and nature of police conduct related challenges confronting the SAPS.
Nevertheless, none of the civilian oversight structures in South Africa has adequately focused on or monitored the internal systems of control of the police. Neither the portfolio committees, nor the secretariats have played any meaningful policy or monitoring role in relation to improving the internal disciplinary system of the SAPS as a whole. As of yet, the SAPS has not provided these structures with its own analysis of trends and patterns relating to police misconduct nor clear strategies as to how these problems will be addressed.
The ICD plays an important role in terms of individual police accountability, as its primary role is to investigate specific allegations against individual police officials. Indeed, the it could be playing a larger role if the following challenges they have identified could be overcome including, they have no explicit mandate to conduct proactive oversight into trends and patterns relating to police misconduct, that there are delays in the finalisation of police disciplinary hearings and that their recommendations for disciplinary steps are not always acted on by the SAPS.
Moreover the ICD only receives a relatively small number of complaints against police officials compared to the SAPS. A total of 5 903 cases were received during 2004 while the SAPS received over 21 200 official cases during the same time period. If the ICD was to take over the investigations of all complaints it would need to increase its capacity by at least 3.5 times. However, handing over all the responsibility for dealing with police misconduct to an external agency runs the risk of those who have the most ability to effectively and quickly deal with misconduct, police managers, ceasing to take responsibility. Ideally, a police agency will have very strong and effective internal systems for dealing with officer misconduct while external agencies will complement rather than replace these.
A greater focus of the civilian oversight structures on this key area could lead to greater attention being paid to it by the SAPS. If the internal systems of control (including the systems of recording public complaints) and the disciplinary system are strengthened, it is likely that there will be substantial improvements in the conduct and service related shortcomings experienced by the SAPS.
Notes:
1 This includes the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the various metropolitan/ municipal police services that have been established since 2000.
2 Stone, C. (2004), The Double Demand on Police and the Role of Police Oversight in Democratic Societies: An International Perspective. Address to the Conference for Policing Oversight in Africa: Accountability and Transformation, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26–29 January 2004. See also David H. Bayley, author of (1994) Police for the Future. Oxford University press: New York, who simply states that police need to be held accountable for 'what they do and how they do it.'
3 Neild, R. (1998) "Internal Controls and Disciplinary Units" in Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A manual for civil society. Washington Office on Latin America, p. 1.
4 Jones, T. (2003) "The governance and accountability of policing in The Handbook of Policing (Tim Newburn (ed) United Kingdome: Willan Publishing, p. 605.
5 SAPS Annual Report for 2003–2004.
6 Burton P., Du Plessis A., Legget T., Louw A., Mistry D., and van Vuuren H. (2004) National Victims of Crime Survey South Africa 2003. Monograph No. 101, Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, July 2004, p. 112.
7 Newham, G. (2005) The South African Police Services Johannesburg Police Area Transformation Survey, 2004. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
8 Independent Complaints Directorate Annual Report 2003–2004, p. 47.
9 This was revealed during a series of interviews with 60 senior station based police officials as part of the Police Integrity Management Project undertaken by the CSVR during 2003.
10 Independent Complaints Directorate Annual Report 2003–4. p. 47.
11 Burton et al (2004)
12 South African Police Services Annual Report 2002 / 2003. p. 134.
13 Newham, G. (2003) The Report of the Police Integrity Measurement Survey at three Johannesburg Police Stations. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
14 Newham, G. (2001) Results of the Hillbrow Police Station Climate Survey. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
15 Newham, G. (2005) The South African Police Services Johannesburg Police Area Transformation Survey, 2004. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
16 Newham, G (2003) The Police Integrity Management Report. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
