A Decade of Criminal Justice in South Africa

Paradigms for Policing

by
Boyane Tshehla
 
 
 
 
 

Boyane Tshehla is based at the Institute for Security Studies.

I looked at the program and said to myself: oh it is the ISS and CPP pitched against each other. Unfortunately, Antony and I have very little in common when it comes to policing, especially the role of non-state players. But I will let you be the judge of that after hearing both of us. So it is actually CPP, if you wish, versus a very divided ISS.

Be that as it may. I think it appropriate to start by congratulating CPP for having kept the show on the road for more than half a decade. That is not a negligible achievement at all. This is particularly true given that the policy situation has not been supportive of community policing initiatives at best or has been hostile to community policing at worst. It depends on who you are dealing with or talking to.

Still on the complimentary note, I think CPP has to be commended for having won the trust of the SAPS. It is quite impressive that a Peace Committee shares offices with the SAPS. I would love to be a fly on the wall some day and just hear what exactly John tells the police to get them to do this. Anyway, that is not an issue for now. What is interesting, for the present purposes, is the fact that despite the fact that policing in South Africa—in the past few years—has returned (to varying extents) to it being about 'the police and what they do' (here I borrow the phraseology of CPP), CPP still managed to penetrate SAPS even though this is at a very local level. To me this shows the disjunction between policy making and practical day-to-day practices. Perhaps this shows how those at the frontline are willing or are forced to look at alternatives to deal with their policing needs. This is something that happens often in townships. Examples of local police officers supporting alternative structures abound. They even support vigilante groups. Not for a moment am I suggesting that CPP is a vigilante group. What I am saying, however, is that in many places police are willing to do whatever it takes to get the job done even if it means overt support of vigilante groups. So this speaks to the context in which police response and/or attitude towards non-state actors should be understood.

Now enough with compliments. Having expressed the above sentiments about the Peace Committee model, one has to look at some of the issues that relate to this model. I am going to list the issues and briefly speak to each one of them. Before I do that, however, I have to disclose that my understanding of Peace Committees is not based on the best of sources. I know a Peace Committee that operated in Khayelitsha—a place where I was doing work in 2000/2001. This committee—I hope John here remembers our conversation—he told me, 'was not a best example of a Peace Committee'. Perhaps some of my thoughts and disquiet—therefore—will be more a reflection of problems of the Khayelitsha structure as opposed to those of the Peace Committee model. I am going to say them anyway.

The issues are:

The extent to which Peace Committees are local,
The focus of Peace Committees in the poor areas,
Related to that, the payment of participants,
Sustainability of the model beyond close knit CPP,
Finally, and this is a question, what are policy implications of CPPs?

The extent to which Peace Committees are local

CPP prides itself of Peace Committees being local structures of dispute resolution. I think this is their strong point. They go micro. What I have never been able to get to grips with is the meaning of local. What does it really mean to say Peace Committees are local? Are they as local as the 'local police station'? If so then that simply means that we are talking in geographic terms, i.e. by virtue of them operating, for instance, in Khayelitsha, then they are a local structure. There is nothing wrong with this. But I think CPP means more than that. It means not only geographical vicinity but also the locality of knowledge used. Draw on local experiences to deal with policing issues. Now my sense is that if this is the interpretation, then we need to subject such locality of Peace Committees to scrutiny. CPP gets into a community, recruits people and form a structure. They train the recruits and give them a code of conduct. The background of this people does not really matter. By background I am talking about whether or not they are community leaders or have influence. Again using a bad example of Khayelitsha. The problem here is that such approach actually disregards local knowledge and systems. In that sense CPP is just another structure alongside the many others that deals with disputes in the community. I think CPP, in this sense, does not tap into local knowledge but creates a different set of practices that has to be internalised and practiced in the community. I understand the expediency of having control over Peace Committee members and their activities. They have to be accountable for the integrity of the programme. But not tapping into the existing system of non-state justice has had the result of creating hostility between Peace Committee members and community leaders. But then that is only in Khayelitsha.

The focus of Peace Committees in the poor areas

Is it not interesting that CPP focuses on the poor communities? What motivates CPP to focus on Khayelitsha and Zwelithemba, etc instead of Rondebosch where their offices are based? Perhaps this is a silly question. But it fascinates me nevertheless. On the face of it, it all makes sense. People in the poor areas are the ones in need of assistance because, as Wilfried Schärf and others would argue, they simply lack access to the structures of power and justice. I have no problem with that. My problem is the extent to which, if at all, this model shifts attention from the real issues of equality—be it economically or before the law. Let me illustrate this: let us for a moment assume that CPP operates in poor areas because of the need there. The question to me is: why is there no such need in the more affluent areas? Exactly the opposite of the rationale for focus on poor areas. Is the real focus then not to be on improving the lot of the poor to enable them to have access to the same structures that the affluent have instead of creating structures specific for the poor? Or have we given up on the structural set-up? This is in no way pointing a finger at Peace Committees, but rather raising a broader issue. By the way, to be fair to CPP, this is a question I pose even in respect of other structures such as the envisaged community dispute resolution structures and the chief's courts. They all have to deal with this problem. And perhaps—just so that I am not to be misunderstood—I am more comfortable with Peace Committees than I would be with state sponsored structures such as the community dispute resolution structures. When government takes the lead and creates a second track of justice—then my disquiet grows quite loud.

Related to that, the payment of participants

Here I am going to be very brief as I think this point resonates with the above two issues. If you pay community members to serve in Peace Committees—a novel idea in South Africa as far as I know—to what extent is such payment the reason for participation? It is even worse if payment is conditional on successful handling of a dispute because—and I am not for a second suggesting that this is happening is Peace Committees—this provides an incentive for two things: firstly, deal with as many cases as you can as quickly as you can and, secondly, be as successful as you can in solving the problems. Shall I put it differently: do whatever it takes. There is room for creative dispute resolution and innovation there. Finally on this point, it is quiet unfair for people with no history of community activity to suddenly be part of a dispute resolution structure and then be paid for it while there are those who have been doing it for decades and are still doing it not being paid. Enough said here save to allude to my interaction with one colleague whose name I will not mention for now but knows himself. He said to me Boyane how can you be so hung up with an amount of R100.00? Well that is a lot of money to the extent that it serves as an incentive for people to participate otherwise what is the point of including it? Anyway, the issue is not the amount but the principle.

Sustainability of the model beyond close knit CPP

I think, correct me if I am wrong John, it was the ambition of CPP to have the model funded by local government among others. I think the current successes of the model is that it is very well-managed. Should the roll-out happen, the question being begged is: Can the model be weaned from CPP without choking dead? There are many example of programmes succeeding while in NGO hands but dying as soon as the big G gets involved. Wilfried Schärf will tell you about pre-trial services ran by the now defunct BJA.

Finally, and this is a question, what are policy implications of CPPs?

 
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