Between Acknowledgement and Ignorance:
How white South Africans have dealt with the apartheid pastby Gunnar Theissen
Chapter 2
Survey research on dealing with the past in West Germany
Before considering the historical development of political culture in West Germany, it is necessary to outline differences and similarities with the South African situation.
The way people and governments deal with the past is highly dependent on their particular context. This is evident in the case of Germany in that the two post-war German states approached the NS past in very different ways. In East Germany denazification resulted in a broad exchange of personnel in the public sphere, including the educational and industrial sector. This process was partly used to put supporters of the socialist unity party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - SED) into strategic positions in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In West Germany, by contrast, many of the old guard continued to hold official positions, especially in the economic and judicial sector, fuelling a continuing series of controversies. The GDR frequently tried to expose the 'brown' past of West German politicians, high-ranking administration officers and judges and thus to demonstrate the fascist continuity in the capitalist Federal Republic. In the GDR itself, it was claimed, the establishment of an anti-fascist and socialist society ensured that the problem of the NS past had been dealt with and that fascist views and perceptions no longer existed. The new state refused to acknowledge any responsibilities arising from the heritage of the Third Reich, as the GDR government argued that the Reich had stopped existing after the establishment of the two new German states. The GDR government also argued that many members of the GDR leadership had been prosecuted as communists during the NS regime and that it was therefore unjust that the victims should pay compensation for something they had not been responsible for at all.
West Germany, on the other hand, claimed to be the only legitimate successor state of the German Reich, based on its borders of 1937. The government therefore had to accept responsibility for the compensation of victims of its predecessor state. This helped to ensure that the past continued to be an issue for political debate and thus also for public opinion research.
2.1. Limits of the Comparison: South Africa - West Germany
It should be acknowledged at the outset that the NS and apartheid regimes were different. The NS state was a totalitarian dictatorship, controlling nearly every sector of German society, including the media and press. The white South African minority regime was an authoritarian regime which excluded the black majority, but within which a limited degree of freedom for independent media and opposition forces existed.
Second, the way the transition from totalitarian or authoritarian rule to democracy took place was different. Germany was liberated from the NS regime by the Allied forces, and the former German territory was taken over by a military administration. The apartheid regime in South Africa was negotiated out of power during the multi-party negotiations dominated by the National Party and the ANC. Past atrocities became a point of negotiation, and amnesty was agreed upon as a means to bring about a peaceful settlement. In Germany the victors, rather than German society, controlled the prosecution of war criminals at Nuremberg. The responsibility for prosecutions changed only four years later, after the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949.1
Third, most of the victims of the German NS regime had been murdered and those who survived lived mainly outside the borders of the Federal Republic. In South Africa the internal pressure to promote justice and reconciliation is therefore much stronger than it was in West Germany. In Germany, reconciliation was more focused on its relationship with foreign countries, rather than on internal relationships.
Finally, it is not possible to equate the extent of the crimes committed by the NS regime with the gross human rights violations that took place in South Africa. It would be inappropriate to compare the systematic genocide of more than six million Jews by the NS regime with apartheid.
There are nonetheless some similarities between the white population in South Africa and West German society after World War II. Germans and white South Africans had largely supported regimes which shared a deeply racist ideology and few resisted. Large majorities actively ignored the brutal oppression of opponents and alleged enemies. Many even supported obvious criminal actions on the part of government. Though the extent of the criminal activity in the two regimes was very different, both societies confronted human rights violations when their respective democracies came into being.
The West German experience is a relatively well-documented example of how attitudes towards the victims, resistance movement, and the past regimes changed during this ongoing process after 1945. It also shows that the establishment of a democratic political culture is a lengthy process. Institutions such as courts, which highlight past atrocities, have an important but limited impact on the establishment of a new moral order. The case of West Germany also shows that working through the past does not guarantee that racist attacks or Neo-Nazism will disappear. It has only changed the perception and awareness of the majority of the population and established a democratic political culture which is at least less tolerant of such activities.
2.2 Sources of Public Opinion Research in West Germany
Information about the values, beliefs and attitudes of the German population in the years directly after the Second World War is mainly provided by the American Office of Military Government (OMGUS) in Germany. Very early in their occupation the American officials in Germany had understood the usefulness of public opinion surveys. Social psychologists and sociologists in the Psychological Warfare Division of the U.S. Army entered towns to survey the population's attitudes towards Nazism and their expectations about the pending military occupation. A primary concern of the Americans was to get feedback about their re-education programme which was aimed at establishing a democratic political culture in Germany. The Allies wished to expose the atrocities of Nazi Germany to the world and the German people and thus prevent such violations from ever occurring again. They believed that until Germans themselves acknowledged the essential evil of National Socialism, they would be tempted to recreate it. In order to convince the German population of the evils of National Socialism the Americans initiated extensive information campaigns, rewrote textbooks and started a year-long trial of the major war criminals at Nuremberg.
After the official end of military occupation, the U.S. High Commission for Germany (HICOG) continued to conduct polls up to May 1955. Several newly-founded West German survey institutions also started conducting public opinion research. The early American research in Germany has been published by Anna and Richard Merritt (1970; 1980). From 1957 onwards the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach has continuously published its Jahrbuch für öffentliche Meinung, the last one covering the period up to 1992.
The SED and its leadership showed no interest in public opinion research about the attitudes of east Germans towards the NS period and denazification. Public opinion research was only conducted secretly to inform the party leadership about the current mood of its "supporters". For this reason this discussion is limited to the West German experience.
2.3 Nuremberg in the Public View
During the early days of military occupation few people had sympathy for Hitler and his closest associates. Only one in eight (12%) claimed recalling that they trusted him as a leader up to the end of the war. Large majorities thought that the Nazi leaders prosecuted in Nuremberg were guilty of the charges levelled against them (Merritt & Merritt 1980: 7). In an opinion poll conducted at the beginning of the Nuremberg trial in autumn 1945, 93% responded that they were aware of the trial. Seventy eight percent of residents in the US zone of Germany said in October 1946 that they regarded the Nuremberg trials as fair. Only about 4% felt that the trials were unfair (Merritt & Merritt 1970: 93). The percentage of those who said they had learnt something about the concentration camps and about the mass murder of the Jews increased from 65% to 87% during the trials. In November 1945, when the Nuremberg trials began, 53% agreed with the statement "National Socialism was in principle a good idea which was badly carried out". In December 1946, as the nature of the crimes became known, agreement with this statement dropped to an average 40%. About 59% acknowledged that Germany had tortured and murdered millions of people in Europe (Merritt & Merritt 1970: 149). Interestingly, the acceptance of the Nuremberg trials started to change several years later as revisionist perceptions began to be fostered in response to the unpopular denazification campaign. The sentiment that the trials had been unfair rose from 4% in October 1946 to 30% four years later. The percentage of those who felt that the verdicts had been too severe increased from 9% to 40%, as did the feeling that justice was aborted by the failure to prosecute Allied officers. By mid-1952 over half (59%) of the West German population disapproved of the way in which the western powers were handling the problem of war criminals. Only 10% were content with their approach (Merritt & Merritt 1980:11).
2.4 Denazification
Unlike the Nuremberg war criminal trials, which focused on a handful of very prominent Nazis, the denazification proceedings directly affected the whole population. The aim of this programme was to remove all Germans who had been "active supporters of Nazism or militarism" from public office and positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises. In the American Zone of Occupation alone, American authorities removed 292 089 persons from such positions and excluded an additional 81 673 (Merritt & Merritt 1970: 36).
Even though 66% of all residents of the American Zone thought it important to hold to account "such people as furthered National Socialism in any way", most of the respondents were dissatisfied with the way the programme was carried out. Support declined from about roughly half in winter 1945-46 to about one-third in October 1946 and about one-sixth in January 1949. The main argument against the denazification campaign was that it dealt with minor members of the party, who were too harshly treated compared to party leaders. Judgements were also considered to be too arbitrary. The programme turned out to be quite unpopular, despite Germans being part of the boards which had to make the decisions.
Figure 2.1: Attitude towards denazification
Source: Institute für Demoskopie (1956: 142) 2.5 The Position of Former NS Office Bearers
By the early 1950s the entire denazification programme had fallen into disrepute. Few West Germans believed that the continuing employment of former Nazis in positions of power was a threat to the new democratic state. Two out of three respondents thought that former members of the Nazi party should have the same opportunities for advancement in business and politics as other Germans. A high percentage (42%) even felt that German generals who had been convicted by the Allies for war crimes had skills and experience entitling them to hold high positions in a new German army. Over one third (36%) were willing to give equal opportunities to those who had held high positions in the Third Reich (Merritt & Merrit 1980: 11).
The political climate during the early Fifties might explain why one of the first laws adopted in parliament was an amnesty law granting amnesty for many minor offences during the Third Reich and the transition period after 1945. The government led by Konrad Adenauer did its best to undo the Allied denazification campaign and successfully lobbied with the support of the german churches for a release of several war criminals held in prisons of the American and British military administration. Most civil servants excluded from holding a public office were reinstated during that time and a new law regulating the civil service entitled all former German servants to full pensions and other benefits. NS criminals profited as well from these regulations. This resulted in the unacceptable situation that many former NS criminals have been comparatively better of in the second German democracy than their victims (Frei 1996).
Thirty five years later a public opinion poll conducted in September 1988 showed a more ambivalent view (see Table 2.1); 37% thought that individuals who had held high office during the Third Reich had been so incriminated that they should not have been allowed to make a career in the Federal Republic. Forty two percent had no objection, believing that the people concerned had helped to reconstruct the country, and had often proven to be good democrats. As Table 2.1 indicates, this view was mainly held by the older generation, who were adults during the NS period.
Tab. 2-1: Dealing with the past - West Germany (1988)
In the post-war period many people regained important positions, who held high offices during the Third Reich. Here two persons are talking about that. Whom would you rather support? under 30 older than 60 total population "It is a scandal that those people received important offices after 1945. Because of their past these people are so incriminated that they should not have been allowed to make a career again." 44% 31% 37% "You can't say that so generally. It totally depends on how the individual acted during the Third Reich. And many of these people have helped in the reconstruction and have proven to be good democrats." 31% 51% 42% After 1945 there have been various claims against German politicians that they had been Nazis during the Third Reich. In general: If it appeared during the post-war period that a politician had been previously somehow active in the Third Reich, should he than have resigned or would it have been inappropriate to demand that? under 30 older than 60 total population The person should have resigned 66% 42% 53% It would have been inappropriate to demand that 20% 29% 21% undecided 14% 29% 21% Source: Institute für Demoskopie (1993: 379) 2.6 Responsibility for the Outbreak of the Second World War
Even though, as time passed, an increasing percentage of the German population came to view their country as mainly responsible for the war (26% in 1947, 37% in 1949) the majority still believed that the responsibility lay elsewhere (Merritt & Merritt 1980: 54). Few West Germans accepted collective responsibility for the outbreak of World War II. Several surveys conducted during the occupation years produced steadily solid majorities, averaging more than 70%, who denied that "the entire German people are responsible for the war because they let a government come to power which plunged the whole world into war." Less than 20% accepted this statement.
Consensus about Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of the war emerged very slowly, with 32% (May 1951) and 47% (April 1956) naming Germany as responsible, and far smaller numbers blaming other countries (24% and 12% respectively) or both sides (18% and 11% respectively). More than twenty years had to pass before there was a clear majority of 62% who acknowledged that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War.
Figure 2.2 Who was guilty for the outbreak of the war in 1939?
Source: Institute für Demoskopie (1993: 408) 2.7 Change of Democratic Attitudes
The degree of acceptance of democratic norms and values in Germany increased over time, as did an interest in politics. In the 1950s and early 1960s only one out of three respondents said that they were interested in politics and over 30% claimed not to be interested at all (Institut für Demoskopie 1993: 617). This apathy changed after 1968 when a new generation challenged the undemocratic values that had partly dominated the early years of the Federal Republic. The student movement of 1968 contributed to this. In the 1980s only about 10% claimed to be not interested in politics at all. When pollsters asked the German population in 1991 if they supported police officers using their batons against demonstrators 57% disagreed (old Federal States). Only 19 of the West Germans interviewed supported the use of batons against protesters compared to 10% in the GDR. Sixty six percent said they would disagree if the government banned a public demonstration. Over 70% would disagree if the government deployed the federal police or military in order to stop a strike (Institut für Demoskopie 1993: 607). In 1991 only 5% disapproved of the statement "every citizen has the right to hold a public demonstration for his beliefs" and 79% thought that "every person has the right to voice his opinions even if the majority is against him". Eighty one percent agreed that "every democratic party should be given the chance to become a ruling party" (Institut für Demoskopie 1993: 626-627). A point of particular interest is support for the death penalty in West Germany. The fact that the death penalty was largely misused during the NS regime to murder political opponents and punish petty crimes - some people were even executed for the theft of goods from social welfare collections - contributed to the decision to outlaw the death penalty in the West German basic law of 1949 (the constitution). However, these experiences did not have much impact on public opinion after 1945. It took thirty years to reverse the support for the death penalty (see Figure 2.3). Nevertheless, this development demonstrates a growing concern for human rights in German society after 1960.
Figure 2.3: Support for the death penalty - West Germany 1950-1992
Source: Institut für Demoskokie (1993: 607) The growing support for human rights is partly linked to the changing perception of the NS past in West German society. People reject the NS system because they are aware of its innate inhumanity. The memory and acknowledgement of past atrocities, injustice and racial discrimination promoted a greater awareness of racial discrimination and human rights. People support non-racial and democratic values because they still have the atrocities of the past in mind. The strength of the pacifist movement in West Germany during the 1980s, can only be explained by the impact Germany's role in the two world wars had on German political culture. 'Never again!' was the slogan of many demonstrators who went into the streets, protesting against the outbreak of the Second Gulf War. This slogan returned in 1992 when hundreds of thousands demonstrated against racist attacks against foreigners. Even the participation of the German army in peace missions is very controversial in Germany as many Germans are very sceptical about the benefits of military operations. More than one-third of all young men now choose to be conscientious objectors and endure a protracted period of civil service rather than serve in the German army.
2.8 Perceptions of the NS Regime
While the economic and political success of the Federal Republic boosted the positive attitude towards the new pluralistic and democratic order, support for the NS dictatorship and the NS ideology declined relatively slowly. When asked in 1951 when Germans had been best off, 42% said during the first years of the NS regime and some 45% claimed it was during the authoritarian German Kaiserreich before the first World War. Only 7% thought it was during the period of the Weimar Republic, the first crisis-ridden German democracy (see Figure 2.4). However, with the German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) of the 1950s the positive perception of the current political order increased relatively quickly. Only a small group hold the view today that Germany was better off during the NS dictatorship.
Figure 2.4: When have Germans been the best of this century?
Source: Bergmann & Erb (1991: 251); Intitut für Demoskopie (1993: 386-387) The positive perception of the new order was rather a product of the unexpectedly fast-growing wealth in West-Germany after 1945 than a break with old authoritarian and undemocratic attitudes. In 1968 still 55% said that "National Socialism was good idea badly carried out", despite its racist, antidemocratic and aggressive character and ideology. The perception that Nazi ideas were basically evil only started to prevail in 1977, when a broad majority of 72% opposed the myth that National Socialism was a good idea. Nevertheless, 24% still hold the opinion that it was a good idea (see Table 2-2).
Table. 2-2: Was National Socialism a good idea badly carried out?
1945/46 1947/48 1948 1968 1977 1994* yes 47% 55% 57% 55% 26% 24% no 41% 30% 28% n.a. 72% 64% undecided n.a. n.a. 15% n.a. 2% n.a. Source: Bergmann & Erb (1991: 252); *FORSA-Survey, in: Die Woche, 01.06.1994 The belief that Hitler was one of the greatest German statesmen if one disregarded the war, was widespread in the first thirty years of the Federal Republic (see Figure 2.5). In 1990 one out of four West Germans still thought that Hitler would have been a great politician were it not for the war. And the percentage of people who believed that the NS-regime was an unjust and criminal state only started to increase slowly (see Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.5: If you disregard the war, would you say that Hitler would have been one of the greatest German statesmen?
Figure 2.6: Would you say that the nazi-state was an unjust state, a criminal regime, or won't you say that?
Source: Institut für Demonskopie (1993: 381, 408, 375). 2.9 Views About Resistance Against the NS Regime
The legitimacy of resistance against the Nazi regime was not accepted in German political culture for some time. In December 1951 only 38% of West Germans approved of the attempt on Hitler's life on the 20th of July 1944. The same percentage was undecided, and about 24% opposed it (Merritt & Merritt 1980: 147). Participation in a resistance movement against the Nazi regime was still viewed more negatively than positively during the 1960s (Institut für Demoskopie 1965: 235). Only in the following two decades did this perception change dramatically (Köcher 1993: 401). The relatively small number of Germans who had been involved in various resistance groups now became the idols of the Federal Republic, as this was the only group of German people during the Third Reich which had not compromised or collaborated with the dictatorship and with whom people could positively identify. It is not surprising therefore, that more and more people came to believe that it had been possible to do something against the unjust NS regime (Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7: Resistance to the Third Reich
Sometimes one hears that the German population in the Third Reich participated in everything and offered too little resistance against Hitler. What is your view? Were there or were there not opportunities for resistance during the Third Reich?
Source Institute für Demoskopie (1993: 381) 2.10 Perceptions with regard to Victims and Attitudes towards Compensation
Many West Germans still hold to a problematic hierarchy in their perception of victims. At the top are those who died as soldiers in the Second World War, even though the German army had been responsible for many war crimes, especially against the Russian population. At nearly the same level are Germans who were expelled from eastern Europe after 1945. German soldiers were rather seen as victims than as perpetrators by the German public. In 1953 55% believed that one should not make any reproaches to German soldiers for their behavior during World War II (Institut für Demoskopie 1956). Furthermore up to recently most Germans believed that only members of the notorious "Schutzstaffel" (SS) had been involved in the war crimes, ignoring the active partisanship of ordinary civil servants, police battalions and the army in the genocide.
One rung below are the German civil victims of the war and members of the resistance groups. This excludes the Communist resistance fighters, who are still seen as anti-democratic by a large section of West German society. This perception is also expressed in West German compensation laws, which denied money to the families of these victims because they allegedly did not fight for a democratic order.
The six million German and European Jews murdered by the NS regime often comes only as the third group of victims in terms of this hierarchy. Right up until the 1980s various other victims like the Sinti, Roma and homosexuals were practically excluded from public consciousness as also having been victims of the NS regime, despite being murdered alongside Jews in concentration camps. Deserters are probably the least accepted group of victims. They were executed in large numbers by German military courts and there has been strong resistance against the erection of a memorial in their honour. The liberal-Christian coalition is still blocking any official recognition of them in parliament.
As early as the 1950s demographic research reflected this hierarchy in public perception. While a full 96% of West Germans felt that the West German government should support war widows and orphans, only 73% thought it should give aid to the relatives of the conspirators who had been executed. The percentage of those who felt that the government should provide aid to Jews who had suffered during the Third Reich was even lower. Only 68% supported some form of assistance for them. Comments by those opposed to giving aid to Jews revealed that most of them thought that they were already getting enough help from various sources or that they could "help each other." In order to limit their own accountability, 21% used the anti-Semitic counter-claim that the Jews had been responsible for their own persecution. Those who shared this view claimed that their alleged dishonest business practices, appetite for power and agitation against the Third Reich had been the main reasons for the Jews' prosecution. A high percentage (27%) felt that it would be best for the remaining Jews to emigrate (Merritt & Merritt 1980: 9). In 1949 only 39% held the opinion that Jews had the right to buy back their own businesses under the same conditions as when they had to hand them over to the NS-regime (Bergmann & Erb 1991: 257). Furthermore, only a minority (25%) of the German population felt some kind of guilt or collective responsibility for all that happened during Nazi rule (see Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.8: Responsibility for events during the Third Reich and the Second World War
Mr. Müller says: "Every German is to a certain degree guilty for that, what was caused by Germany during the Third Reich." Mr. Schmidt says: "Not every German must feel guilty. Nevertheless he should feel responsible and try to 'make things good again'." Mr. Sculze says: "The Germans have no reason to feel guilty nor to feel responsible for compensations. Only those who have really been actively involved are guilty and should also feel responsible for what they have done." With whom do you agree?
N = 1201 Source: HICOG-Report No. 113 (Seies 2) 5. 12. 1951 It is not surprising that in this political climate, two out of three West Germans rejected an agreement in August 1952 between the Federal Republic and Israel for the payment of US-$715 million as restitution for what had happened to the Jews during the Third Reich. In December 1952, 54% of all Germans claimed that they did not feel guilty for the persecution of the Jews, claiming they were under no obligation to undo the injustices Jews had had to suffer (Merritt & Merritt 1980: 9; Report No. 167).
After 1952 the issue disappeared from public opinion surveys, although disagreements about reparations appeared to continue. In 1966, 46% of all respondents supported the statement "We should stop restitution now; the Jews have already received too much" (Bergmann & Erb 1991: 258).
2.11 Forgetting the past
Political discussion about compensation for the victims of the holocaust and the prosecution of Nazi criminals was always accompanied by a call to forget the past and by defensive counter-claims. With the founding of the Federal Republic, economic reconstruction and the emergence of the Cold War, the issues of re-education and German war criminals vanished from public debate. Only occasionally was there any challenge to the prevailing political and social consensus to let NS atrocities rest. This situation continued up to 1958, when a new series of NS trials began in Germany and abroad (e.g. Ulmer Einsatzgruppen-trial, Eichman-trial, Auschwitz-trial; see Werle & Wandres 1995).
Figure 2.9: Prosecution of NS criminals, West Germany
Source: Bergman & Erb (1991: 236). A new judicial institution was founded in Ludwigsburg and staffed with young lawyers and attorneys, whose only responsibility was to inquire and prosecute NS crimes (Steinbach 1981). The foundation of the "Zentralstelle für Nationalsozialistische Gewaltverbrechen" in Ludwigsburg in 1958 was a very necessary step as the judicial system itself had not been cleansed of former NS supporters. Many judges and state prosecutors had rather tried to cover up former crimes than to implement prosecutions. Despite these positive developments, the former NS-judicial system remained completely unchalleged. No German judge was ever sentenced by a German court after 1945 for his participation in racial and political discrimination or for handing down arbitrary death sentences during the NS regime.
NS-trails had nevertheless at least a short term effect on public opinion. A opinion poll conducted during the Auschwitz trial in 1964 showed that most people prefered the prosecutions. During the trail of Klaus Barbie in France public opinion was again strongly for the continuation of prosecutions (see Figure 2.9).
However, generally the desire to stop worrying about the past increased as the Third Reich became relegated to history. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, debates about the limitation periods for NS crimes in the West German parliament drew fresh attention to the issue. Demographic research showed that large majorities did not support parliament's decision repeatedly to extend the periods for which NS criminals could be tried in court (see Figure 2.9). The greater support for the continuation of NS trials after the late 1970s was a feature of differing opinions among different generations of Germans. In 1979 nearly half of all younger people (16-29 years of age) were in favour of continuing prosecutions, while less than a third of adults over 45 supported the idea. It is possible that the television series "Holocaust", which was broadcast on German television in 1979, contributed to reversing the trend.
Figure 2.10 Today, forty yeas after the end of the war, we should not talk so much about the prosecution of Jews and rather forget about these things. (West Germany - 1989)
Source: Bergman & Erb (1991: 241). The desire to forget about the past is greater among the older generation, who personally experienced the NS dictatorship. A number of reasons can be given for this. First, feelings of guilt may cause a desire to forget. One way of avoiding being seriously morally challenged about their role in the past, as they have been, is to try and deny it. In this way personal integrity and self-esteem appear to remain intact. Second, these older people's personal experiences are often dissonant with the public view of that period. Many of them remember the period before the Second World War as a carefree and prosperous time. Very few of them had been directly exposed to repressive acts of the NS regime. They feel that the continued interest in the persecution of Jews and other crimes of the NS past is in effect robbing them of the "youth" that they want to remember positively. This dissonant information can only be absorbed by actively ignoring the "dark" side of Germany's history. Third, the desire among older Germans to forget the past reflects well-documented evidence of a greater degree of anti-Semitic attitudes, right-wing authoritarianism and support for right-wing parties that probably has its roots in their own political socialisation during the NS dictatorship. This may also have been entrenched due to the increasing conservatism that is linked with the life cycle and ageing (Glenn 1974).
The young generation, in comparison, shows a striking lower desire to forget about the holocaust. It may be expected that being born several years after the Second World War may prompt young people to want to forget the past. Interestingly, however, this is not the case. A number of factors explain this. First, they have fewer problems with the NS past, as they are able to personally distance themselves from the NS dictatorship because most of them were born after 1945. Second, their political socialisation took place mainly in the 1970s or 80s, when the schools' curricula had changed radically to include the history of racial discrimination and persecution, as well as the holocaust. Third, education had developed dramatically as a result of the new educational policy implemented by the social-liberal government in the 1970s. As more young people attended A-level schools, technicons and universities, they were exposed to more information about the holocaust (see Figure 2.10).
The generation factor also comes into play when Germans are asked whether they think that the reports over the prosecution of Jews are exaggerated or not (see Figure 2.11). Probably only a minority (less than 10%) of the population under 45 is still remotely receptive to this view - a number which is of course still high.
Figure 2.11: Do you still think that most of the reports about the prosecution of Jews are true, or do you think that many of them are exaggerated?
Source: Bergman & Erb (1991: 240). The desire to forget about the past is closely linked with contemporary prejudices. The discrepancy between the desire to forget and not to be reminded anymore, and the confrontation with German atrocities and NS history provides a new motive for prejudice. Bergmann & Erb (1991) have showed that the degree of support for anti-Semitic survey items correlates closely with views of the past and how it should be dealt with. People who endorsed more survey items against compensation and rejected the notion of any responsibility, scored significantly higher on a social-distance scale regarding Jews. A certain section of the German population perceive Jews as a threat to their own freedom, claiming that they will always threaten Germans with their "Auschwitz-club" (Auschwitzkeule). This new form of anti-Semitism argues that the past is being used by Jews in a 'new conspiracy' against 'decent' Germans in order to insult them morally and damage Germany's international image. 'The Jews' are seen as preventing the Germans from feeling proud of their own history and workmanship, and denying them their due respect.
2.12 Attitude change through media broadcasts
What role can the media play in changing attitudes towards the past and the perception of collective responsibility? Research conducted during the broadcasting of the TV series "Holocaust" in 1979 not only showed that the broad resistance against restitution had decreased during the 1970s, but also gave an idea of the limitations of and potential for attitude change through media broadcasts.
Figure 2.12 demonstrates that confrontation on an emotional level with the holocaust and the devastating stories of individuals through a TV series can lead to greater acceptance of moral responsibility. Any attitude change coming from this learning experience is nevertheless limited. This is borne out by the high percentage of people who were undecided or who denied any moral responsibility. Survey research conducted by Bergmann & Erb eight years later, in 1987, showed further increased rejection of compensations for Jews. This suggests that the effects of broadcasts are possibly short term, especially when there is still a dominant social environment opposed to the idea of moral responsibility for past atrocities. Yet the research around the "Holocaust" broadcast does demonstrate that television can have a major impact and could be one of the most powerful tools in encouraging attitude change. Real change is also more likely if it is combined with other activities to establish a broader social climate for these "new" views.
Figure 2.12: Is Germany morally obliged to pay compensation?
Source: Ernst (1979: 237). 2.13 The German Experience - What can be Learnt?
Even under quite favourable conditions, such as those obtaining in West Germany since the Second World War, the adjustment of the political culture to democratic values and a critical understanding of an authoritarian past takes time. The American dream of re-educating Germany was only partly successful. The Nuremberg trial changed the perception of the NS past, but attitudes which glorified the NS past continued to dominate during the first decade of the Federal Republic. This "cultural lag" lasted at least twenty years before, West Germans adjusted to the new democratic order. The German experience demonstrates that major changes in political culture often only really take effect with the emergence of new political generations. These younger generations have fewer emotional or psychological ties with the past and feel more strongly committed to the values of the new order. Media broadcasts, political trials or institutions like the Nuremberg Trails and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have an important role to play, but they can fail to catalyse real change if their work is not followed up and reinforced through broader changes in other fields such as new curricula in schools.
Political responsibility for past atrocities might not be denied only because people reject compensation. The desire to lay the past to rest is often also linked to the glorification of the past authoritarian order and to deep racial prejudice. The need to forget about the past in Germany is not only an expression of undemocratic attitudes and anti-Semitic beliefs, but can also strongly reinforce them. In order to protect the self from feelings of guilt the past is white-washed, political responsibility denied and new forms of racial prejudice and anti-Semitic counter-claims emerge. Feelings of guilt are compensated for by blaming the victims for their fate. Jews are hated because they remind those who want to forget about the past about the holocaust. Post-war anti-Semitism in West-Germany is very strongly motivated by this type of "secondary anti-Semitism". In South Africa one might encounter similar forms of racial prejudice in the future.
The West German economic miracle strongly boosted the acceptance of the new political order and its values. The end of apartheid has contributed to an end of the economic crisis of the 1980s, but it is unlikely that South Africa will experience economic growth and overall prosperity on the same scale. Instead, many white people might perceive that they are worse off, because the privileges they enjoyed in the past will have been greatly diluted and the scrapping of racist job reservation policies has made the job market more competitive for some white South Africans. Given all of this there is therefore reason to be sceptical about the extent to which the political culture of South Africa's white population will move towards democratic and non-racial values in the foreseeable future.
Notes:
1 From this time onwards criminal prosecutions were handled by the German judicial system, which was itself penetrated by former NS judges.
