Between Acknowledgement and Ignorance:
How white South Africans have dealt with the apartheid pastby Gunnar Theissen
Chapter 3
White post-apartheid myths: "We have always been against apartheid"
This chapter provides historical information about the degree of support by the white electorate for apartheid, thus providing further evidence by which to judge the extent of collective responsibility for the previous regime and its human rights violations. The chapter also describes white attitude change during the last 10 years, and considers its implications for the establishment of a culture of human rights.
3.1 Reasons for the Denial of Support for Apartheid
The fact that nobody today wants to admit to having supported apartheid is in some ways a positive sign, demonstrating that the majority of white South Africans no longer wish to identify with apartheid. However, while the rejection of apartheid could be an indicator of a growing disapproval of the previous political system among white South Africans, it also contains a dangerous component, namely a denial of responsibility for the past, because it is no longer socially acceptable to be seen to have supported the system. "I have never supported apartheid" is a statement which reflects the understandable desire to deny individual and collective responsibility for apartheid, to forget about the past, and to be in touch with the 'new' South Africa. Admitting responsibility could result in feelings of guilt and a need to question the economic and cultural privileges white South Africans still enjoy. It could also result in social contempt by the majority and by those now positions of power. The fact that denying responsibility is easier than admitting it creates the danger that prejudices are maintained, undemocratic and unjust structures from the past are implicitly justified and there is no empathy for fellow citizens who suffered.
Another form of response to apartheid is to alleviate a sense of responsibility about the past by comparing one's apparent lack of involvement in abuse or repression to those who actively abused - in other words to see it as a question of degree. One way of understanding this is through what Miller and Ross (1975) refer to as the fundamental attribution error. They argue that if people are successful in any way, they attribute the success to their own efforts and personality, whereas if people fail or do something wrong, they are more likely to blame external factors, minimising their own responsibility for the failure. Although this may save one temporarily from feelings of personal failure, the political and social dimensions are far more complex. Despite socialisation, learned prejudices and very effective indoctrination, white South Africans still had the freedom to make decisions about their political beliefs and actions.
A crucial question arises at this point: How common is the perception that white South Africans were not responsible for apartheid? To answer this, we present some of the findings of the CSVR survey among white South Africans, which is described in more detail in the next chapter. One of the survey statements covered the myth that "the majority of white South Africans have always been in opposition to apartheid". The statement was deliberately formulated to ask about white South Africans in general, as people can be expected to be more willing to admit that "others", rather than they themselves, supported apartheid. In addition, respondents would probably have felt threatened had they been asked about their personal support for apartheid. The results are presented in Figure 3.1.
About 30% of all respondents believed that "the majority of white South Africans have always been in opposition to apartheid." Another 15% were unsure or did not know if the assertion was correct. Slightly more than 50% of all respondents did not accept it, seeing it as a misrepresentation of the past. Thus barely half of white South Africans are willing to concede that most whites used to support apartheid. In the following sections we review historical data with regard to actual levels of support for apartheid and its institutions.
Figure 3.1 White South Africans' perceptions about support for apartheid
3.2 Support for Apartheid in General Elections
An examination of the election results during the apartheid era debunks the myth that a significant number of white South Africans have always been in opposition to apartheid. There is an argument to be made that whites always had the opportunity to get rid of the undemocratic apartheid regime by voting for a party opposing the National Party (NP). However, it was only in the 1992 referendum that a white majority supported a non-racial negotiation process.
In 1948 the NP/Afrikaner Party coalition managed to obtain a narrow majority in parliament with 79 seats. This was despite the fact that they accounted for only 41,2% of all votes cast, while the opposing United Party and Labour Party together, received 50,9% of all votes. However, the implementation of apartheid and the intensification of racial segregation and discrimination did not result in a withdrawal of support for the National Party. In fact, more and more white South Africans supported the NP in general elections during the 1950s. With 55,5% of all votes cast, the NP outperformed the United Party (UP) for the first time in the general election of 1958. In 1966 the NP gained as many as 126 seats out of 166 in parliament, with 59,2% of all votes cast for the NP (Heard 1974).
The situation is complicated by the fact that voting for the United Party (UP), the former ruling party and biggest opposition party during the 1950s and 1960s, was not necessarily a sign of disagreement with apartheid policies. The UP had been responsible for a range of discriminatory legislation before 1948, which was then used by the NP as the foundation on which to entrench its own apartheid philosophies and legislation. The UP did not fundamentally oppose the apartheid policy of the NP after 1948, even if it did occasionally disagree with certain measures. It was only the small Liberal Party that rejected the racial policies of the NP government unequivocally. In fact, open resistance to apartheid by white South Africans was always confined to very small, left-wing groups and parties.
The Soweto uprising in 1976, which demonstrated the large-scale dissatisfaction with the political system by the deprived and oppressed black majority, putting apartheid again at the top of national and international political agendas, did not lead to political dissatisfaction among NP supporters. In fact, one year after 1976, white support for the National Party was at its peak: 67% of all votes went to the NP. Support for pro-apartheid parties did not decline afterwards; instead ultra-right-wing parties, such as the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) and Conservative Party (CP), grew in stature (see Figure 3.2).
Even in the 1980s the NP could continually rely on a comfortable majority of all white votes. There was no broad rejection of the party responsible for the implementation and the so-called reform of apartheid, which took the form of an ostensible expansion of democracy through a highly undemocratic tri-cameral system for whites, coloureds and indians, while outright political discrimination against black South Africans continued. As the NP increasingly targeted the English-speaking white community with its programme of 'reform', Afrikaans-speaking white voters turned increasingly to right-wing parties (Van Rooyen 1994: 117-138). The HNP, a right-wing offshoot of the NP, gained 14% of all votes in 1981. The South African electoral system, however, prevented the HNP from gaining any seats in parliament, despite its success at the polls. Six years later, the CP, under the leadership of former NP minister Andries Treurnicht, accounted for 27% of all votes becoming the second biggest opposition party in parliament. In 1989, it repeated its success with 31% of the votes, mobilising the same percentage of white voters in the 1992 referendum with its "No" campaign against a negotiated settlement with the ANC. Those parties opposing apartheid and its so-called 'reform', the liberal Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and its successor, the Democratic Party (DP), enjoyed a maximum support of only 20% of the white South African electorate during the 1980s.
Figure 3.2: Voting patterns of white South Africans in 1981, 1987, 1989 and 1992
Source: Van Rooyen (1994: 119, 128, 137, 152). It could be argued that not every white South African who voted for the NP did so only because of its apartheid policies. Nor does support for the PFP or DP necessarily prove that their voters were solely motivated by the parties' opposition to apartheid. The survey research which immediately follows nevertheless confirms that in 1984 there was overwhelming support for apartheid by people with NP-voting inclinations compared to those orientated towards the more liberal parties in 1984.
3.3 Support for Apartheid Legislation in Public Opinion Surveys
Extensive survey research was conducted about the behaviour of the white electorate during the apartheid period. The government-funded Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), for example, conducted many public-opinion surveys which monitored the official 'reform' programme, which implicitly tried to justify the tri-cameral system (Rhoodie, de Kock & Couper 1985). In February and March 1984 the HSRC asked a national probability sample of 1024 white urban South Africans over the age of 18 years about their perception of national problems and their support or rejection of specific apartheid measures. The purpose of this survey could be seen as an attempt to find justification for the tri-cameral system, and to ascertain which petty apartheid measures could be scrapped without alienating too many NP supporters (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Attitudes of urban white South Africans towards seven fundamental apartheid structures (1984)
N = 1024 Source: Rhoodie, De Kock & Couper (1985: 314) The results show that every basic apartheid structure was supported by at least 60% of urban white South Africans in 1984, with an average of 20% of all urban white South Africans opposing those regulations which formed the basis of apartheid. This reflects roughly the percentage of support for political parties to the left of the NP during the 1980s, and as can be expected, support for various apartheid measures varied significantly in terms of the party orientation of the respondents. Only eleven percent of all urban white South Africans supporting the PFP were in favour of all seven apartheid measures, while 43,5 per cent of those of NP party orientation and 59,8% of CP orientation totally supported all seven apartheid measures (Rhoodie, de Kock & Couper 1985: 311). As the survey excluded white South Africans living in rural areas, which are traditionally more conservative and right-wing oriented, the support for apartheid was probably even higher than suggested by the results of the HSRC survey.
Figure 3.4: Attitudes towards seven fundamental apartheid structures among urban Afrikaans-speaking whites (1984)
Figure 3.5: Attitudes towards seven fundamental apartheid structures among urban English-speaking whites (1984)
It is commonly believed that English-speaking white South Africans have always been opposed to apartheid. This is also a myth. The following graphs (Figures 3.4 and 3.5) illustrate two factors: While it is true that support for apartheid and its fundamental structures was significantly stronger among Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans, it is untrue that the majority of English-speaking white South Africans opposed apartheid and its discriminatory laws. Only a minority of English-speaking white South Africans showed a willingness to give up their privileges which were based on the legalised system of injustice.
3.3 Attitudes of White South Africans Towards Repressive Acts
Public opinion research conducted by the HSRC and Market & Opinion Ltd. (M&O) for the daily newspaper Rapport between 1977 and 1989 (see Hofmeyer, 1990) confirms that there was also a high degree of support for repressive acts by the former government against its opponents. One example concerns the government's banning of a range of newspapers and anti-apartheid organisations in October 1977, including nearly all black-consciousness organisations and the Christian Institute of Rev. Beyers Naude. Shortly after, when white South Africans were asked if they approved or disapproved of these repressive measures, only 20% disapproved (Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6: In October the Government banned a number of newspapers and organisations and detained a number of people. Do you approve or disapprove? - White South Africans (November 1977)
N = 2200 M & O Surveys, Hofmeyr (1990: 38) Cross-border raids by the South African Defence Force (SADF) into neighbouring states against alleged ANC-bases also received overwhelming public support from white South Africans (Figure 3.7). The May 1983 raid, one of more than a dozen direct military operations in Mozambique contravening international law, was an act of revenge in response to the deadly ANC-bomb blast in front of the South African Air Force Headquarters, Military Intelligence and Naval Offices in downtown Pretoria. On 29 May 1983 a dozen South African jets attacked the Matola and Liberdade suburbs of Maputo. The SADF claimed it had destroyed ANC bases and killed what it called 41 'ANC terrorists'. In fact, it killed three workers at a jam factory as they arrived for work, a soldier guarding a bridge, a child playing and an ANC man washing a car. At least 40 other people were injured, mostly women and children (Hanlon 1986:138). Public criticism of the attack was very limited despite the fact that it hit mainly civilian Mozambicans, although today most white South Africans would probably argue that they did not know the real facts anyway.
Figure 3.7: What is your personal opinion regarding the SADF's recent attack on ANC bases in the suburbs of Maputo in Mozambique? - White South Africans (July 1983)
N = 1980 M & O Surveys, Hofmeyr (1990: 38) Figure 3.8 confirms that there was extensive support for the security policy of the Botha regime among white urban South Africans irrespective of their home language. In 1984 only about 3% were critical of the government's handling of combating terrorism. In the same survey 80% of all respondents felt that the government was either underspending on defence or spending sufficiently.
Figure 3.8: Government's handling of combatting terrorism (1984)
N = 1024 Source: HSRC - Rhoodie, De Kock & Couper (1985: 308) It was also not only measures against members of the armed wing of the ANC that were portrayed as 'combating terrorism'. The following question in an M&O-Survey reflects this particular type of rhetoric (Figure 3.9):
Figure 3.9: What ahould be done to prevent or reduce terror attacks: Stonger action against the ANC and fellow travellers? - White South Africans (November 1988)
N = 1630 M & O Surveys, Hofmeyr (1990: 38) The high rate of positive response to these questions was undoubtedly secured by the use of the words 'terrorism' or 'terror', known to guarantee an emotive response across the globe. The euphemistic "stronger action" and very broad "fellow travellers" are classic examples of the then government's manipulative techniques for legitimating its activities. "Fellow travellers" obviously included many non-violent anti-apartheid-organisations and activists who were affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF).
Even when white South Africans were asked about the practice of detention without trial after nearly four years of national states of emergency, a comfortable majority of respondents still had no objection to this blatant form of human rights violation (Figure 3.10). This is indeed surprising, as some of the South African press did report critically and responsibly about the mass detention of black people under emergency regulations. An estimated 25 000 people had been detained in the first year of the state of emergency in 1986/1987 alone, including many children of school-going age. Reports about severe ill-treatment and torture in detention were widespread (Foster et al. 1987; Webster & Friedman 1989:22; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1986; Human Rights Commission et al. 1989). Afrikaans- and English-speaking white South Africans showed a large difference in their attitudes towards detention without trial. A three-quarter majority of Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans were still supporting detention without trial in 1989, while the support among English-speaking white South Africans was down to 30%.
Figure 3.10: Please indicate your personal preference regarding the following statement: Detention without trial for suspected violators of security laws? White South Africans (May 1989)
N = 1638 M & O Surveys, Hofmeyr (1990: 38) Even young people with high education supported the repressive acts of the apartheid government. A survey conducted among 638 white students at Stellenbosch University in 1986 revealed that every second student supported the detention of demonstrators. Sixty-nine percent were in favour to deploy military to end a strike and 72% held the opinion that the police should fire on demonstrators who threw stones at them (Gagiano 1986: 19-21). In an other survey 85% of all Afrikaans-speaking students believed that the SADF would protect the interests of ordinary township dwellers and nearly every third student supported the statement that white South Africans should defend their political dominance with force (Booysen 1989: 18-21).
Opinion poll research provides a fairly negative image of the human rights awareness of the white population of South Africa before 1990. It shows a high degree of tolerance for the repressive acts which were often justified by government propaganda as a legitimate defence against communism and terrorism. As attitude change is a complex and lengthy process, these figures suggest that the state of human rights awareness among white South Africans is probably still low, indicating that institutions such as the Truth Commission will not find it easy to promote a human rights culture in South Africa.
3.4 White Attitude Change in the 1980s
There are, however, some indicators of a softening of white racial attitudes during the 1980s, for example an increasing readiness to do away with petty discriminatory legislation such as the Separate Amenities Act (Figure 3.11). There is evidence to support the hypothesis that these changes in attitude were in many cases more a result of shifts in government policy than a reflection of increasing criticism from the white electorate. White support for the Immorality Act dropped from 61,1% in March 1984 (see Figure 3.3) to 38% in June 1985 (Rhoodie et al. 1985b). In the interim, the Act had been scrapped and the government had launched a major media campaign to justify this move. The same happened after F. W. de Klerk announced the unconditional unbanning of the liberation movements, and the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990. After Mandela's unconditional release a clear majority of white South Africans supported that decision for the first time (Figure 3.12). Similarly, while only one out of five white South Africans had supported the meeting in Dakar of leading South African businessmen and the ANC in October 1987 (and with Dr Craven in Harare in November 1988), 44% supported the unbanning of all organisations, including the ANC, after the government decision in February 1990 (see Table 3.1).
Figure 3.11 Attitudes of white South African towards the seperate amenities act: 1978-1009
Sources: HSRC, Rhoodie & Cooper (1987: 202); *M & O Surveys, Hofmeyr (1990: 38) Table 3.1: Attitude towards the ANC (1987-1990)
Dakar meeting with ANC, Oct. 1987 Harare meeting with ANC, Nov. 1988 Unbanning of all organisations incl. the ANC, Feb 1990 Yes: approve 20% 21% 44% Don't know 16% 28% 13% No: disapprove 63% 51% 43% N = 1692 1630 503 Figure 3.12: Attitudes towards the release of Nelson Mandela - White South Africans (1985 - 1990)
N = 500 *not asked in Feb. 1990 M & O Surveys, Hofmeyr (1990: 38). Thus it can be argued that without these shifts in government policy there would not have been the 1992 whites-only referendum, nor the astonishingly high 69% support for the negotiation process.
Therefore, in summary the facts about white South Africans' support for apartheid are clear. A large majority voted for the NP or parties even further to the right, and consistently expressed support for a variety of apartheid practices and policies. It was only when the NP elite took the initiative, first in doing away with various forms of petty apartheid and later in unbanning the liberation movements, that white public opinion started to change.
