The Pathway to Murder:
A Social Psychological Study of the
Evolution of Violence in an Industrial Dispute

by Lloyd Vogelman

Chapter Four: Hardship, Deprivation, Circumspect Non-Violent Protest and Frustration¹

Introduction

The Eight's participation in the Prolecon killings can be shown to have originated in the harsh political, economic and social conditions that engulfed their lives. In the forthcoming chapters I will provide evidence to demonstrate that many of the Eight's remonstrative behaviours, whether violent or non-violent, were primarily intended or justified as an attempt to ameliorate these conditions and to ensure that there was no further deterioration in their life circumstances. The Eight's experience of hardship is thus central to an understanding of their anger, desperation and violence during the dispute. Throughout this chapter I will use the Eight's own descriptions to outline these hardships, because in addition to the actual conditions, I am concerned with the Eight's discontent with these conditions and the various factors that enhanced this discontent.

This chapter correlates with the first four phases of my model, as it is concerned with the preconditions for violence. The broad aim of the chapter is to delineate the conditions which engendered the Eight's hostility towards SATS and gave rise to the strike. I will also explore some of the implications of these conditions for the Eight's behaviour during the strike, and more particularly their violent behaviour. However, the Eight's violence is primarily the focus of chapter five, where the strike and the subsequent developments leading to the murders will be related to the remaining phases (five to nine) of the model.

In chapter three I outlined a model that is based on both research findings and on the Eight's experiences and behaviours. I indicated that for the purposes of clarity and emphasis, the various phases of the model would be clearly differentiated and ordered in a linear fashion. In reality, no such distinctions or linear relationships can be established because each of the Eight's experiences and behaviours was overlaid by others. In a chapter delineating concepts it was less complicated to isolate phases, but it is more difficult to do so in the process of relating the Eight's actual situation. This study is predominately reliant on accounts provided by the Eight, and in their narrative they frequently intermingled their accounts of their actual conditions of hardship (phase one) with their dissatisfaction with them (phase two); and their description of their circumspect non-violent protest about their hardship (phase three) with their frustration about the unsuccessful nature of these protests (phase four). As a consequence of the above, and also in an effort to be concise, I have chosen to couple phases one and two and three and four together.

Phases One And Two: Hardship and Deprivation

This section will illustrate that the hardship the Eight endured encompassed most of the spheres of their lives, from the political to the social to the occupational. As blacks in apartheid South Africa, the Eight were denied political rights and social and economic opportunities. They were also subject to habitual racial victimisation, poor work conditions and economic impoverishment. Furthermore, the structure and operation of apartheid society and the organisational structure of SATS ensured that it was extraordinarily difficult for them to overcome these conditions.

Although the Eight's hardships and dissatisfaction have been described simultaneously, the two are not necessarily synonymous. The literature suggests that except for those conditions which cause obvious physical discomfort, there is no absolute progression from hardship to dissatisfaction (Gurr, 1970; Perry & Pugh, 1978). As I indicated in chapter two, when discontent does coexist with hardship, individuals can be said to be deprived. Before I detail the diverse features of the Eight's deprivation, I will focus on one of the processes that may have contributed significantly to the experience of deprivation: politicisation. Relative deprivation, the other major process that heightened the Eight's discontent, will be dealt with in section 3.1.1.2.

1. Politicisation

In chapter two, with reference to poverty stricken and subjugated individuals, the term politicisation was broadly defined as any process that serves to inform individuals that they have the right to better conditions, that their adverse situation is the consequence of a particular social system and its power relations, and that their plight need not be permanent. Prior to the strike, the Eight's politicisation was reflected in numerous ways. In their interviews they attributed their hardship primarily to their employers and to the political system of apartheid, and not to themselves. Chapter five, which deals with the Eight's decision to join the strike, will show that they believed that they had the right to improved political, social and economic conditions and that those in authority ought to be challenged. The Eight were also convinced that it was within their power to ameliorate their conditions. Thus politicisation is likely to have originated in, as well as generated and amplified, their discontent. The experience of politicisation may also have ensured that the Eight became increasingly aware of the ways in which the various strands of their deprivation were inter-related.

The Eight did not detail the exact progression of their politicisation, but there were some clear indicators. For example, the Eight knew of some black South Africans who had successfully ameliorated their hardships (see chapters five and seven). These success stories were mainly drawn from the actions of unionised black workers in other economic sectors who had achieved substantial improvements in their wages and work conditions through striking. These workers appeared to act as role models and the Eight's expectations about the success of their own strike may have evolved from their conduct. I will return to these issues later in this chapter and in chapter five.

Between 1984 and 1987, the Eight witnessed a profound political challenge to apartheid, and also the government's repressive response to this revolt (see chapter one). Although the messages that the Eight internalised during this political period were never explored in any depth, it is possible that any antagonism that the Eight harboured towards the government and those individuals who carried out government policies and programmes, would have increased. The intensity of the resistance and the government's inability to quell it, may also have imparted the message that those in authority, no matter how powerful, could be challenged. This subject will be explored further in chapter five where I consider the Eight's expectations of success in the strike, despite their limited power in relation to SATS.

While the Eight may have been influenced and politicised by any of the political events, issues or campaigns in the years prior to 1987, none were sufficiently inspired to become politically active or to join any political organisation. Neither did they experience any active attempts to recruit them into any political organisation. There are a number of plausible reasons for their political non-involvement. Their families of origin had no history of activism or heightened political consciousness. With the exception of Mamphaga, who had completed secondary schooling, their political awareness was also impeded by their limited education and literacy levels. As a result, they had little access to political insights from newspapers and political literature. BLATU, a weak "sweetheart union", was the only union present at their workplace. Any desire to participate in organisation or protest was also dampened by the fear of governmental repression. Finally, their work hours were long, and they had little spare time. The leisure time they did have was used for sleep, domestic chores, familial contact and recreation.

Prior to the strike, the Eight's information about injustice, resistance and the successes of others was mostly obtained through informal communication on public transport, with colleagues at work, with friends at recreational venues (for example shebeens), with fellow hostel residents, or with family members (Dzevhe, Reinterview, 14/12/92; Mamphaga, Reinterview, 25/2/94). In the months preceding the dispute they were subject, directly or indirectly, to a concerted membership drive by SAHRWU organisers and other SATS workers who had become members of SAHRWU (Dzevhe, Reinterview, 14/12/92; Mamphaga, Reinterview, 25/2/94). SAHRWU had distributed pamphlets and sent organisers to the depots and SATS hostels to convince the workers of the benefits of unionisation and collective action. Of the Eight, Dzevhe had been the most involved in the union. He had joined SAHRWU in January, 1987, nd had signed up a number of his colleagues at his depot and his hostel. By March 1987, Dzevhe estimated that 50 percent of the black workers at SATS had signed up (Reinterview, 16/10/93). Those workers who had not yet signed up, like Mamphaga, had at least heard of the union's existence (Mamphaga, Reinterview, 16/10/93).

In view of the above, the Eight's politicisation should not be evaluated solely in terms of their participation in union and political organisations, but also on the basis of their perceptions, ideas and consciousness. While the Eight may have been lacking in sophisticated political analysis, their politicisation, as indicated earlier, was evident in many of their attributions, perceptions and desires. In the sections below I will focus on those aspects of the Eight's politicisation which were apparent in their high levels of political, occupational and social discontent and their belief that the government and SATS were hostile to their interests and responsible for their multitude of deprivations.

2. Political Deprivation

2.1 Perceptions of Central Government

The denial of fundamental political rights to the Eight meant that they could not vote or exercise any form of direct influence over the formal political process. Only Matshile believed, momentarily, that the government might improve the quality of life for blacks. In the early 1980s, his expectations were aroused by President P.W. Botha's assertion that there was a need for political reform. However, Matshile concluded that these reforms had no positive impact on his life:

I thought that parliament could change its mind and come with a positive response. But they never did nothing. (Matshile, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

The others, like Molefe and Mamphaga, did not believe that the government acted in their interests. They held parliament responsible for the oppression of black people, and viewed it as a vehicle designed to serve white interests:

It didn't solve the grievances of black people. It was there to serve the interests of the white people and not for the black people. (Molefe, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

Parliament to my knowledge is something which made legislations for the people, but in South Africa it was designed only to serve the whites. Parliament made me angry. I did think all the violence and the poor was made by parliament because they made these bad laws. (Mamphaga, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

Not only were the Eight not represented amongst those in power who determined their futures, but central government was also strongly antagonistic toward their interests. By 1984, P.W. Botha's government's use of force to quash township rebellion had generated a view amongst the Eight that the government was highly hostile to black aspirations. Molefe used a biblical metaphor to describe this sentiment: "I compared P.W. Botha with Pharaoh because he was a man who was not prepared to resolve people's grievances. He liked to rule people with an iron fist". (Molefe, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

2.2 Perceptions of Homeland Government

Apartheid policy dictated that the Eight should exercise their political aspirations in one of the thirteen homelands - euphemistically referred to as self-governing territories. For the Eight, this system was representative of the continued attempt to deny political rights to black South Africans and the homeland governments were not viewed as legitimate:

The homeland governments were there to enforce apartheid itself and to please some by oppressing the majority These homelands were there to serve the whites not blacks. (Mamphaga, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

I felt very angry about homelands. They are there to help the oppressors of black people They were liars. (Molefe, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

I could not see the homeland government from the apartheid government, they were the same to me. I didn't like them. They weren't good for black people. (Matshile, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

These perceptions appeared to be consistent with a wider sentiment. When these homeland governments did permit elections, polls were minute, often less than fifteen percent (Streek & Wickstead, 1981). Their credibility was further tarnished by evidence of corruption, the opulent lifestyles of their ministers, and their tyrannical rule. The homeland governments also directed frequent, virulent and lethal repression at the ANC, the UDF and COSATU (SAIRR, 1987/88), who questioned and resisted their legitimacy through both violent and non-violent means.

Besides the few employment opportunities in the civil service, the police force or the army, all of which required political acquiescence, there was little chance of finding employment in the homelands. In 1984, it was estimated that 80 percent of the homeland population lived below "a stringently defined poverty line" (The Economist, 1984, p. 67). Over time, economic circumstances in the homelands deteriorated rather than improved. For instance, the percentage of destitute families - that is families without any income, land or cattle - was 5 percent in 1960, but by 1980 it had risen to 13 percent (Crapanzano, 1985).

Although they lived on the Witwatersrand, the economic impoverishment of the homelands continued to impact on their lives as all of the Eight had one or more dependants in their homeland of origin who were almost completely financially reliant on them. This factor is likely to have exacerbated the Eight's concerns about their poor wages at SATS (see section 3.1.1). The influence of homeland economics on the Eight's situation highlights the relationship between localised situations - such as wages at SATS - and the broader economic and political context. This relationship also illustrates, as I will indicate in the following chapter, that many of the determinants of strikes (Kelly & Nicholson, 1980) and of violence are located a distance away from the actual conflict situation.

2.3 Perceptions of Local Government

The Eight's lack of political representation extended into the micro level. In their own residential areas they did not perceive the formal civic structures to be concerned with their social plight. These black local authorities, established by the government to help with the operation of the civil and social affairs of the townships, were seen as the lackeys of apartheid. Muangedzo viewed their function as rudimentary: "… the local authorities were there to enforce apartheid laws" (Muangedzo, Reinterview, 26/2/1991).

The Eight presumed that the black mayors and councillors who participated in these local authorities were corrupt. Molefe stated: "… they never do anything for the people. All they did was to take the money from the people" (Reinterview, 26/2/1991). The allegations of corruption were founded on the councillors' high salaries, the bribes they received from township residents desperate to be allocated housing, and the commercial rights they granted themselves for extremely profitable initiatives, such as retail liquor outlets.

The Eight's perception that these local authorities had little interest in improving, local living conditions was coupled with the belief that it was futile to lodge complaints with them. Matshile remarked: "Even though I was unhappy with being in the hostel and I wanted a house but I would not inform the councillors because they were far away from the people" (Reinterview, 26/2/1991). In reality even if these councillors had been sympathetic to their plight, central government provided so few resources for black residential areas that they could have done little to improve the lot of the Eight and other township residents.

Like the homeland leaders, black local councillors were also associated with repression. In 1984 as the opposition mounted those councillors who refused to heed the demand to resign from "apartheid structures" often sought the protection of the security forces. This move further inflamed the hatred of township residents. Attacks against these councillors were frequent and, as indicated in the introduction, they became the primary victims of crowd killings, human burnings and "necklace" killings.

Much of the opposition to the black local councils was organised by UDF and ANC aligned civic associations in the respective areas. In the vast majority of cases the civic associations did not have the infrastructure to provide direct services to residents, but they did often furnish residents with "assistance" in the form of protection from police and criminal violence. Most importantly, because they were at the forefront of organising rent boycotts on homes and land owned by the local councils, civic associations provided residents with substantial financial savings. The latter however was only of benefit to Mamphaga who lived in a house in Soweto. Sibisi lived in a squatter camp and did not pay rent, Matshile lived with his girlfriend in a rent free room in a white suburb, and the remaining five lived in SATS or municipally owned hostels. In SATS hostels, rent was deducted from their monthly wages and in municipal hostels non-payment of rent could lead to them being barred from access to the hostel and immediate eviction. Thus at a local government level, the Eight obtained few benefits from the actions of the civic associations, and so they experienced little relief from their social deprivation from this source.

2.4 Political Deprivation, Striking and Violence

It is unclear to what extent, if at all, the Eight's political deprivation contributed to their decision to join the strike. The subject was not explored in my interviews with the Eight and received almost no mention during the trial. If it is assumed that such a contribution does exist, it is likely to be apparent in an examination of three areas: the ways in which South African politics directly or indirectly shaped those labour practices at SATS which were a source of dissatisfaction to the Eight; the extent to which the Eight's political deprivation intensified their experience of occupational deprivation; and, bearing in mind that striking is in part a challenge to the power of those in authority, the degree to which the Eight's striking was a symbolic challenge to those who exerted control in the political realm.

Political deprivation may have had a more tangible influence on behaviour during the strike. The political marginalisation experienced by the Eight may have engendered the belief, that their peers, and the "liberation" organisations such as COSATU, the UDF and the ANC were their only allies. (Matshile, Reinterview, 26/2/91; Mamphaga, Reinterview, 26/2/91; Molefe, Reinterview, 26/2/91). However, for a number of reasons, including political restrictions and operational inadequacies, the strikers received little overt assistance from these organisations. The assistance they did receive was mostly in the form of messages of support and attempts to strengthen the consumer boycott of SATS transport (see strike diary, 31st March) by heightening awareness of the boycott. COSATU provided a venue for the strikers' meetings, the halls in COSATU House.

The meagre support that these organisations, particularly the UDF and the ANC, gave to the strike did not appear to have been a major source of tension for the Eight - possibly because they acknowledged that these organisations were embroiled in their own particular struggles. This lack of support from their perceived allies may have intensified the Eight's belief that the only resource available to them was other strikers, and consequently notions of collective solidarity and loyalty may have become more entrenched. In chapter five I will draw on the literature concerning group theory (Brown, 1988; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel, 1981) in my discussion of how the perception that only fellow group members can be relied upon contributed to the magnitude of the polarisation and conflict between the strikers and SATS and their perceived allies, the non-strikers.

There are manifold causes of violence, and it would be naive to assume that democratic structures, in the political or any other domain, would have been sufficient to prevent violence. However, in the case of the Eight and other strikers, I would hypothesize that such structures may have reduced their propensity for violence and the intensity with which this violence manifested. For example, creditable political channels for non-violent conflict resolution would have compensated somewhat for the absence of credible avenues for negotiation at SATS; and formal political representation, besides making the Eight and other strikers feel less cornered, may have, for its own electoral reasons, pressured them to remain within the confines of non-violent resistance.

3. Occupational and Economic Deprivation

Prior to the dispute, the Eight's poverty encapsulated a broad range of circumstances: meagre income, poor living and working conditions, the lack of skills and education to advance within the economy and a daily struggle to make ends meet. During the strike it appears that the initial euphoria of the strikers' demonstration of collective power soon dissipated, and they were faced with the possibility that SATS might not accede to their demands, including payment of wages whilst on strike, and also with the threat of dismissal. In the next chapter I will demonstrate that as a consequence of these prospects, the strikers became extremely concerned about the possibility of destitution for themselves and their dependents. The Eight had a very definite understanding of the roots of their poverty and their economic vulnerability: they attributed both to their working conditions at SATS.

3.1 Deprivation and Work Dissatisfaction at SATS

Although the Eight believed that employment was preferable to unemployment, and they went to great lengths to preserve their jobs at SATS, their work conditions were a source of acute and longstanding bitterness. With the exception of Mamphaga, who joined SATS in 1985, they had all experienced poor working conditions for at least four years. Matshile and Rikhotso had been at SATS for almost ten years (for further details see chapter one).

The conditions at SATS that provoked the most resentment included: poor wages; racist practices, especially with respect to wage differentials and promotion opportunities; limited opportunity for promotions; long hours; managerial authoritarianism; and the lack of adequate grievance procedures. All of these will be discussed below.

3.1.1 Poor Wages

The Eight's discontent about wages was characterised by three primary features: the dire economic implications that poor wages had for their standard of living; their belief that their meagre wages devalued their personal worth; and their disenchantment arising from the comparisons they made with other workers who were better off, particularly whites at SATS and black workers in other industries. The latter two features, which embody dimensions of relative deprivation, will be examined in sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2.

Although there were differences in pay amongst the Eight, they were unanimous in their resentment of the inadequacy of their earnings. In the table below I have detailed their starting salaries and their salaries at the time of the strike. These wages do not include overtime payments.

Gross Wages (R/month)
Name	Starting Salary		Salary at time of strike
	Year	R/month
Dzevhe	1982	R136,00	R405,00
Mamphaga	1985	R220,00	R320,00
Matshile	1978	R80,00	R797,50
Muagedzo	1980	R230,00	R350,00
Molefe	1983	R258,00	R340,00
Netshitungulwane	1982	R136,00	R380,00
Rikhotso	1978	R80,00	R380,00
Sibisi	1980	R107,00	R400,00

The Eight's wages were paltry at the outset of their employment and, with the possible exception of Matshile, length of service did not herald any major improvements. Rikhotso, who had worked for SATS for almost ten years, was earning a monthly salary of R380.

South Africa's inflation rate escalated rapidly from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, and it is necessary to explore whether the Eight's wages improved or deteriorated in real terms when compared against the inflation rate. Between 1972 and 1979, the government consumer price index estimated that the average annual inflation rate was 11.6 percent; while between 1980 and 1988 it had increased to 14.6 percent (SAIRR, 1987/8). Between 1980 and 1987, the years when most of the Eight were employed at SATS, the annual inflation rate was as follows:¹

Year	Consumer prise index change
1980	13,3%
1981	15,2%
1982	14,7%
1983	12,3%
1984	11,7%
1985	16,2%
1986	18,6%
1987	16.1%
1987	12,9%

(SAIRR, 1987/88, p. 326).

With respect to these figures, in real terms there was an improvement in the wages of Dzevhe, Matshile, Netshitungulwane and Sibisi. Dzevhe's wages increased in real terms by approximately 29 percent, Matshile's by 166 percent, Netshitungulwane's by 21 percent and Sibisi by 24 percent. The other four evidenced a deterioration: Mamphaga's wages decreased in real terms by approximately 10 percent, Muangedzo's by 97 percent, Molefe's by 52 percent and Rikhotso's by 27 percent. As Davies (1974) would put it, these four had become relatively deprived because of a deterioration in their economic circumstances. However, the four whose wages had improved in real terms complained as vociferously as those whose wages had decreased. These complaints may be related to another dimension of relative deprivation, namely the discontent that was generated by the gap between the wages they expected and the wages they achieved (Cook et al., 1977; Gurr, 1970). I will provide some evidence for this assertion in section 3.1.1.1, when I explore wages and self concept. The fact that all of the Eight found it difficult to support themselves and their dependents on their wages may be another plausible reason for the similarity in grievances about wages.

The Eight had an average of six dependants each (for more specific details, see chapter one). In 1987, according to the Institute of Planning Research at the University of Port Elizabeth, the Household Subsistence Level (HSL) for a family of six was R474,73 in Johannesburg, and R464,57 and R458,54 in Germiston and Springs respectively (SAIRR, 1987/8). The HSL was calculated at the lowest retail cost of a budget of necessities, which included, food, clothing, fuel, lighting, washing, rent and transport to and from work. Since not all consumers are able to obtain the lowest retail cost of these consumer items and since the HSL did not make provision for expenses such as hire purchase, holidays, purchase and replacement of household equipment and recreation, the Institute of Planning Research recommended that a more realistic income level was the Household Effective Level (HEL), which was 150% of the HSL (SAIRR, 1987/8). Although economists and social scientists in South Africa could not always agree as to what constituted a minimum level of health and decency and the income required to maintain such a level (Community Resource and Information Centre (date unknown); SAIRR, 1988/9), the Eight were particularly conscious of the real gap between the earnings required to subsist, and their own salaries:

I earned R320,00 a month. It was too little. I believe I should have got more. I could not support my family on this money. (Mamphaga, Interview)

The money was very little for me and I could not maintain my family. (Molefe, Interview)

According to Rikhotso, his low wages left him little choice but to supplement his income through working overtime at SATS:

My job at SATS was to clean the inside and outside of the trains. It was hard for me this work but there was still no money from this work. I did much overtime work … . Many times I was working 12 hour shifts seven days a week. (Interview)

I did not obtain details about the amount of overtime that the Eight worked at SATS, but it is evident that although all of the Eight did work overtime at some point, this work was not a consistent feature of their employment - mainly because this work was not always available.

For the Eight, overtime work was not only confined to their employment at SATS. Dzevhe, for instance, took advantage of the poor quality of the food served in the hostels by selling food informally on the weekends: "I used to sell tin food in order to make extra money, and there was a great demand for tin food because the food was so bad" (Interview). Despite such efforts to obtain extra income, the Eight remained impoverished.

3.1.1.1 Wages and self concept

The Eight's dissatisfaction with their wages also stemmed from their perception that their meagre wages were an insult to their personal worth. Mamphaga, the lowest earner of the Eight, associated his low salary with the lower value SATS attached to his race:

I was earning R320 per month when the strike began. It didn't matter to me how long I worked. I should have started a higher salary. I'm a person like anybody. There was no white who was getting what I was getting. (Mamphaga, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

At the opposite end of the wage spectrum, Matshile, the highest earner, felt equally undervalued:

I was doing a hard job. I should have got R3000,00 a month for all the work I was doing and what I got was R779,00. (Reinterview, 26/2/91)

The similarity between the discontent experienced by Mamphaga and Matshile emphasises the role of expectations as a cause of dissatisfaction. On the basis of earnings alone Matshile should have been more contented than Mamphaga, but his relative deprivation, provoked by the gap between his expectations and his achievements (Cook et al., 1977; Gurr, 1970), provoked extreme discontent. Prior to his employment at SATS, Mamphaga had been unemployed for two years. However, the dramatic financial improvement resulting from his employment was offset by his association of his paltry wage with human debasement. In my interviews with Mamphaga I did not investigate when this association between his wages and human degradation developed, and so I can only hypothesise that it evolved as his initial relief at finding work subsided. It is possible that Mamphaga's memories of his desperation and his wish to obtain employment gradually faded during his time at SATS, and the desire to secure a better wage became a more prominent aspect of his consciousness. At the outset of his employment, there was perhaps greater congruence between his expectations and the reality of his situation at SATS, but it appears that the external reality of SATS could not keep pace with the changes in Mamphaga's internal world.

3.1.1.2 Wages, social comparisons and discontent

The Eight's dissatisfaction with their wages was compounded by negative social comparisons with other wage earners, and this would seem to confirm the contention of social comparison theorists that psychological well being is evaluated in both relative and absolute terms (Merton & Kitt, 1950; Festinger, 1954).

Social comparison theory delineates three inter-related criteria that predict which individuals will be selected for social comparison: those with whom the individual is in habitual contact; those who are similar to the individual, but with whom the individual is not in direct contact; and those people that are liked or admired by the individual (Festinger, 1954; Hyman, 1942; Merton & Kitt, 1950). In the case of the Eight all of the above criteria were relevant and were confirmed in the interviews.

In my interviews with the Eight they did not indicate which individuals or groups they compared themselves to most frequently, although it was evident that they compared themselves to other black employees at SATS. These were the people to whom the Eight were most similar, and with whom they had the most frequent and intimate contact. However, although there were differences in earnings amongst the Eight and their wages did not always compare favourably with other black workers, there was little disenchantment in relation to other black workers at SATS, probably because they all experienced analogous work conditions.

The Eight also had frequent contact with white workers and supervisors, and the preferential wages and promotion opportunities afforded to whites at SATS were a significant source of dissatisfaction. Although I will describe some of these disparities below, it is worth noting here that in 1985 (figures for 1986 and 1987 were unavailable), whites earned on average four times higher (R1600 per month) than black employees (R421 per month). The perception that these white employees did not deserve their higher wages was a central aspect of their resentment of this disparity.

In relation to other unskilled blacks, with whom they were similar but not necessarily in direct contact, the Eight were in a position of both relative privilege and relative deprivation. Compared to the vast pool of unemployed blacks, their position was one of extreme privilege. The unemployment figures for blacks were high, with the range of estimates varying from the official statistic for 1986, of 17.9 percent (SAIRR, 1987), and for 1987 of 22 percent (Court Record, p. 1115), to the unofficial statistic for 1987 of 71.5 percent (SAIRR, 1986). The latter statistic included unemployment figures in the homelands thus accounting for the large difference between the two figures. The Eight's position of privilege also extended to comparisons with the many black workers in other economic sectors, such as the agricultural and the domestic, who were paid lower wages.

While the Eight were conscious that they were "better off" (Mamphaga, Interview) than the unemployed, they did not make mention of the fact that they were more privileged than many black workers in other economic sectors who were paid lower wages, for example, those in the agricultural and the domestic sectors. One obvious explanation for this omission is that this issue was not explored in my interviews with the Eight, but it is also possible that the Eight were simply ignorant of the wages in these sectors. In view of their high level of dissatisfaction with their own inadequate income, it may also have been hard for the Eight to believe that other workers could receive even lower wages than they themselves did.

Another likely explanation can be found in the work of Festinger (1954), who asserts that people have a drive to improve themselves. As a result, individuals tend to compare themselves with those who are slightly better off than themselves, as opposed to with those who are, or who are perceived to be, in an inferior position. My experience as a clinical psychologist suggests that there are problems with Festinger's thesis. Numerous clients that I have seen appear to demonstrate no such drive to improve themselves, while others appear to derive a sense of superiority by comparing themselves to those in less fortunate positions. Nevertheless, Festinger's thesis may help to explain why the Eight focused their attention on those black workers in relation to whom they felt deprived. This group of more privileged black workers consisted of unionised black workers in other sectors, such as retailing, who had achieved substantial improvements in wages and other work conditions through striking (see chapter five for an example of this). These black workers had elements of both the second and the third criteria: they were similar to the Eight, and the Eight felt an affinity to them. Although the Eight were envious of this group of workers, they also respected and admired them because of the work benefits that they had secured through their "struggle". The Eight also referred to the "victories" these workers had won through their union. According to a study conducted by management consultant Andrew Levy, wage settlements negotiated by black unions resulted in an average wage increase of 81.5 percent between 1985 and 1988 (SAIRR, 1989/90), Given the obvious benefits of these union "victories", the Eight were keen to have SAHRWU recognised by SATS.

With the exception of Matshile, who earned R797,50, the Eight earned less than other unskilled black workers. In June 1986, the average monthly earning of blacks in the non-primary sectors (that is, excluding agriculture and the mining sector) was R500 (SAIRR, 1987/88). In February 1987, the average wage for such workers was R522,83,² while the Eight averaged R416,50. Compared to black workers in other economic sectors, such as manufacturing, universities, government and banking, the Eight were even worse off. According to the Bureau for Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosch, black workers in the manufacturing sector earned an average of R652 per month in 1987 (R7824 per annum) (SAIRR, 1987/88).

It seems that the more privileged black workers were shielded from the Eight's antagonism, because, in addition to the Eight's respect for these workers, they were also perceived to be victims of impoverishment, racism and political oppression. Instead, the Eight's hostility was targeted at SATS management, not because the Eight coveted their salaries, but seemingly because they were held responsible for, amongst other things, depriving the Eight of the conditions that were enjoyed by other workers.

The Eight did not mention any resentment regarding managerial wages. Berkowitz (1972) provides some explanation for this finding, with his postulation that the deprived do not compare themselves to the very wealthy because individuals are generally inhibited from yearning for things that they believe are impossible to achieve. Festinger (1954) expresses a similar view: "Comparisons with members of a different status group, either higher or lower, may sometimes be made on a phantasy level, but very rarely in reality" (p. 54).

The assertions of Berkowitz and Festinger would also help to explain why, when the Eight did compare themselves to individuals in positions of authority, they referred mainly to white co-workers and supervisors. The Eight were in constant contact with these individuals, they felt that they had similar skills and proficiency to them, and they believed that they could attain the same jobs, if given sufficient opportunity.

Although the arguments presented by Berkowitz and Festinger do appear to be pertinent to the Eight, this does not imply that they are generally applicable. Research conducted in Britain and North America offers no conclusive support for their contentions. For instance, while Runciman (1966) found that blue collar workers in England became more dissatisfied when blue collar (as opposed to white collar) workers made greater economic advances, twenty percent of his sample were concerned about the gains made by others in groups which had a higher socio-economic status. Research conducted in the United States also evidences contradictory findings. One study of participants in public violence in the 1960s demonstrates that more rioters (39 percent) than non-rioters (27 percent) in black ghetto's were perturbed by the growing economic gap between wealthier and poorer blacks (Caplan & Paige, 1968),³ than by the gap between blacks and whites. However, another study of black militancy in 1968 found that more blacks, 31 percent compared to 25 percent, were concerned about whites, as opposed to other blacks, that were socially or economically advantaged (Abeles, 1976).

Politicisation can also mediate the process of comparison, as it may generate a longing for financial prosperity and also the inference that the wealthy have achieved their wealth at the expense of the poor. While the Eight did not appear to assume that senior SATS management had been enriched at their expense, they did hold management responsible for their deprivation and relative deprivation. As this perception seemed to be shared by the mass of black workers, SATS was prone to be targeted for social militancy and protest action (Abeles, 1976; Berkowitz, 1972).

3.1.1.3 Wages and violence

Low wages are often a major cause of poverty and discontent and in this way they boost the potential for violence. However, low wages cannot reliably predict those individuals that are likely to participate in collective protest or collective violence. Many SATS employees earned lower wages than the Eight, but not all of them went on strike and/or engaged in violence. In the United States, Caplan and Paige (1968) found no significant differences between rioters and non-rioters on the basis of income.⁴ On the basis of their findings they reached two conclusions:

First, differences in economic status do not differentiate rioters from their non-rioting neighbours. Second, the rioters are not the poorest of the poor. Whereas there may be many people with very low incomes who riot, a comparable percentage of people whose incomes are low do not. (p. 17)

As indicated in chapter two, collective violence committed by blacks in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s occurred more frequently in the northern states, where there was less racism, and where blacks were in a better position economically (Murphy & Watson, 1970; Sears & McConahay, 1970). A similar tendency is apparent in South Africa. The most notable occurrences of collective violence frequently originated in townships that, although poverty stricken, were not the most impoverished. Soweto, the site of the 1976 rebellion and other resistance, was markedly better off than many townships in other regions, especially rural areas such as the Ciskei where resistance was lower. The reasons for this phenomenon are extremely complex and do not fall within the ambit of this study, but it is likely that factors influencing this behaviour include divergent degrees of politicisation, political organisation, literacy and unmet expectations.

Although low wages are implicated in collective violence, there is no direct association between the two variables. Thus any impact that the Eight's low wages may have had on their later violence should perhaps be understood in terms of an interaction with other contingent factors, such as: deprivation in other domains; familial economic pressures; politicisation; relative deprivation; frustration with unsuccessful non-violent protest; the perception that credible channels for non-violent conflict resolution were unavailable; lack of economic assets and fear of destitution during the strike; and their assessment of the rewards and costs of violence. These factors will be discussed in the chapters that follow.

Although I have emphasized low wages as a cardinal feature of the Eight's discontent at SATS, there were other factors that promoted their dissatisfaction with working conditions. These included, racism, lack of promotion opportunities and disciplinary measures. Besides the issue of wages, racism was the factor that the Eight most frequently associated with their work dissatisfaction in the interviews and in their court evidence.

3.1.2 Racism at SATS

Racism is partly premised on establishing the inferiority of others, and so it is closely linked with the undermining of self worth. In section 3.1.1.1, I indicated that the Eight felt debased as a result of their low wages and I cited the specific examples of Matshile and Mamphaga. There were, however, many other work practices, including those that were racist, that were perceived by the Eight as degrading. Hamburg (1984) asserts that it is the combination of economic indigence and social devaluation that leads to human debasement:

Poverty is partly a matter of income and partly a matter of human dignity. It is one thing to have a low income but to be treated with respect by your compatriots; it is quite another matter to have a very low income and to be harshly depreciated by more powerful compatriots. Let us speak then of human impoverishment: low income plus harsh disrespect … . To speak of impoverishment in this sense is to speak of human degradation so profound as to undermine any reasonable and decent standard of human life (Hamburg, 1984, p. 7)

It seems that racism was the social practice that most intensely amplified the human impoverishment of the Eight at SATS. In their testimony to the court and in their interviews with me, the Eight emphasized the racist practices that permeated the organisation in both the interpersonal and structural spheres. At an interpersonal level, white supervisors and workers would habitually make derogatory remarks about black workers. According to Molefe: "Black people were treated like animals and because we were treated like this by the white guys, it was easy for us to be called a kaffir" (Reinterview, 26/2/1991). In his court evidence, he described one such incident:

My problem was that I worked with a white man, and this white man called me "kaffir". If he sent me to fetch a key, or to fetch a spanner, if it was a monkey wrench then he would say "go and fetch your brother". (Court Record, p. 1881)

Complaints (see section 3.1.4) about and even direct challenges to the racist insults were ineffective. Although I have no concrete evidence, it is possible that challenges to racism failed because the perpetrators had no moral qualms about their racist remarks, and because they were confident that SATS would not take any action against them. They may have also received social endorsement from their peers for their racism. Mamphaga's statements provide an example of the victimisation and powerlessness that was experienced by the Eight in the face of these racist comments:

There was an electrician by the name of Piet. He always used to call me "kaffir". I complained the way he spoke to me but nothing was ever done about it. (Interview)

Whilst I was working with this master of mine he was calling me kaffir, and then I said "But who is a kaffir?". He said "You David, you are a kaffir". Well I felt bad about it though there was nothing that I could do, I had only to beg to continue working at this place. (Court Record, p. 1593)

Another major source of discontent for the Eight was job reservation for whites:

I compared myself to the booking clerk, who was white and the white foreman. I looked at them and I thought I could also do that job. When I looked at them I thought why did they not take me on that job. Is it simply because I was a black man. I'm also a man. I also want what I don't have. I wanted what they had. I wished for a decent house, a car, and giving my family a good security. I also had an aspiration to give my children a good education. I never had an opportunity to do that because I was a black man. They never allowed us to qualify for the jobs the whites did. (Mamphaga, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

The Eight's anger about job reservation was also associated with wage discrimination. Dzevhe, for instance, performed the same job (surveying) as his white counterparts, but earned less than a third of their salary of R1400. Dzevhe spoke of his anger at this injustice (Court Record, p. 1301), and expressed disgust at the poor salaries received by black workers who had worked at SATS almost all their adult lives:

Now the way they treated the blacks, in other words the whites used not to treat blacks in a proper way. People who had long services at the railway, about 30 years, their salaries would be equal or the same as the salary of a person who was about 5 years at that job. (Court Record, p. 1222/23)

In addition, the Eight perceived many of their white counterparts as incompetent, and this amplified their anger about prejudice and partiality. They described the laziness of white workers and the way in which they sponged off the productivity of black labourers. Matshile commented: "White workers they would stand around in the office, not working, while the black workers would do the job, and then they say to the whites, you did well" (Interview). While these perceptions do appear to be rooted in the reality of the situation, they may also have been exaggerated as a result of the intergroup conflict that existed between black and white employees. Sherif (1966) and Tajfel (1981) (see chapters two and five) assert that in such situations of intergroup strife there is a tendency amongst individuals to magnify both the positive qualities of their own group (the ingroup) and the negative qualities of the group with which they are in conflict (the outgroup).

3.1.3 Lack of Promotion Opportunities

For Matshile, the unjust recognition afforded to white workers was related to another of his concerns: the lack of promotion opportunities for black employees. Like the rest of the Eight, he attributed the lack of promotion opportunities to racism. He stated: "Always the chances for black workers to go ahead were much less than for whites" (Interview). Mamphaga and Molefe supported this assertion:

I felt definitely the whites get more promotions than us. The black people in the electrical department where I worked was never allowed to go to get more education. I never saw a black person driving a train. The whites always seemed to get better things. When I compared the blacks and the whites, the whites always get more. (Mamphaga, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

We weren't treated the same as the white guys in our job. The colour of a person meant a lot as far as promotion. They wouldn't promote a black person to a certain position. (Molefe, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

In addition to the question of race, the Eight also felt that promotion or demotion was dependent on arbitrary decisions made by their supervisors. The success of their applications hinged on whether they were liked or disliked by their supervisors. Matshile, who was determined to advance, had to do so with persistence and insidiousness:

Before promotion the foreman was not good to me. I would apply for promotion and this foreman crushed my papers. But after a year I applied again at a different office. They told me to come for a test and I passed. (Interview)

Matshile's strategy of applying at a different office is evidence that there were limited opportunities for promotions at SATS, although his tenacious strategy could also have resulted in censure by the foreman. In general, the Eight's upward mobility, and probably that of other black employees, was thwarted by racism and their limited formal education. It is also possible that there may have been legitimate reasons for the lack of promotion opportunities, for example a dearth of vacant posts, but Molefe and Mamphaga, who applied unsuccessfully for promotion, believed that racism was the simple and overriding reason for their failure.

Individuals tend to interpret events within the framework of the concepts that dominate their consciousness. The Eight's experiences of apartheid and of SATS were suffused with racism, and consequently negative episodes were frequently attributed to racist practices. Their answers to questions put to them in court and their comments during my interviews with them suggested that they did not consider the possibility that their own inadequacies or limitations could be responsible for any of their failures. Because external forces such as the government, SATS, and the police had exerted such rigid control over their lives, these forces were liable to be blamed for all of their deprivations. This framework of attribution seems to have had important implications for the manner in which the Eight analysed events and accounted for their conduct during the strike. As I will illustrate in the next chapter, it perhaps encouraged the Eight to hold SATS and their perceived allies, the police and the non-strikers, completely responsible for the lack of resolution of the strike. These perceptions may have also fostered the Eight's belief that they had to resort to various strategies, such as violence, in order to hasten resolution of the dispute.

3.1.4 Disciplinary Measures at SATS

Disciplinary measures, ranging from fines to dismissal, were generally imposed if white supervisory and managerial staff judged black employees to have been unproductive or disrespectful, or not to have complied with certain work procedures. It also seems that severe penalties, such as dismissal, were occasionally imposed for minor misdemeanours. Nedzamba's dismissal, as a consequence of handing in R40 two days late, provides some evidence for this assertion.

In the same way as racism affected the Eight's wages and promotion opportunities, it also impacted on their experience of disciplinary measures. On no occasion did the Eight indicate that disciplinary measures may have been justified, or unaffected by racist practices. As in the case of promotion opportunities, this attitude appears to have stemmed partly from their perception that any negative action taken by whites against themselves, or any other black worker, was racist. However, the primary source of this perception appears to be the racism which characterised disciplinary measures. Netshitungulwane described one such incident to the court:

And at a certain stage, I am not so certain of the month, whether it was July or August whilst we were working there was a white man who was working together with a black man and these people were busy putting up a scaffold. Now when they were still busy putting up the scaffold … when they were supposed to have assisted one another in order to take up a piece of plank the white man refused to do that and then he said "you, the black man must do that, you must take the piece of plank up". The black man then asked the white man to assist him because … he was unable to take the plank up. Then the white man came across, he then said he did not want to work with a kaffir who did not understand.

At that stage he then chased him away and he called me to come and assist him, that is the white man. I also told him that look I would not be able to take that plank up alone. I then also said to him "look you have already said you do not want to work with a kaffir who does not understand so I am also a kaffir, so I do not want to come and work with you". He was then cross, he walked away in the direction of the office.

On his return he was accompanied by a foreman. The foreman had a paper with him, or a document with him and when they came to me the foreman asked me to sign, he showed me where to sign on that document. I refused to sign. I was then called into the office. I was then told that seeing that I did not want to work with that white man so a deduction of about R20 was then made I was then given a piece of paper, something was written on that paper that I should report back on duty the following day. On the following day as I returned I was then told to go back to work but at the end of the month I noticed that the R20 had been deducted. So I felt bad about that. (Court Record, p. 1825/26)

Matshile provided another example of the perception of racial prejudice in the disciplinary procedures:

If a black worker made a mistake it could go down in his file. When the same mistake is done by a white, it would not. If blacks were a few minutes late, they had to write a report, not so for whites. (Interview)

The majority of whites at SATS had the status of permanent employees, while most of the black employees, including the Eight, were temporary employees. Permanent employees obtained a host of financial benefits that were not available to temporary employees, particularly with respect to pensions and housing subsidies (Dison, Interview, 14/10/1993; Roussos, Interview, 18/10/1993). While the Eight were disenchanted with this system, they were particularly angered because their temporary status meant that they were more vulnerable to dismissal:

The thing that really worried me was that we always used to be threatened with dismissal. We had no permanent status and if anything went wrong or if you could be blamed for anything you would be threatened with dismissal. I was very upset about the unfair dismissals and it worried me that the Railways could just dismiss you. (Mamphaga, Interview)

Thus the Eight believed that they were vulnerable to capricious penalties and that promotion opportunities were blocked. This perception is likely to have ensured that they had little faith that individual action, such as increased productivity, would enable them to overcome their deprivation, and so it may have helped to lay the groundwork for the perception that collective action was the only avenue available to them to improve their occupational life.

4. Social Deprivation

One inevitable consequence of wretched wages and a dearth of access to the corridors of political power, is abysmal living conditions. Mamphaga lived in small, overcrowded house in Soweto, Matshile in a small room behind a church in Randfontein and Sibisi in a shack in Soweto. The remaining five members of the Eight lived in hostels and endured the most detrimental conditions. In my court reports on Dzevhe and Muangedzo I provided a brief description of some of the conditions that they and other hostel dwellers tolerated daily:

Mr Dzevhe lived in the Delmore hostel. He says he shared a room with fourteen others, it was overcrowded, there was little place to keep private belongings, the food was poor, money was deducted from his salary for food even when he did not eat there, and women were not permitted to visit. (Vogelman, Court Psychological Report)

Mr Maungedzo lived at a municipal hostel in Soweto. He reports that conditions at the hostel were poor. He shared a room with ten others, there was insufficient space for his possessions, there was little light, the ventilation was inadequate, visitors were limited and his wife was not allowed into the hostel. (Vogelman, Court Psychological Report)

These conditions caused aggravation and discomfort. The absence of storage space meant that the people occupying any of the top bunks, which three of the five did, had to store their possessions on their beds. Many of these belongings were stolen as theft was rife in the hostels. It was also difficult to sleep because of the cramped conditions. Hostel residents worked different shift times and so at night sleep would be disturbed by those people returning from the late shift, and in the morning, wakening was preempted by those leaving for early shifts. Residents' privacy was necessarily restricted because of the communal rooms, but their privacy was further eroded by the lack of enclosures in the ablution and toilet facilities. There were very few locations within the hostel where residents were not intruded upon or observed. These uncomfortable conditions were further exacerbated by the continual stench of inadequate sanitation.

Like most South African hostels, the hostels in which Dzevhe, Maungedzo, Molefe, Netshitungulwane and Rikhotso resided, were single sexed and people of the opposite sex were not permitted to even enter the hostels for visits. This was a source of immense aggravation to the five and more particularly to those, like Muangedzo, who were unable to bring their wives to their place of residence. One consequence of all male hostels is that the machismo culture prevalent in South Africa is further reinforced within them (Segal, 1991a). In view of the association between masculine pride and aggression (Hoch, 1979; Toch, 1972; Vogelman, 1990a), which I will explore in more detail in chapter seven, this machismo culture is likely to have further reduced inhibitions against the commission of violence during the strike.

Between 1980 and 1984, Sibisi lived in a hostel. He too complained that his family was not permitted to visit him and remonstrated about the lack of: privacy in the ablution facilities, mattresses, storage space, hot water, adequate cooking facilities, and cleanliness. These conditions were so abhorrent that Sibisi preferred to live in a squatter camp known as Mshengu Village, in Soweto, rather than in the hostel.⁵

In Mshengu Village, Sibisi shared a single bed with his wife, while his child slept on the floor. He also shared four mobile toilets with a thousand other residents, and there was no running water or electricity. In the evenings, residents had to queue for water and live by candlelight. However, in contrast to life at the hostel, Sibisi was able to share his life with his family, and this provided him with a measure of comfort (Vogelman, Court Psychological Report).

The Eight also had difficulty in finding recreational releases. Poverty, long work hours, lengthy travel time, the absence of electricity and poverty all impinged on the Eight in different ways. Molefe commented:

I arrived home from work between six and seven and I went again to work the next day at seven. I went to visit my friends and my family and sometimes I just slept. I was not able to go to any places because I was very penniless and you have to pay to go to any of the places. (Interview)

In essence, virtually every moment of the Eight's lives was tainted by some degree of discomfort. Their abysmal living conditions failed to provide a respite from workplace degradation and instead constituted an additional source of stress. Without exception, the Eight blamed the government's apartheid policies and SATS for their social deprivation. The Eight also held SATS responsible because their poor wages made it impossible for them to afford decent accommodation. For those, likes Dzevhe, who lived in a hostel owned by SATS, their anger towards SATS was further intensified.

Although Dzevhe and the other four members of the Eight who lived in hostels were more angry about their accommodation, in my interviews this did not seem to translate into a marked difference in their overall level of anger about their situation, or towards SATS. Thus there were similarities in their general level of anger although each of the Eight had issues, stemming from their own individual circumstances, which especially infuriated them - for example, Dzevhe's feelings about accommodation, and Matshile's dissatisfaction with promotion opportunities. All of the Eight, however, were similarly dissatisfied with their social conditions, all were keen to improve them and all believed that increased wages, together with other occupational improvements, would help them to achieve this aim. On this basis, social deprivation needs to be added to the combination of factors which contributed to their decision to join the strike.

4.1 Social Deprivation and Violence

Social deprivation can generate immense dissatisfaction, but it is not, as is sometimes assumed, the sole cause of collective violence. Lieberson and Silverman (1965), in their study of race riots in the United States in the 1960s, emphasize this point. Perry and Pugh (1978) also endorse such findings, with specific reference to housing conditions:

When cities that experienced a riot sometime between 1913 and 1963 are compared with riot free cities of similar size and region, it is impossible to statistically distinguish these cities on the basis of housing conditions. The sad truth is that dilapidated housing is so common in most American cities that it cannot be used to account for why riots occur in some cities but not in others. Moreover, housing conditions were actually improving for urban blacks in the period between 1940 and 1970 [N]early 40 percent of all black households lived in crowded conditions in 1940, but by 1970 the percentage was less than 20. For the most part, people were less crowded in the 1960s than in the 1950s, yet the riots occurred in the 1960s rather than in the 1950s. Bad housing isn't likely to make people happy, but bad housing in itself cannot explain the occurrence of riots. (p. 147)

Similarly, although the Eight's abysmal living conditions cannot fully account for their violence during the strike, they are likely to have contributed to this violence, albeit in a small way. The Eight's experience of social deprivation, together with the accompanying stresses, may have decreased their tolerance levels both prior to and during the strike. For example, with the exception of Matshile, all of the Eight complained of sleep disturbance. In itself, this is a cause of irritability and in some cases it can contribute significantly to aggressive and violent behaviour.

The Eight believed that striking was a means of improving their general quality of life, and that violence was a means of winning the strike (see chapter five). Thus their violence can be linked to their quest to improve their social conditions, as well as to their attempt to prevent any deterioration in their living standards when they became fearful that they would lose the strike.

Phases Three and Four:
Anger, Circumspect Non-Violent Protest and Frustration

Thus far, phases one and two of the model have outlined and integrated the Eight's deprivation, which encompasses both their actual conditions of hardship and their discontent with these conditions. In phases three and four of the model I will describe the Eight's anger, and their non-violent and circumspect protest stemming from their deprivation. I will also highlight the frustration that ensued when this protest was unsuccessful in ameliorating their conditions.

In the outline of my model in chapter two, I indicated that sadness and anger are two cardinal feelings associated with loss and discontent (American Psychiatric Association, 1987; Bettelheim & Rosenfeld, 1993). When sadness engulfs the individual, the result is often despondency and depression (Rohrbaugh, 1981). Although the Eight did express sadness in relation to some of their conditions and experiences, I found no evidence to suggest that they ever became overwhelmed by their sadness or that they were ever inordinately morose.

A host of reasons may account for this finding, but I will delineate only three. First, this result may be the consequence of the methodology of this study. In my interviews that were conducted as part of my role as an expert witness, although I did explore whether any of the Eight suffered from depression or related disorders, my focus was on their anger, as this was the dominant emotion that was expressed in answer to my questions. As an expert witness, one of my central objectives was to explain the Eight's violence and so I also concentrated on an analysis of those emotions, such as anger, that have been strongly associated with violence (Bettelheim, 1986; Fitch, 1970; Fromm, 1974; Gilligan, 1991). If I had examined the issue of sadness more closely, I may have unearthed more of the Eight's experiences of depression. A second reason may have been related to the Eight's reluctance to recall some of the pain associated with intense sadness and depression. Finally, it is possible that the Eight simply did not experience depressive episodes. Their anger may have been directed towards a number of external targets, such as SATS and the government, and this could have helped to subdue any strong feelings of sadness stemming from their experience of deprivation (Fitch, 1970; Rohrbaugh, 1981).

As the literature indicates that it is anger, rather than sadness, that is strongly associated with violence, this study focuses more on the anger elicited by the Eight's deprivation than on the depression. During their period of employment at SATS the Eight expressed their anger about their working and social conditions verbally, to work colleagues, family members and friends, on public transport and in their homes or neighbourhoods. They also expressed their anger towards white personnel and supervisors at SATS. All of the Eight cited at least one incident where they had challenged a white worker's racist jibe, or a supervisor's decision. When and how these grievances were articulated appeared to be dependant on a host of factors: the confidence of the particular individual; the extent of their anger; and the perceived risks of or opportunities for challenge. The balance of power, however, ensured that even Matshile, the most confident of the Eight, was only able to express his anger on a few occasions. For reasons which will be explored below, the Eight chose not to express their anger through the formal grievance procedures at SATS.

The grievance machinery was never explained to the Eight in any detail. Mike Roussos of SAHRWU also asserted that SATS managerial staff were themselves unclear about the specifics of these procedures (Roussos, Interview, 18/10/1993). The Eight generally understood the grievance procedure to operate as follows: the worker should approach a BLATU representative who would take the complaint to the foreman. The foreman would then report the matter to the station master, who was head of the depot. BLATU representatives, however, were apparently reluctant to report to the foreman because of their desire to be seen in a positive light by the white managers. And, even on the occasions when they did make reports, the foreman often did not bother to take the matter further. Employees could write directly to the station master but according to Mamphaga, if the foreman found this out the person "would be in trouble" (Reinterview, 16/10/1993).

In some cases where complaints were made directly to white authorities these authorities would deflect the complaint, saying that it should go through the recommended procedure, that is, that it should first be taken to BLATU. The Eight however were unanimous in their condemnation of BLATU, which they viewed as a vehicle through which management could communicate with the body of black workers, but not vice-versa.⁶ Mamphaga commented:

BLATU took an instruction from the white bosses to the black workers. But if the black workers had any grievances it would never go to the bosses. (Reinterview, 16/10/1993)

For the most part it was believed that BLATU took no action, or that it was unable to achieve any success. These perceptions were based on experiences such as the one described by Molefe below:

One of my main grievances were that quite often at the end of the month I would not get my pay cheque and the railway would say that I should wait until the end of next month to get my pay cheque. This happened three times while I was at SATS and it was very difficult because I had no money for my family. I complained at the head office and they said that I must just wait there will be a solution, but there were never ever any solution to my problem. I started seeing that I was just like a person who was unemployed because I was getting up in the morning for nothing because there is nothing from the railway.

When I complained to the authority they referred me to the shop stewards of BLATU. They told me to take my complaints there but when I did this those shop stewards did nothing about this. (Interview)

Incidents such as this one contributed to the discrediting of BLATU. Sibisi, who was a grade steward of BLATU, and responsible for relaying worker complaints to management, confirmed BLATU's ineffectuality. My court report detailed Sibisi's description of his work:

In his official capacity as a staff association grade steward, Mr Sibisi took complaints to management. These included: suspensions, assaults on black workers by co-white workers, late arrivals resulting, in reports and/or dismissals, poor living conditions in the residences and the compounds, inadequate sick and death benefits, sick persons who were taken to hospital often forfeited their accommodation, and people who were dismissed and had to wait many months before they would receive their wages. Mr Sibisi states that while he had a satisfactory relationship with Mr Radford, one of the central individuals who dealt with complaints, nothing much was done about problems raised. (Vogelman, Court Psychological Report).

Thus the Eight's reluctance to report their grievances stemmed largely from the belief that to do so was an exercise in futility. The objections that they did make were ignored. Rikhotso and Matshile commented:

Every time I went to the station master with my problem, nothing would be done. Never once was their help to me. (Rikhotso, Interview)

Nobody would listen to our problems. The railways would not answer our grievances and nothing happened after we spoke about our problems. (Matshile, Interview)

Mamphaga and Muangedzo provided more detailed accounts of their experience of the futility of making complaints:

One time they took R10,00 from my salary for coming late. I then asked them why my money was taken, they did not give me an answer. I never raised a problem with the railways again about this but I still am upset about that R10,00. At SATS it was hard to change things so I just left that R10,00. (Mamphaga, Interview)

Well I was not looked after [at SATS]. If I had some complaints they would not attend to my complaints. Well at one stage I complained about the boots and overall and I had to use my own money in order to buy those equipments. Well at the end of the month I would buy an overall and a pair of boots and each time I went to the authorities to complain about my clothes that when I was getting my clothes they said no we will attend to that, we will see. Up to today I am still waiting for their reply over my complaint of clothes. (Maungedzo, Court Record, p. 1762)

For the most part, the Eight made their complaints informally and verbally, because they feared that making a formal complaint or pursuing any of their grievances would lead to dismissal:

I would only complain once and I was very careful how I said it because I was afraid I would get fired. (Matshile, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)

I was afraid to raise complaints. It was a great risk. I thought I'd lose my job. (Molefe, Reinterview, 26/1/1991)

The Eight's fear of dismissal meant that they did little to contest disciplinary penalties. This acquiescence was yet another manifestation of their powerlessness. The Eight's inability to obtain their desired changes not only led to frustration but also to a continuation and intensification of their deprivation. For the Eight, the absence of adequate grievance redress procedures, like the dearth of political rights, was perceived as an additional hardship they had to endure. Furthermore their deprivation was probably intensified because the longer the deprivation continued the more resentful they are likely to have become.

Dzevhe commented that "after a time it does not help you to talk anymore" (Reinterview, 16/10/93). If this statement also reflects the experience of other members of the Eight, then it would seem that after a period of time the Eight's informal conversations with friends, family and colleagues, previously a primary avenue for the expression of anger, no longer produced a cathartic effect. The psychological release provided by such dialogue was probably outweighed by the inertia of their deprivations and frustrations. Paradoxically, these expressions of discontent may have begun to have a deleterious effect, because they emphasised the Eight's ineffectuality in ameliorating their deprivation and overcoming their frustration.

Although the Eight's behaviour at their workplace suggested a retreat into passivity, new attitudes characterised by militancy and borne of BLATU's ineffectuality and their supervisors' unsympathetic responses to complaints, were being established. These attitudes were based on the belief that SATS would not change willingly, and that a more combative strategy was required. The form of this strategy is likely to have been influenced by the Eight's heightened deprivation and frustration, their increased politicisation, the context of political insurrection, their knowledge about other successful strikes and SAHRWU's attempts to recruit members. The strike, which in the case of the Eight was the strategy of choice, will be described in chapter five.

Notes:

¹ The head of remuneration services for P. E. Corporate services, Naomi Brehm, said in January 1990 that the official rate of inflation was regarded by economists with great suspicion. The annual rate of inflation between 1980 and 1990 was believed to be between 25% and 30%, and not between 14% and 15% as officially stated (SAIRR, 1989/90).

² This figure was provided by Mike McDonald, head of the economics division, Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA) in a telephone interview on the 6th February, 1991, and the figure was calculated before the annual wage increases. By November 1987, the average had increased to R603,51.

³ Parker and Kleiner's (1966) study on mental illness evidenced similar findings. The most severe psychological disorders in the American black population were amongst those who compared themselves unfavourably with their close friends.

⁴ Studies have also found no significant differences between rioters and non-rioters in terms of employment. Caplan and Paige (1968) found that in Detroit, the incidence of unemployment for both rioters and non-rioters was almost identical, at 32%. Patterns of employment differences were however discovered in their examination of rioters and non-rioters in Newark, where rioters were more likely to be marginally employed than completely unemployed.

⁵ Immediately after leaving Nancefield hostel, Sibisi moved into an outside room of a house in Orlando East, Soweto, before moving to Mshengu Village.

⁶ BLATU officials did not receive any financial remuneration for their position in the trade union. These officials tended to be the older, and more conservative black employees, and they appear to have been motivated by their quest to obtain respect from white managers (Mamphaga, Reinterview 16/10/1993). When the strike broke out, BLA TU officials generally sided with SAHRWU. However, when it became clear, after the 31 st of March, that the strike was going to be one of long duration, they were among the first workers to break the strike (Dzevhe, Reinterview, 16/10/1993).

Chapter 5