The Pathway to Murder:
A Social Psychological Study of the
Evolution of Violence in an Industrial Disputeby Lloyd Vogelman
Chapter Five: Militant Aggression and Violence
Introduction
By March 1987 all of the Eight had experienced the deprivation-frustration cycle for years. As a result, it was increasingly likely that an incident symbolising their deprivation and frustration might trigger off behaviour that corresponded with the growing belief that their conditions could only be improved through militant aggression. This chapter corresponds with phases five to nine of the model, as it focuses on the Eight's militant aggression, in the form of the strike, the frustrations that emerged during the strike and the violence that resulted from this frustration. By way of introduction to these topics, I will provide a brief overview of the literature on strike causation and its relevance to the Eight.
1. Models and Theories of Strike Causation and their Relevance to the Eight
The Eight were not the initiators of the strike, they merely joined a strike undertaken by thousands of workers. Thus it is necessary to indicate from the outset that in referring to the Eight and strike causation, I am referring to them in the context of the group of employees to which they belonged. Also, as my sample did not include other strikers, I am unable to ascertain whether there were any characteristics unique to the Eight that made them more prone to join the strike. As regards the implications that strike involvement has for violence, later in this chapter I will demonstrate that it was the processes and events during the strike, as well as the lack of strike resolution, that led to violence. It is for this reason that militant aggression (phase five), which in this case study refers to the strike, precedes violence (phase seven).
The models and theories of strike causation that will be examined below generally assume: unionisation; the legality of strike maintenance behaviours such as picketing and consumer boycotts; political stability; and democratic and legitimate government (Kelly & Kelly; 1991; Kelly & Nicholson, 1980; Klandermans, 1984, 1986; Waddington, 1986). However, with the exception of unionisation, which was present to a limited and superficial extent, none of these conditions were present during the SATS strike. Nevertheless, these models and theories are useful because they reflect many of the causes that the Eight themselves attributed to their actions, and also some that they did not mention but which I believe may contribute to an explanation of their decision to join the strike.
The work of Bluen (1994), Kelly and Kelly (1992) and Kelly and Nicholson (1980) classifies the models and theories of strike causation into seven broad categories. Each of these models and theories, to a lesser or greater extent, evidences inconsistent findings (Bluen 1994), and certain of these models and theories are more appropriate for this study. In most cases, the connection between the Eight and the literature on causation is clearly evident - where this is not the case, I will indicate the association.
The first category of causes identified in the literature are those that relate to demographic attributes (Bluen, 1994; Kelly & Kelly, 1992). These studies attempt to predict attitudinal and behavioural militancy through the use of a myriad of individual attributes, for example, age and gender (Alutto & Belasco, 1974; Black, 1983; Fox & Wince, 1976; Kelly & Kelly, 1992). These studies are generally based on teacher samples, and they contend that the most militant individuals tend to be young males. Whether it is possible to generalise these characteristics to the Eight and other railway workers is extremely debatable. Furthermore, studies which focus purely on demographic variables often do not indicate why certain groups become militant or are prepared to strike (Bluen, 1994).
The second category relates strikes to characteristics of the company (Bluen, 1994), for example, size; production pattern; nature of the work (Kerr & Siegal, 1954) and earnings (McShane 1985; Snarr, 1975). Nature of the work and earnings are closely linked to the third category of causes: worker attitudes and job dissatisfaction. The latter is frequently linked with characteristics of modern industrial labour, such as monotonous work (Hackman & Lawler, 1971) and, inadequate career advancement (Alutto & Belasco, 1974). In categories two and three, it would seem that poor earnings and deficient promotion opportunities were particularly relevant to the Eight's decision to strike.
Category four encompasses union related strike predictors. Proponents of this view argue that union attitudes correlate with the intent to strike or strike conduct (Barling, Fullager, Kelloway & McElvie, 1992; Fullagher & Barling, 1989; Mellor, 1990; Ng, 1991; Premack & Hunter, 1988). Premack and Hunter (1988) assert that joining a union signifies a willingness to take part in strikes, while others emphasise the degree of union commitment (Barling et al., 1992; Mellor, 1990; Ng 1991) and participation in its activities (Coche & Bohr, 1974) as two important predictors of strikes. This category also includes those explanations that emphasise the role of union leaders as instigators of strikes (Salamon, 1992). The reasons for this instigation include acquiring prestige and influence over their members (Stagner & Eflal, 1982); garnering support prior to union elections (Bluen, 1994); or concealing their ineptitude at negotiations (Brett, 1980).
Not all of the indices in this category were applicable to the Eight, and some were applicable only to a few. For example, some of the Eight became members of SAHRWU before striking, while others only joined the union after striking. With respect to the instigation of the strike by union officials, SAHRWU organisers did embark on a massive recruiting campaign prior to the strike but in my interviews with the Eight I did not explore whether they, or any other workers, were encouraged to strike. If such appeals were made, they are likely to have been related to the quest to obtain recognition for SAHRWU, rather than to intra-union politics, such as the election of officials (Roussos, Interview, 18/10/93). Any role played by SAHRWU officials in the strike should, I believe, be viewed as a reflection rather than a cause of the conflict of interests that existed at SATS (Bluen, 1994). I will briefly revisit the subject of union instigation later in the chapter, in a discussion of Klandermans' theories of mobilisation.
In contrast to the theories outlined above, which emphasise the role of either management or labour, the fifth approach to strikes emphasizes social processes and intergroup relations (Kelly & Kelly, 1992). In Kerr and Siegal's (1954) isolated mass hypothesis they contend that certain industries, such as mining and dock work, are more prone to strikes because of the social isolation of the workforce from management. As a result the workforce develops its own distinctive norms and subculture. Underlying this argument is the assumption that contact between groups lessens ignorance about the other group and that amicable interpersonal relations reduce conflict and enhance intergroup relations (Kelly & Kelly, 1992). The latter assertion is questionable in light of Sherif's (1966) group studies which demonstrate the fragility of friendships and interpersonal relationships in the face of intergroup conflict. Also in this category are those explanations which view strikes as the product of poor industrial relations climates in which there is inadequate communication between management and workers, high levels of alienation, and little concern for people (Bowers, 1983).
Although interpersonal relations between the Eight and their supervisors were at a low ebb, seemingly as a consequence of their supervisors' authoritarian and racist attitudes (see chapter four), good interpersonal rapport is unlikely to have prevented the strike. In all probability, the conflict of interests over work conditions would have been too strong for personal affinities to supersede the intergroup antagonism which stemmed from this conflict.
Relative deprivation theory also fits into the category of social causation. Van der Merwe (1983) argues that the intergroup comparisons made by black workers in the Eastern Cape with the wealthy white community help to account for the high strike rates in the area. The case of the Eight also points to the importance of relative deprivation. In this case, however, while comparisons with the white community may have provoked political resentment, the unfavourable comparisons that were made with those more similar to them - other black workers - appeared to be more effective in precipitating the strike (Festinger, 1954) (see chapter four).
The sixth category of strike causation focuses on cognitive processes and individual decision making. In this category, two models predominate: Klandermans' (1984, 1986) value expectancy theory, and Waddington's (1986) social cognitive approach. The cognitive processes outlined by Klandermans and Waddington are relevant not only to the Eight's decision to strike, but also to their disappointment during the strike, and so I will devote a little more attention to them.
According to Klandermans (1984), social or union movements, unlike governments, have few means of compelling people to participate in the achievement of collective objectives. Persuasion is thus pivotal to their mobilisation. Two forms of mobilisation can be distinguished: consensus and action mobilisation. Consensus mobilisation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for action. It occurs when unions attempt to influence members' attitudes and beliefs, and in so doing gain support for their objectives. However, as workers consider not only the value of a particular objective but also the costs and benefits of its realisation, action mobilisation is also required. This form of mobilisation aims to influence behaviour, and a principal means of achieving this goal is to persuade union members that if they engage in the recommended action, such as striking, the benefits will outweigh the costs. This principle forms the basic tenet of Klandermans' (1984) theory:
The willingness to participate in any activity or action … is a function of the perceived costs and benefits of the participation in that activity or action. (p. 108)Perceived costs and benefits can be catalogued within the framework of three types of incentives: goal, social and reward motives. With respect to goal motives, to ensure participation, members must believe that a high level of participation is necessary; that other workers will participate; that costs will be widely distributed among them; and that action will lead to the achievement of the goal. These "expectations multiplied by the value of the intended goal, generate the worker's goal motive and hence the term value expectancy" (Kelly & Kelly, 1992; p. 251). Similarly, social motives are a consequence of the expected responses of significant others and the value of these responses. Reward motives are linked to the anticipated rewards and punishments stemming from participation, for example, wages and promotion opportunities.
As I studied Klandermans' theory after the stage of data collection, some of the issues that his theory raises were only covered coincidentally in my interviews with the Eight. As a result I will consider only a few of Klandermans' points, and some of this analysis is conjecture. With respect to mobilisation, although I am not familiar with the content of SAHRWU's recruiting programme or the manner in which they attempted to influence attitudes and behaviour, I have assumed, based on the resistance ideology of the time and the literature published by SAHRWU and COSATU, that great emphasis was placed on the potential of the collective as a vehicle for ameliorating living conditions. During the strike, a collective consciousness was evident and it was reflected in various ways, for example in slogans ("An injury to one is an injury to all"), and in the anger directed towards non-strikers for betraying the group. Evidence of the Eight's goal motives is reflected below in a number of statements made by the Eight. In these statements, they reveal their belief that only mass worker participation in the strike would secure their goals.
In terms of their social motives, most of the Eight held the position of head of their households, and this may have meant that family members did not have much influence on their decision to strike. Furthermore, their dependents may have' supported the strike because they too were oppressed and may have shared the Eight's perception that the strike would be successful and of short duration (see section 3.1.2).
Finally, with respect to reward motives, in line with Klandermans' theory I would postulate that it would be unlikely that the Eight would have embarked on the strike had they not believed that there was a small chance of victory. This attribution would probably have been based on the Eight's assumption that the strike would receive widespread support from other railway workers, and that there would be minimal personal costs (see section 3.1.4).
While aspects of Klandermans' (1984) theory may be pertinent to the Eight, Kelly and Kelly's (1992) criticisms of this theory are also worth noting. On the basis of examples of strikers who have embarked on strike action in order to uphold a moral principle, Kelly and Kelly assert that the costs of striking are not always evaluated. Thus contrary to Klandermans' assertions, consensus mobilisation alone was sufficient to persuade these workers to strike. Another limitation that Kelly and Kelly (1992) point to is that in some cases, although workers are concerned about the costs, they "simply accept that strike action involves sacrifices" (p. 253) and consequently they do not always include costs in their calculations before engaging in strike action. The extent to which the Eight evaluated the costs of strike action is unclear as the subject was only superficially explored in my interviews. It seems, however, that as a consequence of their expectations of the success of the strike, the Eight may have underestimated the costs of striking. These expectations will be examined later in the chapter. A final criticism that may be of relevance to a study of the Eight's strike action is Kelly and Kelly's assertion that Klandermans "assumes that workers make rational calculations before deciding to act but it would be just as plausible, and equally consistent with his data to suggest that workers first decide to act and then proceed to rationalise their decision with post hoc justifications" (p. 254).
Waddington's (1986) social cognitive theory identifies two prerequisites for strike action. Firstly, a group of workers must have sufficiently strong grievances to conclude that striking is justifiable. Secondly, in agreement with Klandermans, they must believe that the action will be fruitful. According to Waddington (1986), workers compare their position to other strikers in order to reduce the feelings of uncertainty that are characteristic of strikes. In so doing they also assume that they better understand management's plan and possible actions. Thus workers search for cognitive scripts which are:
Conceptual structures comprising an interlocking series of event chains (ie scenes or vignettes) defining how well-known situations are likely to proceed. Their obvious utility is that they lend structure to otherwise ambiguous events, providing the individual with a ready made basis for predicting future outcomes and why he or she might care to prevent them. (Waddington, 1986, p. 234)In chapter four I alluded to the Eight's use of the cognitive scripts of black workers in other industries who had successfully embarked on industrial action. Later in this chapter, in dealing with expectations about the success of the strike, I will provide evidence of the use of these scripts. In reality, the Eight's anticipation of success, which was partly based on this comparison, was mistaken and served only to increase their frustration when SATS did not respond positively to their demands.
According to Kelly and Kelly (1992), one weakness of Waddington's social cognitive approach is that it neglects to consider instances where workers "fail to locate any relevant scripts or have no personal experience of strike action on which to draw" (p. 256). This criticism appears to be partly true for the Eight, as they had managed to locate relevant scripts, but they themselves had no previous experience of strikes. Kelly and Kelly also assert that in the vast majority of strikes documented in the literature there is no evidence that strikers used cognitive scripts in the manner portrayed by Waddington. Whilst this criticism may be valid, it is important to bear in mind that strikers may also draw on scripts from others who are regarded as similar, but who have conducted their struggles outside of the workplace, for example, in the political and social arena. This appeared to be the case for the Eight (see section four and chapter seven).
The models of Kelly and Nicholson (1980) and Kelly and Kelly (1992) fit into the seventh category, namely multi-dimension causality. These models incorporate political, economic, social, psychological and institutional processes into their explanations. Kelly and Kelly refer to their approach as a contingency model of psychological and situational determinants. They propose a two by two matrix: personal versus social identity and novel versus familiar situations, and contend that different modes of decision making apply under different psychological and situational circumstances.
Kelly and Kelly (1992) assert that when personal identity is more salient to workers than social identity, cost-benefit calculations will assume greater importance. However, when social identity (defining oneself according to race, class, occupation etc.) is dominant, then "cost-benefit calculations will be less important than group norms" (Kelly & Kelly, 1992, p. 262). With respect to the novelty versus familiarity dimension, they posit, using the work of Klandermans and Waddington, that cost-benefit estimations are most likely to be used when workers, are in novel situations - for example, in the case of the Eight, they had no previous experience of strikes.
In their integrated model of strike causation and process, Kelly and Nicholson distinguish three different elements in strikes: issues, triggers, and demands. Their model begins with the social psychological context of strikes - an industrial relations climate that is influenced by a number of components. The first component they identify is the worker's frame of reference. This refers to the value orientations that engender particular perceptions of the world, for example, racist or socialist. A second component, derived from group theory (Allport, 1954; Brown, 1988; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel, 1981), relates to perceptions of particular actors and groups, which they have termed intergroup perceptions. The third and crucial element consists of the issues and grievances related to the workplace, which may be linked to the broader economic environment. This environment may either provoke or exacerbate these grievances and so inhibit or facilitate their resolution.
The next phase of the model introduces contingent factors, such as the willingness to engage in action, structural facilitation and the presence of triggers. Once a strike has commenced, demand formulation is the next important phase. Three central processes are distinguished: interparty bargaining, intraparty bargaining and strike maintenance. Interparty negotiation refers primarily to negotiation between management and union; intraparty negotiation to the communications between union leaders and rank and file members; and strike maintenance to activities such as picketing and consumer boycotts.
Inter- and intra-bargaining and strike maintenance give rise to a series of "transitional outputs". These are structural strike facilitators and suppressors which affect the strikers' cohesion and morale. Strike content is another output which refers to the modified demands generated throughout the strike. These transitional outputs then result in final outputs - the substantive and procedural rules stemming from the strike, and the strike's impact on the industrial relations climate, thereby introducing a feedback effect.
Kelly and Nicholson's model was particularly useful for the purposes of this study. In terms of their frame of reference, the Eight were oppressed both as workers and as blacks and they believed that they could only obtain their objectives as a collective. As a consequence of their appalling work conditions, numerous issues were sources of discontent, and they believed that these needed to be rectified. Furthermore, their work conditions created a very negative perception of SATS as a group. Overlaying this dissatisfaction and quest for change was a context of heightened political resistance, a union recruiting campaign and an economic environment in which many black workers had made solid economic progress through their unions and strikes. Seemingly, all that was required was a trigger to take them into a new phase. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the phase of militant aggression, and the subsequent phases which culminated in the Eight's participation in the murders of non-strikers on the 28th April 1987.
2. Phase Five: Militant Aggression - The Strike
Nedzamba's dismissal, on the 12th March, 1987, was viewed by the collective of black workers as inordinately unjust (Anstey, Court Record; Molemohi, Court Record), and it triggered their strike action. In March and April every year, around the time when annual bonuses were paid, SATS regularly dismissed large numbers of black workers. These dismissals were viewed as an attempt by SATS to reduce expenses, and consequently provoked enormous antagonism (Anstey, 1990). The suspicion that Nedzamba's dismissal signalled the start of large-scale unwarranted dismissals, and the perception that their jobs too might be in danger, prompted workers at the City Deep depot to embark on a strike (Anstey, 1990). In his expert evidence, Anstey remarked:
The dismissal of Andrew Nedzamba appears questionable in terms of both procedural and substantive fairness. … [A] detailed examination of this aspect of the case would be misleading however. The central issue is that Nedzamba's fellow workers perceived the act as so unjust as to warrant strike action. (Court Record, p. 1071)The strike spread quickly from City Deep to other depots. By the 24th March 1987 the number of strikers was estimated to be 8,400 by SATS, and 14,000 by SAHRWU (Anstey, Court Record, p. 1081). Although the histories of the SATS workers differed, the similarity in their occupational positions and the nature of their work relationships at their depots seemed to engender an overwhelming identification with the plight of Andrew Nedzamba. They also shared feelings of hostility towards SATS about dismissals and other work conditions and a desire to transform their occupational life (Anstey, Court Record; Molemohi, Court Record). Although Muangedzo, Rikhotso, Mamphaga and Matshile worked at different depots and did not know each other prior to the strike, the statements below reflect some of the similarities in their motivation for striking.
Muangedzo, who was informed of "Andrew's case and the strike" (Court Record, p. 1762), by three City Deep strikers, said:
I left the work, sat down, thought within myself, thought of my own problems. … I then decided to join the strike. … I then joined the strike on 23 March … well I joined the strike so that maybe some of my complaints would be rectified. (Court Record, p. 1762/3)Rikhotso and Mamphaga stated respectively:
Firstly, the way in which they dismissed Andrew, it is possible that it can also happen to me, because also where I worked I had a problem, or complaints, and I thought that if Andrew's case comes right, it is possible that other problems or complaints that I also had can also be put right. (Rikhotso, Court Record p. 1702)Everybody kept on saying we are now tired about the handling of the conditions here at work. We have to side with Andrew because Andrew's case was also involving us. The manner in which we are being handled by our employer it does not satisfy us and all of us then joined the strike. (Mamphaga, Court Record, p. 1599-1600) … . I felt pleased about the strike. I saw no other way to solve our problems and difficulties at the workplace and I saw that the strike would open an avenue to us. (Mamphaga, Interview)And Matshile commented:
I was sad about that [the dismissal of Andrew Nedzamba] because I spoke with [other workers] and said that it is possible that Andrew had been expelled for nothing. … Seeing that now my heart was painful over this and further on I had complaints of my own we then also left our duties and went away in order to find out whether it was the truth what we had heard. (Court Record, p. 1530)Well the dismissal of Andrew it affected us workers. If we were to just left it there that Andrew should be dismissed in that manner tomorrow or the next day it would be somebody else or it would be myself being in the same situation. Now as it was we workers we then thought we should assist or come together. Then the strike continued so as to make that our problems, all the complaints which we had at different places of work should be able to be solved. (Court Record, p. 1532)These assertions provide evidence of the Eight's deprivation, their despair about previous attempts at grievance redress, their belief that striking was the only alternative available to them and the perception that this was an opportune time to improve their work conditions.
The above statements also reveal another important dimension of the strike: the role of identity. The two primary elements that constitute identity are the personal (personality) and the social (membership of a particular group) (Kelly & Kelly, 1992; Tajfel, 1978). While group concerns were paramount to Muangedzo and Rikhotso, their statements also reveal their own personal concerns. Mamphaga and Matshile on the other hand clearly emphasise a view of themselves as part of a collective with a shared history and hardship, and a belief that as a collective it would be possible to obtain the improvements they desired. The salience of their social identity is also revealed in the above statements through the use of the pronouns "we", "our" and "us". Group theory suggests and it is partly confirmed by this study, that when social identity becomes paramount, the individual becomes particularly concerned about promoting group interests (Brown, 1988; Kelly & Kelly, 1992; Tajfel 1981). However, even in these situations personal interests do not disappear, and self interest may be advanced by the promotion of group interests.
Group theory offers two other insights pertinent to this study (Brown 1986, 1988; Janis, 1983; Kelly & Kelly, 1992; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel, 1978, 1981). The first of these, especially relevant given the Eight's negative stereotyping of the non-strikers (see section 3.2.4), is that a positive relationship exists between group identity and the increased stereotyping of members of other groups (Brown, 1988; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel, 1978, 1981), and between group identity and the demonstration of more extreme and polarized attitudes regarding group relevant matters (Brown, 1986, 1988; Johnson, 1974; Kelly & Kelly, 1992). The second finding is that once group identification has been established, identifications with other associated social groups may become more pronounced (Kelly & Kelly, 1992). In the case of the Eight, one of these associated social groups may have been the ANC liberation fighters. The issue of the Eight's identification with these liberation fighters will be explored further in chapter seven, where I will address the possibility that the Eight may have interpreted their violence against the non-strikers as an act of political liberation.
While the Eight's actions were partly the consequence of a shared social identity with other black workers at SATS, the strike itself may have helped to enhance the bonds between the Eight and other strikers. These bonds were perhaps reinforced because of intergroup conflict (see section 3.2.2) and the Eight's belief that collective action was essential to win the strike (see section 3.1.4), but also because during the meetings in COSATU House their social identities seemingly converged with those of similar others (Smelser, 1962). Thus meeting in one location provided an impetus for their greater integration into the group.1
In chapter four I indicated that during their employment at SATS the Eight and other black workers received different wages. Although these differences did not appear to be a source of resentment for the Eight, any tension that may have existed may have been dissipated by the strike because during the dispute the strikers did not earn a wage.2 Another area which was not explored with the Eight, and which does not appear to have received much attention in the literature, is the question of whether, in the midst of a strike, comparisons in terms of earnings are made with other workers in other sectors of the economy who are not on strike.
The strike may have also served as a unifying force because it generated new definitions of self and shared experiences. Regarding the former, strike action appeared to have generated a perception amongst the Eight that they were powerful, rather than submissive, in relation to political and work authority. Their strike action reflected what Forward and Williams (1970) refer to as internal control: the belief that social rewards are contingent upon action, and that the individual has the capacity to shape his or her own destiny.3 For the Eight, however, their potential to reshape their world was premised on the need to act as a collective (see section 3.1.4).
Because they congregated at COSATU House on an almost daily basis, the Eight were exposed to identical events, some of which are likely to have provoked similar changes in self definition. For example, they would have encountered intermittent police harassment and violence (see section 3.2.3). Such experiences may have created a shared view of themselves as direct victims of police violence. Common experiences, particularly when they are traumatic, frequently emphasise for the survivors that their fates are interdependent (Billig, 1976). In this way the Eight's bonding with other strikers may have been intensified. The regular contact that the Eight had with other strikers during the dispute was an important vehicle for this bonding.
2.1 Regular Contact with Other Strikers During the Strike
Many of the Eight were either acquaintances or friends with other strikers prior to the dispute. They had either worked at the same depot; lived in the same hostel or neighbourhood; travelled to work together on public transport; or shared the same recreational facilities. In the same way as this contact would have highlighted the parallels in their deprivations and frustrations, their convergence at COSATU House was a reminder of their shared resentment of SATS.
Casual conversations and public enunciations from the stage in the big hall served to further remind them of their hardships and their resentment. Dzevhe commented:
During the discussions about the problem with SATS I felt tense. The problems discussed were exactly the problems at our workplace. It made me angry because it reminded me of the problems. Sometimes you can have a problem, but you live with it. But then others also say they have the same problem and they complain about it and from then on you begin to feel the pain. (Interview)The Eight's sense of group cohesion may have also been enhanced by a host of joint, and at times banal, activities during the day. These activities included pooling their money to buy bread and beverages, singing, dancing, and drinking alcohol. At this point I will only comment on the drinking of alcohol in COSATU House, as I address the subject of singing and dancing in section 4.1.4.3, which focuses on the atmosphere of heightened emotion in COSATU House. According. to the Eight, the drinking of alcohol in COSATU House was not excessive, and it took place mainly in the corners of the big hall, in the small halls and sometimes on the pavements outside of COSATU House. Whilst drinking, the strikers discussed their personal frustrations and seemingly assuaged their anxieties by mutual reassurance and re-affirmation of their commitment to the group and the strike.4
In the following chapter it will become evident that violence, like singing, dancing and drinking, became an ordinary day to day activity for the Eight. This behaviour also became a means of strengthening the bonds between the Eight and their fellow participants. The following section delineates the phase that preceded the Eight's violence: frustration and the intensification of deprivation.
3. Phase Six: Frustration Despite the Use of Militant Aggression
In the strike diary (chapter three) I detailed the negotiations between the various parties in the strike: SATS, BLATU, the strikers and their representatives. As a result of the lack of progress in these negotiations, the deprivation that had sparked off the militant aggression showed no sign of improvement. Consequently, the perception that their militant aggression in the form of the strike was not successful, meant that the Eight began to experience frustration.
As I will indicate in the following section, the Eight faced both internal and external sources of frustration during the strike. The former were precipitated by their own expectations about the strike process and SATS' response to their demands, while the latter were a consequence of the conditions imposed on them by the trio comprising of non-strikers, SATS and the police. As the strike progressed, the Eight's experience of these frustrations increased incrementally.
3.1 Internal Sources of Frustration
3.1.1 Expectations in the Context of Power Imbalances
In my earlier discussion of Klandermans' (1984) work, I suggested that the Eight would not have gone on strike had they not expected to triumph. Paradoxically, this expectation may have arisen partly as a result of their inability to comprehend the extent of the power imbalance in favour of SATS.
Like the vast majority of strikers in this dispute, the Eight approached the strike with little or no prior experience of labour disputes or negotiations (Campbell, Interview, 1/8/1994). Their union was similarly inexperienced. Although SAHRWU had been established in 1936, over the years its membership had declined and it had only recently been rejuvenated after the founding of COSATU in 1985 (Roussos, Interview, 18/10/1993). During and subsequent to 1985, it emerged as a militant union, through its declarations concerning apartheid and the "bosses". The union also had limited financial resources, an inefficient administration, and a leadership lacking in the skills required for negotiation and the control of large militant worker crowds (Campbell, Interview, 1/8/1994) (see chapter six).
The strikers' ability to arrest production by withholding their labour was hampered by the lack of financial resources available to them (Business Day, 8 April 1987). As a result of the elementary nature of the South African welfare system, they could not derive any significant welfare payments and they had little or no personal savings and almost no relatives who could provide them with financial support. Union strike funds were negligible and restrictions on the political organisations that supported the unions made it difficult for these organisations to collect monies on the strikers' behalf. These financial pressures meant that there was strong potential for strike breaking in the case of a protracted strike. It was also difficult to ensure strike unity because of the legal restrictions, such as those affecting picketing - a form of non-violent protest designed to exert moral pressure on strike breakers or potential strike breakers (Webster & Simpson, 1990).
The strikers were further disadvantaged because they were mostly unskilled and there was a large of pool of unemployed workers who could and who in all likelihood were willing to, replace them. The knowledge that they were easily replaceable may have provided much of the impetus for the strike breaking that was to occur after 31st March. For those strikers who, like some of the Eight, lived in SATS hostels, the consequences of being replaced or dismissed were even more profound, as their accommodation was dependent on their employment at SATS.
The authoritarianism and racism that characterised SATS (see chapter four), meant that it was unlikely that SATS would be influenced by moral criticism of their poor treatment of their black employees. SATS was also a government-owned body, and so although management was concerned about financial loss, government sponsorship ensured that there was less pressure to avoid financial mishap and so less urgency to reach a speedy settlement (Joffe, 1990). At that time, the South African government had almost unbridled political power, and so management could rely on the brisk passage of legislation to assist them in the dispute. This advantage was evident when the SATS General Manager was given powers of mass dismissal on the 23rd March (see chapter three).
SATS had, in the form of the South African Police (SAP), the equivalent of their own private militia. At the time, the SAP did little to conceal its political partisanship to the government and its allies and was rewarded with almost total impunity for acts of unprovoked violence. Because the strikers were seen by the government to have endangered the economic interests of the country, and in addition were members of SAHRWU and COSATU and part of the "communist onslaught" against South Africa, they were defined by SATS and the government as the "enemy" (COSATU, 1987; Financial Mail, 24 April 1987). Thus there was little doubt that the police would take action against the strikers if SATS requested their assistance, which they did from the outset of the strike. SATS' use of the police and of the military culminated in the adoption of the strategic plan "Operasie Telbord" (Operation Scoreboard) on the 20th April. This strategy was designed to crush the strike by increasing the costs to strikers through detentions, breaking of the consumer boycott and dismissals.
In this context, it was unlikely that the Eight's expectation that SATS would soon capitulate to the strikers demands would be realised. This expectation, along with many others, was rooted in the assumption that SATS would be overwhelmed by the strikers' demonstration of collective strength.
3.1.2 Expectations about Negotiations and the Duration of the Strike
In this section I will illustrate that the Eight believed that negotiations with SATS would herald an immediate and propitious response. This assumption may have originated in their lack of experience in industrial disputes and their lack of awareness of the lengthy negotiations that sometimes characterise strikes. In Rikhotso's court evidence for instance, he articulated his belief that once negotiations with SATS had been initiated "I thought that maybe all our complaints would be corrected" (Court Record, p. 1704).
Rikhotso did not anticipate that negotiations might not take place at all, that they might only have commenced at a much later stage, or that they could be terminated at any stage. Much of his optimism stemmed from his knowledge of the "OK strike", where, as he understood the situation, all of the workers' demands were met. He believed that this success was founded solely on collective solidarity and he did not consider that other elements may have contributed to this victory. For example, the union representing the OK Bazaars workers, the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) was formally recognised, stronger and more established than SAHRWU. The OK Bazaars, which was popular with black consumers, was also a private retail outlet in a competitive retail market. Unlike SATS, the OK Bazaars did not monopolize its market, and so it was more vulnerable to a black consumer boycott in support of the strikers. Consequently, it may have been more anxious to reach a settlement.
Within the framework of Waddington's (1986) social cognitive theory, Rikhotso's scripting of the events of the OK Bazaars strike resulted in cognitive distortions. Rikhotso failed to realise that his situation differed from that of other black strikers in other sectors, and that the past struggles of others are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the successful adoption of similar tactics in other situations (Kelly & Kelly, 1992).
In addition to their belief that SATS would enter into negotiations in good faith, the Eight were also confident that the dispute would be resolved quickly. Rikhotso believed that the strike would last for a maximum of two to three weeks (Court Record, p. 1704), a view which was shared by Matshile (Vogelman, Court Psychological Report), while Muangedzo believed that the dispute would end almost immediately: "I thought it would be a matter of two or three days" (Court Record, p. 1764). Netshitungulwane, under cross examination by state prosecutor Hayes, evidenced similar expectations:
Netshitungulwane: Well, from the time I participated in the strike, I thought it would only take a short time. I did not lose hope.Mr Hayes: When you heard that the transport services did not want to talk to the workers any more [after the 31st March], did you believe it?Netshitungulwane: Well I did hear of that, they did talk about that, but I myself didn't believe it, and I still did not lose hope. (Court Record, p. 1849)Netshitungulwane's answers reflect his initial difficulty in integrating the reality of SATS' refusal to negotiate (after the 31st March) into his preconceived ideas about the process and outcome of negotiation. His continued belief in the success of the strike, despite evidence to the contrary, may have partly been fostered by the pronouncements of union leaders and other strikers that the strike had had a profound impact on SATS and was heading for victory (Hartley et al., 1983). However, as SATS' refusal to negotiate became more explicit after the 31st March, much of Netshitungulwane's hope dissipated into increasing frustration about the absence of a fruitful resolution to the dispute (Vogelman, Court Psychological Report). The protracted nature of the strike also highlighted another of the expectations of the Eight that was not fulfilled, namely the payment of wages.3.1.3 Expectations about Payment Whilst on Strike
The Eight anticipated that they would be paid whilst on strike, although this was not standard practice in labour disputes in South Africa. In the course of the strike, this expectation became an immutable demand that SATS pay the workers for the time they were on strike. The origins of this expectation are not clear, but like their other expectations, it may have stemmed from their inadequate knowledge of industrial disputes and from scripts borrowed from other disputes.
While this expectation was legitimate, particularly if SATS were found to have acted unfairly against Andrew Nedzamba, the demand was a contentious one and one which SATS was likely to resist. A strike is, in part, a trial of strength between workers and management. For management, the "no work no pay" strategy is an obvious one, because besides limiting its own monetary costs, the greater the financial cost to the strikers, the greater the pressure to return to work (Anstey, Court Record, p. 1102).
SATS had a long history of unilaterally blocking the aspirations of black workers, and this seemed to promote a tendency amongst the Eight to perceive any refutation of their demands as arbitrary and unfair. In the interviews, many of the Eight stated that SATS' intransigence on the issue of payment during the strike, especially after the 31st of March, was unjust, or in the words of Dzevhe, "not right" (Interview). This may have been experienced as yet another attempt to frustrate the achievement of legitimate demands, and so the Eight might not have viewed this strategy as part and parcel of normal, legitimate tactics utilised by management in a labour dispute. And, because the Eight may have interpreted a non-arbitrary frustration as an arbitrary one, their anger about their demand not having been met may have intensified (Pastore, 1952).
3.1.4 Expectations about Unanimous Support for the Strike
The expectation that the dispute would be of short duration and would be successful was largely premised on the belief that all black employees would endorse the strike action, and would continue to do so until SATS agreed to their demands. As Dzevhe remarked: "We could win this strike provided we co-operated as workers who could stand as one unit" (Court Record, p. 1250). The Eight's assumptions of solidarity were, however, incorrect. While black SATS employees may have been united in their dissatisfaction with their working conditions, it seems that there was lesser consensus about the action to be undertaken to improve these conditions. The perceived risks of striking probably inhibited a number of workers from joining the strike, and even those workers who did strike did so for different time periods. Financial pressures, fear of dismissal and a growing perception - after SATS withdrew from negotiations on the 31st March - that the strike may not be won, seemed to result in a flagging commitment to the strike and an increasing drift back to work from the beginning of April.
Political factors also appeared to impact on the Eight's expectations of unity. The political ethic that the oppressed should sustain and support each other was popular in both COSATU and ANC aligned circles at that time. This ethic was encapsulated in the fashionable slogan that the Eight, together with thousands of other strikers, would recite: "An injury to one is an injury to all". Because the Eight had limited access to political and financial resources, the collective was looked on as a shield against political and economic subjugation, as well as a means of asserting their power.
The strength of the Eight's expectation of solidarity seemed to increase as the conflict intensified. This dynamic accounts for much of the Eight's intolerance towards the non-strikers. Anstey, in his court evidence, commented:
Groups mobilising for survival or conflict purposes become intolerant of non-conformists in their efforts to maintain cohesiveness for purposes of strength. (Court Record, p. 1092)The increased conflict between the Eight, their group and the non-strikers had a number of other effects on the strikers' intragroup dynamics. I will return to this in more detail, particularly in the next chapter, but at this point I will focus on intergroup dynamics and the Eight's primary sources of external frustration.
3.2 External Agents of Frustration
In the subsections below it will become apparent that in line with group theory, the Eight were intensely antagonistic towards the non-strikers, SATS and the police because they felt that the goals of their own group (the ingroup) were at variance with the goals of these other groups (the outgroups) (Brown, 1986, 1988; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel, 1981). The Eight had no sense of the existence of super-ordinate goals, goals which all groups desired and which required some co-operation between the groups (Sherif, 1966). The Eight believed that their interests were unambiguously distinct from the other groups and that these outgroups, in their determination to obtain goals that were important to them, did their best to undermine the strikers. In my interviews and in their evidence to the court, the Eight identified three major outgroups and external agents of frustration: the strike breakers, SATS, and the police.
3.2.1 Strike Breakers
3.2.1.1 Black non-strikers
In the interviews the Eight articulated their belief that it was in the strikers' interests to ensure that the strike was as expensive as possible for SATS. The Eight assumed that the less work done at the depots, the greater the losses that would be suffered by SATS, and the more eager SATS would be to settle the dispute. From this perspective, strike breakers effectively ensured that production could continue, so that SATS would be less motivated to compromise and the strike was prolonged (Matshile, Court Record, p. 1537). Matshile and Mamphaga articulated this belief:
I thought that it is these people (the non-strikers) that are making this strike go on (Matshile, Court Record, p. 1709). … I was cross because why, because those scabs were breaking our chance, while we were waiting for the result from SATS. (Matshile, Interview)I was angry that there were those who were returning to work. I felt that those who returning to work were delaying the strike and delay us returning to work. I believed that it would stall management in coming to a settlement with us. I saw that if people went back to work, they would delay the strike and there would be no further negotiations. (Mamphaga, Interview)As a consequence of the belief that the non-strikers had the potential to thwart the goals of the strike, the Eight held them responsible for frustrating their attempts at improving their occupational conditions and the economic wellbeing of themselves, their families and their group. In Matshile's words: "I feel bad. What made me feel bad about the scabs was because we were trying to fix our problems and they break our chance to fix them" (Matshile, Interview). As the strike progressed and the Eight's deprivation intensified (see section 3.3) they held the non-strikers responsible not only for the obstruction of their economic advancement, but also I for the economic adversity suffered during the strike.
3.2.1.2 White non-strikers
The racial and political animosity between black and white workers at SATS probably accounts for why, as the Eight expected, white workers did not join them in solidarity action. There was also a second group of white non-strikers - those workers that were employed, some from the outset of the dispute, as replacement labour. Later this replacement labour was extended to the recruitment of white school children to do odd jobs (Business Day, 8/4/1987). In public interviews, SATS intimated that these white replacement workers were more productive than their black counterparts (Business Day, 8/4/1987). In view of the climate of racial and political conflict in South Africa, the Eight's experience of racism in and outside of SATS and their resentment that white employees at SATS capitalised on black workers' productivity (see chapter four), it is not difficult to discern why the Eight were so angered by these public interviews and why they further inflamed the Eight's hostility towards SATS.
The Eight believed that the white non-strikers, like their black counterparts, frustrated their goals because they ensured the continuation or resumption of production at various SATS depots. The most obvious instance of the latter was on the 16th March, at the City Deep depot, when white drivers complied with the request to drive trucks normally driven by black drivers. This behaviour was seen by City Deep strikers as an attempt to obstruct the success of their action and as a result the strikers blocked the entrance of the depot with their vehicles so as to ensure that movement in and out of the depot was prevented (Anstey, 1990). The strikers' actions were significant in that they were the first indicator of an escalation in the conflict which had now progressed from the withdrawal of labour to obstruction of the work process (Anstey, 1990).
3.2.2 SATS
In the following sections I will attempt to illustrate the various procedures adopted by SATS that contributed to the escalation of conflict. These procedures probably also served to confirm the Eight's perception that SATS was deliberately frustrating the strikers' quest for a salutary settlement.
3.2.2.1 Supervisors' non-acknowledgement of grievance and protest
The hostile response of white supervisors to the strike action at their depots appeared to be the precursor to the antagonistic stance that SATS management would adopt. Sibisi stated that when he approached a senior official at his depot (Kaserne) about the strike at City Deep, this official sarcastically replied that he had never heard of the City Deep depot (Vogelman, Court Psychological Report). Dzevhe reported that he was confronted with an overtly aggressive attitude from his supervisor:
I … went to my office to go and pick up my briefcase. On my way to the office I then met the supervisor, Mr Hennie Booysen. He wanted to know where I was going to and what I wanted. I then told him that I was going to pick up my briefcase. He then said to me: "look here you should never set your foot here seeing that you are not working, so you are being dismissed". I felt bad about it and I notice now that the supervisor wanted to fight with me and I did not want to fight with him. (Court Record, p. 1232)Dzevhe's interaction with his supervisor suggests, in contradiction to the assertions of some authors (Kerr & Siegal, 1954), that interpersonal contact does not always have a positive effect on intergroup relations (Kelly & Kelly, 1992). In this instance, contact instead of eroding stereotypes, is likely to have reinforced them and to have strengthened Dzevhe's perceptions of the incongruities in beliefs, attitudes and interests between his group and SATS.
3.2.2.2 Length of disputes and proliferation of demands
Earlier in this chapter I referred to Kelly and Nicholson's (1980) proposition that the content of strikes be analysed in terms of issues, triggers and demands. While the trigger in the SATS strike was obvious and distinct, the distinction between issues and demands was less conspicuous, and most issues - such as wages and unsatisfactory work conditions - were translated into demands. The failure to swiftly resolve the trigger event of Nedzamba's dismissal and other demands relating to occupational conditions prolonged the dispute and, as a result, new demands pertaining to the dispute itself emerged.
One of the most central of these new demands was that the strikers be paid whilst on strike (see section 3.1.3). The longer the strike continued, the more important this demand seemed to become to both the Eight and other strikers; and the more important it became, the less willing the strikers seemed to be to reach a compromise on the demand. This in itself then contributed to the lack of resolution of the strike. The sections that follow will examine some of the other principal reasons for the prolongation of the dispute.
3.2.2.3 Failure to keep channels of communication open
During the strike, and particularly in its initial stages, SATS failed to keep lines of communication open. On the third day of the strike, the 16th March, the regional manager, Le Roux, did not arrive at an arranged meeting with City Deep depot strikers, nor did he convey his apologies. This incident intensified underlying antagonism and engendered suspicion about future SATS' undertakings as one of the strikers' primary grievances was management's indifference to worker complaints, and their failure to establish adequate grievance redress procedures (Anstey, Court Record). Isaac Molemohi, who was also a member of the strikers' negotiating committee at City Deep, stated:
That then showed us that Le Roux does not take our complaints seriously and does not take much notice of us as workers. (Court Record, p. 1073)Earlier, I indicated that the rationale behind the barricading of gates at the City Deep depot was to put a stop to the work of white strike breakers. However, it may not be merely a coincidence that this incident occurred on the day that Le Roux failed to arrive for his meeting with the strikers.
3.2.2.4 Management's false claim of neutrality
SATS management's contradictory presentation of themselves was revealed on 17th March, the fourth day of the strike. Barendt, who was in the employ of SATS, approached the City Deep strikers with the claim that he was a neutral party who would assist them in resolving the strike. The former claim was immediately refuted by some of the strikers, who recognised him as a SATS employee (Molemohi, Court Record, p. 803). In the early hours of the following morning, the absurdity of Barendt's claim of neutrality was emphasized when he accompanied the police to deliver the court interdict ordering strikers to desist from disrupting work at the depot.
As I did not interview Barendt, the nature of his assertion of neutrality remains obscure. It is possible that Barendt shared the racist beliefs of the organisation he represented (see chapter four), and so he may have assumed that black workers were witless. His assertion of neutrality may also have derived from a unitary perspective of labour relations, where it is presumed that there is no conflict of interests between labour and management, and that the role of human resources personnel is to act as an intermediary between management and its employees (Anstey, 1990). From the strikers' perspective, however, this was not the case. Even if Barendt's claim of neutrality had been valid, his appointment as "mediator" reflected another contentious issue: SATS' unilateral approach to decision making (Dison, Interview, 14/10/93).
3.2.2.5 Unilateral decision making
For much of the dispute SATS adopted a unilateral style of decision making. The 20th March, when a special Government Gazette conferred powers of mass dismissal on the General Manager of SATS, provided an excellent illustration of this policy. This new policy infuriated the strikers - not only did it increase SATS' power, but, in light of SATS' constant exhortations that it was policy that prevented negotiations with SAHRWU (Anstey, Court Record, p. 1079), it also demonstrated how quickly SATS would alter policy when it was in their interests to do so.
There were numerous other instances of unilateral decision making. On the 31st of March, SATS decided to appoint its own negotiators from each depot. When these appointed negotiators withdrew and negotiations were instituted with striker representatives, SATS insisted that they would only negotiate with striker representatives from City Deep. This decision may have been an attempt to de-escalate the conflict by focusing on the point of origin, but it was also a change in the negotiation process that was unilaterally imposed by SATS (Anstey, Court Record, p. 1103). Such a strategy was doomed to failure, since the conflict had advanced far beyond the City Deep depot and now involved thousands of strikers from numerous depots.
3.2.2.6 Equivocation about negotiation with the strikers and refusal to negotiate with SAHRWU
According to Kelly and Nicholson (1980), strike literature identifies three possible temporal relationships between strikes and negotiation. Strikes may occur concurrently with negotiations, so as to hasten their proceedings and the achievement of desired outcomes; strikes may take place after negotiations in order to secure their restoration; or strikes may precede negotiations and are intended to inaugurate deliberations on the issues at stake, and particularly union recognition. The SATS strike fits largely into the third category.
Although SATS refused to negotiate with SAHRWU, their chief negotiator, Barendt, did demonstrate good faith on the 17th March, by agreeing to negotiate with striker representatives at the City Deep depot about the issue of Nedzamba's dismissal. In so doing, SATS tacitly recognised that BLATU was not entirely representative of the work force (Anstey, Court Record, p. 1073/4). After the 17th March, however, SATS adopted an equivocal stance with regard to negotiation with striker representatives. Anstey, in his report to the court, described their paradoxical position:
On 13th March Barendt negotiates with BLATU and elected representatives. On 19th March Keyser at City Deep excludes non- BLATU representatives, collapsing negotiations. On 23rd March depot wide negotiations include non-Blatu representatives. On 24th March initially SATS excludes non-BLATU representatives but they are allowed in after resistance. On 31st March SATS tries to appoint its own worker negotiating team, then closes the negotiations to only City deep workers, effectively ending the process. On the 8th April Barendt again refuses to negotiate with anyone but BLATU. (Court Record, p. 1083/4)SATS' decision to exclude striker representatives had a detrimental effect on negotiations. By negotiating only with groups and leaders it found acceptable, SATS seemed to disregard the importance of other collective interests besides their own and those of BLATU. In so doing, they negated the collective bargaining process (Anstey, Court Record, p. 1076). The organisation with which SATS chose to negotiate, BLATU, had minimal credibility in the eyes of the strikers and little influence over them and so was ineffectual in defusing the conflict. After five weeks of strike action, SATS appeared to acknowledge this situation, but instead of amending its policy it attempted to boost BLATU's status by announcing that an agreement had been reached with BLATU on wage bonuses (Financial Mail, 24/5/1987).
Ironically, although SATS was a government owned body, its insistence on negotiating only with BLATU contradicted labour policies explicitly articulated by the government seven years previously. In 1980, the Minister of Manpower had declared that "to impose a group favoured by management but not those they are supposed to represent will lead to disaster" (The Star, 19/9/1980).
The Eight's evidence clearly indicates that they believed that the mass of strikers were unanimous in their support for SAHRWU. SATS too had good reason to reach this conclusion. The representatives elected by the strikers were members of SAHRWU and the strikers had chosen to gather at COSATU House, which housed SAHRWU offices. Furthermore, SATS are likely to have been aware that prior to the strike SAHRWU had signed up many of their black workers and that after the strike began thousands more had joined the union (Roussos, Interview 18/10/93).
SATS' assertion that SAHRWU was using the strike so as to advance its own organisational interests was probably correct (Anstey, Court Record). Certainly, the strike provided them with thousands of new members. However, as an article in the Sowetan newspaper pointed out:
What could SATS have lost by talking to it? If SAHRWU was genuine in intent to assist in resolving the dispute, settlement may have ensued. If it was not capable of assisting it would have been exposed in this light. It was likely that if SAHRWU wished to use the situation to organise further in SATS it would have a real interest in actually settling the matter, it would not want to fail. (The Sowetan, 27/3/1987)As SATS' management were not interviewed, I can only speculate on the reasons for their refusal to negotiate with SAHRWU. It is possible that they feared that negotiations with SAHRWU would result in a recognition agreement with the union. Because SAHRWU could not be controlled like BLATU and furthermore it was a militant union, such an agreement would lead to an erosion of their power. In contrast to their uncontested, unilateral decisions about working conditions, matters involving working conditions would be contested and would involve greater consultation and negotiation. Political ideology also appears to have been a factor. SATS' believed that SAHRWU, together with other COSATU unions, constituted part of the communist threat against South Africa. Any form of recognition of SAHRWU was therefore tantamount to legitimising a political enemy which aimed to destroy the society that SATS was keen to conserve.
3.2.2.7 Refusal to accept neutral third party intervention
The problems inherent in the grievance procedures at SATS were described in chapter four. These issues also affected the strike, as the Eight and other strikers did not trust existing SATS procedures to resolve Nedzamba's dismissal or other issues that arose in the course of the conflict (Anstey, Court Record; Roussos, Interview 18/10/93). On this basis and because of SATS' equivocation about negotiations with the strikers and their refusal to negotiate with SAHRWU, the strikers regularly demanded independent third party intervention in the form of either mediation or arbitration (Anstey, Court Record).
SATS did consider mediation and arbitration briefly, on the 30th March, but decisively rejected this option on the 31st of March - effectively negating another option for resolution. This refusal was at variance with a growing trend in South Africa for parties in industrial conflict to seek independent third party intervention.5
The table below indicates the use of mediation and arbitration as conflict resolution mechanisms in the years 1984-7:
Mediations Arbitrations 1984 39 5 1985 60 24 1986 139 73 1987 199 162 (Independent Mediation Service of South Africa, 1987; cited in defence team's informal notes).
The rationale behind SATS' refusal to accept third party intervention is unclear. I I assume that this decision may have been linked to the fear that if they acquiesced to one of the strikers' principal demands, it would be interpreted as a capitulation. Furthermore, bearing in mind SATS' history of unilateral decision making, there may have been extreme reluctance to relinquish any control over the outcome of the dispute to a mediator or even worse, an arbitrator.
3.2.2.8 Lack of consistency, trust and skill in negotiations
A consistent and trusting relationship between parties and their representatives is often a crucial factor in the success of a lengthy negotiation. As a consequence of the on-off nature of negotiations, management's false claims of neutrality, and SATS' equivocal attitude about the representatives with whom they were prepared to negotiate, this relationship was not established during the SATS strike.6
Although negotiations between SATS and the strikers were haphazard, they may have been more fruitful had the strikers perceived SATS to be more reliable and credible (Anstey, Court Record). In this respect, I have referred to SATS' oscillating stance on the issue of negotiations with non-BLATU representatives, and the sharp reversal of their attitude towards third party intervention on the 31st March. Their capriciousness was also evident with regard to the strikers' demand to be paid while on strike. Prior to the 31st March, the striker representatives understood from SATS negotiators that if Nedzamba "was exonerated everybody would get his payment for the other days which we did not work" (Molemohi, Court Record, p. 827). However, on the 31st March, after SATS had indicated that it would no longer negotiate with these representatives, SATS issued the following statement:
It is management's unyielding stance that employees on strike will not receive remuneration for the period they do not work. That will also be case should Andrew [Nedzamba] be exonerated or blamed, irrespective of the duration of the strike. The principle of no work, no pay is applied freely in the public sector. (Court Record p. 826)Incidents such as this one confirm the suggestions that SATS management was both inexperienced and unskilled in negotiation (Anstey, Court Record; Roussos 18/10/93). Similarly, the strikers, with their limited experience of unionism and industrial disputes, appeared to have few negotiation skills. This was partly reflected in the transient nature of membership of the strikers' negotiating teams. For example, on the 26th March, in their discussions with SATS many of the strikers' representatives were not conversant with the details of earlier negotiations (Anstey, 1990).
Because of the strikers' resolution that their negotiators should be representative of the various depots, the strikers' negotiating team on the 26th March consisted of 96 members. This remarkably large group lacked lead negotiators and apparently also a planned approach to the negotiations. As a result, during the negotiations the representatives were unable to concur among themselves about agreements that they could or should reach with SATS (Anstey, 1990). This incident can probably also be attributed to the strikers' organisational inexperience, as it seems that they were not aware that a smaller negotiating team might have been equally representative had there been a representative system of voting, mandating and ratifying. The debacle on the 26th March prompted Anstey (1990) to write:
Properly organised unions with clear structures and mandating systems do not generally behave in this way. This is one of the reasons for promoting union organisation for purposes of effective conflict regulation. (p. 82)Anstey, in his evidence to the court and in his book Negotiating Conflict: Insights and Skills for Negotiators and Peacemakers (1990) emphasizes the benefits of the institutionalisation of conflict. Once parties to conflict are familiar with the rules and parameters of negotiation, the process is more predictable, unrealistic expectations are avoided and the individuals involved in the conflict are less apprehensive (Anstey, 1990). With regard to the Eight, I would suggest that had they been able to anticipate future developments in negotiations, their feelings of insecurity and powerlessness during the strike might have been substantially reduced. These emotions, which will be extensively documented in the forthcoming chapters, are associated with their use of violence.
3.2.2.9 Termination of negotiations
The Eight's insecurity about the decisions that might be taken at negotiations was eclipsed by their experience of helplessness and anguish when SATS withdrew from negotiations on the 31st March. A SATS document, detailing its strike strategy, asserted that the chief motivation behind their withdrawal was to ensure that the strikers "sweat it out" (Exhibit III, Heads of Argument, p. 39), as SATS was confident that it was in a more advantageous position. The newspaper Business Day, with reference to the power imbalance and the termination of negotiations, wrote:
SATS is in a powerful position. It has white children and students for the holidays and its spokesmen talk of holding out for up to five months. For low paid workers, that is a formidable prospect. (Business Day, 8/4/1987)From my interviews and the court evidence it is clear that the breakdown of negotiations signalled to the Eight the possibility that their quality of life might never improve. However, it did not mean that they had abandoned their desire to rectify their grievances and deprivation (Anstey, Court Record, p. 1086). According to Molemohi, the hostility generated by SATS' decision was so immense that the strike leaders found it difficult to contain the crowd of strikers in COSATU House: "Well they were disappointed and angry in such a way that we were also afraid to address them" (Court Record, p. 828).
Consequently, on the 31st March the most effective avenue of non-violent conflict resolution was eradicated. Anstey (1990) asserts that SATS' refusal to negotiate forced the strikers to choose between capitulation and more extreme resistance. Within the framework of my model, the termination of negotiations on the 31st March triggered the Eight's endorsement of and participation in violence against non-strikers.
Thus far, I have explored two of the three major external sources of frustration: the non-strikers and SATS. I will now proceed to the third source, the police.
3.2.3 The Police
3.2.3.1. Interference, interdicts and violence at depots
Although SATS were unwilling to concede to mediation or arbitration, in principle they were not opposed to third party intervention, especially if it was to their advantage - as was the case with police involvement in the strike. The Eight, however, viewed police action as unwarranted and inappropriate interference in their labour dispute. This view seemed to have been influenced by their antipathy towards the police and their experience of police violence. Dzevhe remarked:
According to me I found it to be very unfair for the police to come and interfere about the dispute which was between the management and the workers (Court Record, p. 1239). … I didn't trust them because they always used force during the strike. They didn't mind to shoot an unarmed person. They've gone out of their way, that is they didn't fulfil their mandate of protecting society. Instead of protecting society they kill society. (Interview)The first direct contact between strikers and the police was on the 18th March, when the City Deep strikers were served with a court interdict restraining them from obstructing work at the depot (see section 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.2.4). Later, similar interdicts were served on the sympathy strikers at other depots. While these interdicts may have been legitimate and reasonable, they nevertheless escalated conflict because they necessitated the involvement of the police, a force which for decades had upheld apartheid and had been at the forefront of the persecution of black South Africans (Anstey, Court Record; Dison, Interview, 14/10/93).
The incident at the City Deep depot indicates that the timing of an interdict can be of critical importance in hindering settlement of a dispute. On the 18th March, the strike was four days old, it had not spread beyond the City Deep depot, and the workers were involved in negotiations with Barendt. After the strikers' deliberations with Barendt on the 17th March, they had expected him to return the' next day to discuss their demands, which he had agreed to forward to the General Manager (Anstey, Court Record). Instead, in the early hours of the next morning, the strikers were faced with Barendt, the police and an interdict. Anstey asserts that the interdict heightened the conflict because it was "delivered at a moment in time when workers were actually awaiting a resolution of the dispute and were not expecting an escalation in the use of coercive measures" (Court Record, p. 1077).
Like their colleagues at the City Deep depot, the Eight's first contact with the police during the strike was at their respective depots. Their experience however, involved not only the delivery of interdicts, but in most cases also the experience of violence. Of the Eight's three sources of external frustration - the non-strikers, SATS and the police - only the police engaged in violence. The Eight interpreted this violence not merely as an indication of cruelty, but also as an attempt to undermine the success of their strike action.
At Matshile's depot, police violence occurred after strikers had refused to heed police instructions to either leave the premises or resume their work (Matshile, Court Record, p. 1532). Police then chased and sjambokked the strikers (Matshile, Court Record, p. 1532). Netshitungulwane and Molefe describe similar police action at the depot in Langlaagte:
And we started sitting also at Langlaagte yard up to that stage when the police arrived and the police said to us: "If you do not want to work you had better leave and go away because you are not wanted at the SATS premises". At that stage they were busy sjambokking us, we all ran away. From there we started meeting at COSATU House. (Netshitungulwane, Court Record, p. 1828)The first time I saw violence was at the depots. I could not understand why the police did not ask people why are they gathering, all they do is sjambok the people and spread the teargas to the people. (Molefe, Interview)At Sibisi's depot, police violence appeared even more malicious:
This was the first time I saw people get very angry. It was when the police came and threw out the workers' belongings onto the yard and burnt the workers clothes and put them into a bin. They broke our cooking pots … they beat the workers with sjamboks on their backs. They shouted that the people mustn't sit in the depot because they are not working. After this I missed my bank book, my workers certificate, my shoes, my boots, my clothes, my textbook for my training college at the railways. (Sibisi, Interview)
At Mamphaga's depot, there was no overt violence, only the threat of violence and a mammoth show of force:
Now on a certain day we were then surprised as we arrived there came the police, the police were with dogs, carrying guns, tear gas, carrying sjamboks, when they came to us they then told us to leave the premises: "If you do not want to work you either leave the railway premises. If you do not want to leave we are going to take you out by force". We left the railway premises though we were not satisfied about it because we had hoped that our management would solve this problem. (Mamphaga, Court Record, p. 1601)
In response to the interdicts and police violence, or the threat thereof, and also because of a desire to be closer to the union offices, from where the strike was being coordinated, the Eight and a multitude of other strikers began to converge on COSATU House (see Netshitungulwane's statement above).
3.2.3.2 Police presence outside COSATU House
From the 21st March, the date of the first large gathering of strikers at COSATU House, to the 29th April, the day after the Prolecon killings, the police maintained a strong presence outside the building. During this time, they also engaged in numerous acts of harassment and disruption. COSATU House was full to capacity, but strikers who attempted to congregate outside the building were forced inside by the police (Dzevhe, Court Record, p. 1238). Periodically, the police also fired teargas into the meeting hall (Dzevhe, Court Record, p. 1238; Matshile, Court Record, p. 1534/5). This act seemed to be aimed at interfering with the strikers' capacity to organise, but the police's disregard for the injuries that may have ensued from the strikers' panic and attempts to escape the teargas in the hall suggests a lack of concern for black life and a confidence that their violent actions would go unpunished - attitudes likely to have contributed to the police killings of strikers on the 22nd April (see section 5.1.1.2).
Police repression during the strike - detention, assault and torture - mirrored the coercive measures that were used against the government's political opponents (see chapter one). Numerous union officials and strikers were detained and beaten. (see strike diary 7th April), and these "operations" as was indicated in the strike diary (see 15th April) also took place in strikers' places of residence. All of these actions, however, pale in comparison to the police's invasion of COSATU House and their use of lethal force on the 22nd of April.
In addition to the Eight's perception that police violence was an attempt to subvert their goals, this violence also ensured that they felt fearful and physically vulnerable. Matshile and Dzevhe commented:
I felt frightened. They can beat us, shoot us. They can do what they want to do. (Matshile, Interview)There is nothing I can do against the police because they can also hurt and shoot me. (Dzevhe, Interview)Furthermore, police violence left the Eight with a strong desire for retribution against the police and their perceived allies for the injuries and deaths sustained amongst their group. This desire was pivotal to the quest for existential equality (Fromm, 1974) that was described in chapter two, and this theme will be further explored in chapters seven and eight.
In concluding my discussion of external agents of frustration, I will delineate various factors that affected the Eight's perception of these agents and of themselves. These factors include a stereotypical and unitary view of these agents, and the Eight's belief that their own group was "positively distinct" from these agents (Tajfel, 1978).
3.2.4 "Positive Distinctiveness", Stereotyping and Unitary View of the Three Sources of External Frustration
Tajfel (1978) refers to a group's favoured differentiation of itself as the "establishment of positive distinctiveness" (p. 83), while Fromm (1974) describes this phenomenon as "group narcissism" (p. 203). In my interviews, these processes were revealed in the Eight's repeated definition of their group's conduct and attitudes during the strike as positive, and that of all of the members of the respective outgroups as negative. In part, these definitions appear to have originated in the Eight's perception that the aims of their group (the ingroup) unlike those of the three outgroups (non-strikers, SATS and the police) were justified and more noble, and also from their belief that these outgroups, within a context of heightened conflict, were attempting to undermine their legitimate goals.
In painting all of the members of the outgroups with the same brush, the Eight were "guilty" of stereotyping. The Eight also seemed to extend this stereotyping to themselves, as they associated themselves with the common attributes which they saw as part and parcel of their own group (Brown, 1988). The most obvious example of the Eight's negative stereotyping of an outgroup was their categorisation of all non-strikers as "mpimpis". The word "mpimpi" refers to a traitor or an informer, and was frequently used in COSATU, UDF and ANC circles to describe any perceived apartheid collaborator. It was also an accusatory epithet that those non-strikers incarcerated and assaulted in COSATU House had to habitually endure (see chapters seven and eight). Netshitungulwane articulated his understanding of the label:
What I know is that a person that does not stand together with the people (the strikers), or support (them), or a person that carries a message from one side to the other side, we call that person "mpimpi". (Vogelman, Court Psychological Report)In addition to stereotyping each specific outgroup as "bad", the Eight also appeared to have a largely undifferentiated view of the three outgroups. They seemed to regard the non-strikers, SATS and the police as equally heinous. No major differentiation of the various outgroups existed on the basis of their different histories; social, political and economic positions; or conduct during the strike. This presumed negative stereotype of all of those who were responsible for frustrating the Eight may have stemmed from their perception that these three outgroups had shared interests and a shared a superordinate goal (Sherif, 1966): to undermine the strike.
One inferred consequence of the Eight's unitary view of the three outgroups was that if anyone of these three outgroups antagonised the Eight, hostility towards the other two increased. Dzevhe appeared to evidence this reaction when he asserted that he held the non-strikers responsible for the police killings of strikers at Germiston and COSATU House on the 22nd April:
According to what I noticed was that these non-strikers were the people who made it difficult for us that some of us were being chased away, we were being killed because of these non-strikers. (Dzevhe, Court Record, p. 1250)Group theory literature provides some of the rationale for the Eight's positive stereotyping of themselves and their negative stereotyping of the three outgroups. Tajfel and Turner (1979) assert that individuals prefer to have a positive rather than a negative self concept, and that self concept is partly defined in terms of group affiliations. Within the framework of this assertion, the Eight would have had a predilection to view their group more positively than any outgroup, and by perceiving their group as superior, they could revel in its reflected glory (Brown, 1988).
Although the Eight's group was in a subordinate position to groups such as SATS management, they did not appear to view their group as inferior. According to Brown (1988) group theory literature suggests that there are a number of ways in which subordinate groups can avoid defining themselves as inferior (Caddick, 1982; Lemaine, 1966; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). I will explore two of these which seem pertinent to the Eight.
The ancillary group, in this case the Eight and other strikers, can bypass the principal dimensions of comparison on which they are judged to be inferior, and either formulate new dimensions or modify the significance of existing dimensions (Brown, 1988; Lemaine, 1966). On the basis of statements that the Eight made to me and to the court, it would seem that they achieved this by measuring self worth in terms of, for example, loyalty and commitment to their fellow strikers, as opposed to wealth or respect for those with formal authority. In some cases, subordinate groups do not experience a sense of inferiority because they believe that their subordination is the result of illegitimate and unfair practices (Brown, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus according to group theory, because the Eight perceived their poverty and lowly occupational position to be the result of the discriminatory practices of the apartheid government and SATS, this diminished the degree to which they may have held themselves responsible for their indigence and lack of advancement within the workplace. In this way, they were probably able to preserve some of their self esteem. Also, according to Brown (1988), when there is a perception that the status quo of subordination is not necessarily permanent, subordination tends not to be synonymous with inferiority. The process of politicisation, outlined in chapter four, is likely to have an important influence in this respect.
I have digressed slightly, and I will now return to the issue of the individual's quest to maintain a positive definition of his group. This desire may be so strong that he will attempt to preserve this definition, even when evidence suggests otherwise (Tajfel, 1981). This is often achieved by attributing ingroup members' negative behaviour, such as sadistic violence, to external causes ("we were provoked"), while the same behaviour from outgroup members would be explained in terms of dispositional causes ("they are evil people") (Brown, 1988, p. 236). Fromm (1974) also suggests that individuals are able to take pride in their group, despite their group's commission of outlandish acts, because for the most part, people's "reality is constituted by general consensus and not based on reason or critical examination" (p. 203). Thus the ingroup's commission of sadistic violence is perceived as acceptable and normal because there is group consensus about the behaviour. This view was partly validated by Rikhotso, in his explanation of the legitimacy of his violence: "Violence was right because everyone was doing it" (Interview).
The tendency to see one's group in a favoured light often leads to cognitive distortions. Hartley et al. (1983) illustrate this point in their study of the British steel strike of 1980. In this case, strike activists claimed credit for acts which enhanced the strike, such as a successful picket, but blamed other groups, such as the police and union leaders, for failures. A similar cognitive process was evident amongst the Eight. At no point in my interviews with them or in their court evidence were they ever critical of themselves or of the behaviour of the strikers in general, nor did they indicate how they and their group may have contributed to the continuation of the strike and the distress they themselves suffered. In so doing, the Eight were probably able to preserve the reputation of their group and also that component of their self esteem associated with group membership. Another propitious spin off of holding outgroups rather than ingroup members responsible for misfortune is that this frequently helps to prevent internal dissension and maintain group cohesiveness (Sherif, 1966; Brown, 1988).
There are two other functions of stereotyping that were mentioned in chapter two and which seem to be applicable to the Eight. The first of these is the "mental short cut" that stereotyping afforded the Eight (Brown, 1988, p. 231).
Stereotyping, because it introduces simplicity and order to replace intricacy and random variation (Allport, 1954; Tajfel 1981), may have enabled the Eight to more easily understand the complex events of the strike. The Eight's negative stereotyping may also have made it easier for them to justify their actions, both planned and committed, against the non-strikers outgroup (Tajfel 1981). In addition, as I will demonstrate in chapters seven and eight, the Eight's negative stereotyping of the non-strikers helped them to define their violence towards the non-strikers as an act of moral, social and political value.
3.3 Continuation and Intensification of Deprivation
Phase six of the model centres on the factors that contributed to the Eight's frustration with militant aggression. At this point, it should be noted that the continuation of the strike meant that the Eight's deprivation not only continued, but intensified. This intensification was most apparent in the deterioration of their economic circumstances, as they were no longer receiving wages, and they had no access to financial safeguards through family, welfare or union strike funds. In addition to their financial difficulties, the actions of SATS and the police further augmented the Eight's deprivation. These actions have already been described in section 3.2.3. In the following section, I will focus on another variable that intensified the Eight's discontent considerably during the strike: relative deprivation.
In chapter two, three types of relative deprivation were described: disappointment and unmet expectations (Cook et al., 1977; Gurr 1970; Folger et al., 1983); a deterioration in economic circumstances (Davies, 1974); and negative social comparisons (Festinger, 1954; Merton & Kitt, 1950). In chapter four, all of these forms of relative deprivation were linked to the Eight's heightened discontent with working conditions and by implication their strike action. In this chapter, two facets of relative deprivation have emerged with respect to the Eight's experience during the strike: the gap between their expectations and achievement, and the worsening of their economic situation. I will now explore the third dimension of relative deprivation, namely social comparison, and more specifically the comparisons that the Eight made with non-strikers.
3.3.1 Relative Deprivation in Relation to Non-Strikers
The Eight's resentment of the non-strikers stemmed largely from the fact that the non-strikers continued to be paid, while they received no wages. Furthermore, they were infuriated because the strike breakers would benefit from any improvement in working conditions that resulted from the strike. The Eight were thus in a situation where the individuals that they despised and who they believed were obstructing their goals, would benefit from their sacrifices. Muangedzo, Dzevhe, Molefe and Sibisi commented:
I could see that the scabbing was very unfair in that we are sacrificing our jobs and our positions and there are those who would gain from the strike and were not prepared to sacrifice their jobs. (Muangedzo, Interview)What I further noticed was that if this problem or this dispute would be solved and this disciplinary procedure would also be looked at, these people who were the non-strikers would also benefit from that or from that outcome. (Dzevhe, Court Record, p. 1250)Well I felt bad (angry about the non-strikers) because I thought these people also do not want to take part in the strike, because if everything had been fixed it would be the same for them. (Molefe, Court Record, p. 1904)The workers said that other workers did not want to join the strike and that we are fighting for all. For that we are on strike and we are making sacrifices and if our demands are met the scabs will also benefit. (Sibisi, Interview)Because the non-strikers did not make economic sacrifices, but were still eligible to receive economic benefits, they were also perceived to be selfish, self-centred and egotistical or to use the terminology of Klandermans (1984), "free riders" (p. 108). Molefe and Dzevhe commented:
I thought that these people were selfish and that they did not want to support other workers and they were not thinking about other people. (Molefe, Interview)I didn't like them because they were prolonging the strike, because they didn't care about other people, because they were ignorant of what is going on because they knew we wanted our rights They care for themselves more than they care for other people. (Dzevhe, Interview)The Eight did appreciate the economic pressures that provoked strike breaking and the difficulty of enduring the economic suffering induced by the strike, but they could not condone the strike breakers' inability to tolerate this hardship. This inability probably further confirmed their view of the non-strikers as men of lesser value and moral fibre (see chapter seven).
It is still not clear why the Eight and thousands of other black workers, chose to strike and then to continue with strike action, whilst others did not. This question again highlights the need to understand individual and social differences. I can only hazard a guess as to some of the factors which may have contributed to this decision. These include: the Eight's greater degree of politicisation; the greater salience they attached to their social identity, which in turn would have made them more likely to conform to group norms (see chapter six); and their enriched sense of self, which inspired them to demand better living and occupational conditions.
4. Phase Seven: Violence
While the Eight's endorsement of violence manifested in various ways and was directed at various targets, including that of SATS property (see section 4.3.2), it was principally directed against the non-strikers and it is this violence which is the real concern of this study.
Although there were violent incidents against non-strikers from the outset of the dispute, these were very few and were characterised by a minimal use of force, mainly pushing and shoving (Mamphaga, Reinterview, 16/10/1993). However, after the cessation of negotiations on the 31st March, the nature of this violence changed dramatically in terms of its frequency and form. Violence against non- strikers became endemic - it occurred daily, there were numerous incidents and there was an abundance of offenders and victims. The violence, now mainly in the form of assaults, took place at numerous venues such as hostels, depots, train stations and other places where the non-strikers gathered. This study will concentrate on that violence which occurred in COSATU House.
A cardinal feature of the strikers' violence in COSATU House was that it followed an almost uniform pattern. Non-strikers were regularly abducted from their workplaces, their places of residence (in particular SATS hostels), and from the railway stations where they travelled to or from work. They were then brought to COSATU House and interrogated, mostly on the stage in the big hall or in one of the small halls. Initially, these interrogations were accompanied by random assaults by those present in the halls, later however, the violence became more ordered and non-strikers would receive a standard sentence of five lashes (see chapter six). This punishment would be meted out in the offices of the strikers' co-ordinating committee, in one of the small halls or in any other private place in COSATU House. The non-strikers were then released or forced to perform other chores first, such as cleaning the toilets or sweeping the floors of the big or small halls (see chapter eight).
On the basis of the above, I have marked the 31st March as the date of the onset of violence in the strike. In the following chapter, the details of this violence will be further explored, but in the remainder of this chapter I will set out the myriad of contingent factors which combined to facilitate the Eight's use of violence in the strike.
4.1 Contingent Conditions that Facilitate the Choice of Violent Behaviour
4.1.1 The lack of Alternatives and Desperation
In order to grasp the impact of the cessation of negotiations on the Eight, it is necessary to contextualise this event within the politically repressive environment of the 1980s. Numerous non-violent strike maintenance behaviours, such as picketing, protest marches and influencing public opinion, were subject to legal prohibitions. These behaviours, which are common to industrial disputes elsewhere in the world, are designed to maximise the impact and success of a strike (Kelly & Nicholson, 1980). Furthermore, as indicated in chapter four, there were no formal political channels through which the Eight felt their occupational grievances and other discontents could be articulated.
There was one non-violent strike maintenance behaviour which, while also subject to legal prohibitions, was more difficult for the government to suppress - the consumer boycott. This strategy was generally aimed at increasing the costs of a strike for management and it had been employed with some success in other disputes in South Africa (see chapter one). The consumer boycott adopted by the SATS strikers had a similar function and centred on appeals to consumers not to pay fares for SATS transport.
This non-violent strategy was adopted after, as opposed to before, the 31st March, so that it occurred after violence broke out. The reasons for its late adoption appear to be related to the time required to organise such a boycott and the belief, earlier in the strike, that a settlement would be reached swiftly. After the 31st March, the endemic nature of the violence also appeared to affect the putative non-violence of the consumer boycott, so that passengers were frequently intimidated not to pay fares (Dzevhe, Reinterview, 16/10/1993).
The effect of SATS' withdrawal from negotiations was further exacerbated by the absence of established procedures for grievance redress at SATS. Negotiations with SATS were central to the redress of matters relating to their deprivation and the termination of negotiations signalled the real possibility that their occupational discontents may not be rectified (see section 3.1.2). The Eight were thus particularly ardent in their desire to restore negotiations with SATS (see below).
The Eight believed that the best way to restore negotiations was to make the strike more effective, primarily by ensuring that more workers would acknowledge the call to strike. The non-violent means of achieving this aim were severely curtailed by police enforcement of the legal prohibitions against behaviours such as sit-ins and pickets at depots. Also, the Eight's heightened resentment of those groups that they held responsible for thwarting their goals and increasing their economic hardship meant that the potential for violent strike maintenance behaviours aimed at non-strikers was likely to be strong. Molefe, Mamphaga and Matshile explained their endorsement of the violence as follows:
We believed that only violence would bring enough pressure to SATS to talk to us again. (Molefe, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)I felt it was right that the scabs were beaten because if they continue to drift back to work, the strike would be delayed and we would not resolve the strike. I believe that the scabs were harmful to the strike. (Mamphaga, Interview)I heard that management who had been talking with our negotiating team, did not want to carry on talking with them. … This worried me that the strike would not end soon and I would have money problems because SATS will not pay us … . This was … why I did not mind the scabs being beaten because I hoped the strike would end with negotiation. (Matshile, Interview)In his court evidence Matshile expressed similar sentiments:
Well intimidation we did it as workers, trying or thinking that maybe the railway would try and talk or SATS would try and talk to the workers. Now by intimidation or stopping people from going to work we wanted that the railway or SATS should realise that there is nothing of his that was maybe moving. (Matshile, Court Record, p. 1537)These statements reveal an important dimension of the Eight's violence: it was directed toward a goal. In this case, their goal was to bring the strike to a hasty and satisfactory conclusion by increasing the costs to SATS through increasing the number of strikers. Thus while there was clearly an emotive aspect to the Eight's violence, originating in anger and arousal (see section 4.1.4.3) there was also a rational and intentional element, partly founded in the belief in the efficacy of violence.
4.1.2 The Belief in the Efficacy of Violence
There are numerous probable roots for the Eight's belief in the efficacy of violence. Amongst the most important of these was their experience as both victims and witnesses of violence within their family (see chapter six). The lesson that is likely to have been learned from these experiences of violence is that as a means of expressing anger and dispensing punishment, violence provided power to the offender, instilled fear and submission in the victim and was an effective method of conflict resolution. As this subject is considered in chapter six, I will not elaborate further, except to note that the Eight also encountered these lessons later in their adult life, in the context of political repression and day to day social relationships.
4.1.3 Risk and Self Sacrifice
Although the Eight's heightened deprivation, acute frustration and commitment to the broader goals of the group are all likely to have encouraged them to engage in personal risk taking for the sake of change, they did not appear to eradicate the fears of personal risk completely. The Eight faced two main types of risks in their participation in violence: the physical and the social.
4.1.3.1 Physical risks
Physical risks were likely to emanate from two main sources: direct physical retaliation by the targets of the violence; and the actions of law enforcement and judicial agencies that could lead to detention, torture, long term imprisonment or judicial execution.
With respect to the former, the non-strikers posed little danger. In fact, it seems that it was because the non-strikers could offer little physical resistance that they became the chief targets of the Eight's violence (see section 4.3.1). Some of the factors which appeared to limit the non-strikers ability to retaliate included: their vulnerability to surprise abductions; their disorganisation as a group; their lack of access to superior weaponry; and the fact that they were vastly outnumbered. The latter was a most important factor for the Eight:
I was not worried about the non-strikers coming after me. It never crossed my mind, but if you ask me it was because we were in the majority. (Matshile, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)I was not afraid of the scabs because they were not coming to a daily meeting. They were scared to attack us because they know we would take them to COSATU and give them harsher punishment. (Muangedzo, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)I didn't think about it once or twice of the scabs retaliating but I knew they couldn't afford it. It was impossible for them to defeat us because there were so many of us. (Molefe, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)7In contrast, legal and judicial retribution remained a concern for the Eight right up until the murders at Prolecon. This concern, however, seemed to exist side by side with the Eight's belief that they would escape arrest and conviction for their assaults on the non-strikers. Although this issue was not explored in the interviews or during the trial, a number of factors can be identified which are likely to have reduced the Eight's concerns about arrest.
The sites of the assaults, the various halls and rooms inside COSATU House, were concealed from police view. And, although the violent victimisation of non-strikers would not have escaped the attention of police informers, who in all probability were members of the crowd inside COSATU House, the Eight, with the exception of Sibisi, evidenced little concern in this regard. This lack of concern may have been a consequence of their naivety about police undercover operations, or of their belief that because their participation in violence took place within a crowd, police agents would find it difficult to identify them. In this sense, their belief that they were anonymous in relation to the authorities may have contributed to their violence.
As I will indicate in chapter six, Sibisi believed that he was less anonymous than his fellow strikers because he chaired the meetings in the big hall. This factor is one of a myriad which may help to explain why Sibisi was the most reluctant of the Eight to participate in the murders at Prolecon (see chapter six). Sibisi's individual concern also suggests that in evaluating the impact of anonymity on violent behaviour in crowds or groups, these collectives cannot be viewed as homogenous. Similarly, it should not be assumed that all members of these collectives are always able to achieve the same degree of anonymity in relation to the authorities.
The case of the Eight also illustrates another factor which must be considered in the study of anonymity: the divergent desires of members of a collective in relation to anonymity. As I will demonstrate in chapter seven, although the Eight wished to conceal their identity from the authorities, they also wanted to establish a reputation amongst their peers through their acts of violence.
The Eight's confidence that they would escape arrest may also have been founded in their assumption that their victims would not dare to report their assaults for fear of further reprisals. The non-strikers worked in the same depots and lived in the same hostels as strikers, and no witness protection programme existed in South Africa. This assumption would have been validated by the general non-reporting of assaults, and so it is likely to have encouraged the belief that arrest could be avoided. Once violence had emerged, this belief may also have facilitated its continuation.
A number of cognitive and social-psychological processes may also have acted to stifle the Eight's concerns. The Eight's sense that they had little to lose may have been amongst these. If such a belief did exist, its origins could probably be traced to the Eight's heightened deprivation and their perception that there was little difference between the misery they currently endured and prison. In addition, the Eight's definition of themselves as members of the strikers' collective and as liberation fighters (see chapter seven) may have been congruous with the notion of self sacrifice for the good of their group.
A third element which may have diminished the Eight's concern about risks was their use of cognitive scripts (Waddington, 1986), this time drawn from their observations of the broad political resistance to apartheid that occurred between 1984 and 1987. Although this period was marked by extreme governmental repression, it was also characterised by the security force's inability to quell political violence and to apprehend all of the perpetrators. Thus it is conceivable that the Eight concluded that if ANC cadres and other violent offenders could escape arrest, so could they.
4.1.3.2 Social risks and the subculture of violence amongst the strikers
In this instance, social risk refers to the fear of social ostracism and exclusion from the group. This social risk stems from the possible censure induced by a particular behaviour which lies too far outside of the group's norms. In the case of the Eight, there were no perceived social penalties but only perceived social rewards for committing violence. In fact, as a consequence of the subculture of violence and intragroup dynamics amongst the strikers at COSATU House (see chapter six), the Eight risked censure for not endorsing or participating in violence. Chapter six will illustrate how this subculture's sanction of violence helped to maintain the high levels of violence in COSATU House.
4.1.4 Physical Environment
The physical environment of COSATU House may also have impelled the Eight's violence. The following section will investigate the elements of overcrowding, temperature and the presence of weapons.
4.1.4.1 Overcrowding
The precise number of strikers who gathered at COSATU House was impossible to ascertain. Estimates ranged from 1500 to 6000, with 4000 being the most widely quoted figure. Video footage (COSATU, 1987) and accounts obtained from the Eight and other eyewitnesses indicate that the big and small halls were congested with strikers. The Eight identified this overcrowding as a source of great discomfort.
While it is not viable to establish a direct link between overcrowding and violence (Freedman, 1972; Siann, 1985), it is possible that the overcrowding did heighten the Eight's irritability and reinforce their existing feelings such as anger, particularly because the Eight held the police responsible for the overcrowding. According to the Eight, police violence at the depots made it impossible for strikers to gather there, with the result that a massive body of strikers began to assemble at COSATU House. The big hall where they met was filled beyond capacity and this situation was exacerbated by the permanent police presence outside COSATU House and their refusal to permit the overflow of strikers to congregate on the pavement next to the building.
As a consequence of overcrowding, another negative physical condition evolved - excessive heat. This heat was further intensified because the strikers had shut some of the windows in the big hall for fear of police teargas attacks - a measure which proved wholly ineffectual since on occasion the police merely fired their teargas canisters through the windows.
In chapter two I noted that the academic literature regarding temperature and violence focuses on the relationship between violence and daily temperature (Baron & Ransberger, 1978; Berkowitz, 1972; Tyson & Turnbull, 1990), and that some studies assert that the higher this temperature, the greater the potential for violence (Baron & Ransberger, 1978; Berkowitz, 1972). In the case of the Eight's violence, however, no such association can be made. The average daily temperature for April 1987 was a mild 23.8 celsius, and on the day of the killings, it was an even milder 23.5 celsius (South African Weather Bureau, 1987).
However, I have argued that the actual temperature encountered by the Eight was more germane than the daily temperature and also, that the Eight's experience of this temperature is significant. The Eight did report that the heat inside COSATU House was experienced as aversive and in a similar way to the effects of overcrowding, while the heat may not have been a direct cause of the Eight's violence, it did increase the potential for violence by provoking and reinforcing irritability and anger. In the interviews, the Eight maintained that, as was the case with overcrowding, much of their anger about the heat stemmed from their perception that these conditions were a consequence of police harassment.
4.1.4.2 Violent cues
One feature of the physical environment both in and on the periphery of COSATU House was the enduring presence of weapons. The police, in addition to an assortment of other weapons, displayed their firearms and as the strike progressed the strikers too began to carry weapons such as knives and pangas. All of the Eight denied carrying weapons, but their observation of the array of weapons both in and outside of COSATU House may have served as a constant reminder of the option of violence. In this sense, weapons represented violent cues (Berkowitz, 1968) and so they may have acted as a stimulus to the Eight's participation in violence. As Berkowitz (1967) asserts, guns and other weapons do not only permit violence, they are also responsible for eliciting the behaviour.8
4.1.4.3 Heightened emotion
All of the physical conditions described above interacted with an atmosphere of heightened emotion - and particularly aggression. On a daily basis, strikers vented their anger about their work conditions at SATS; apartheid; hostel conditions; their economic difficulties; police violence; and other negative developments during the strike (Molemohi, Court Record; Roussos, Interview, 18/10/93). From the strikers' first meeting at COSATU House they sang songs and chanted slogans denouncing the government and its "allies", and praising SAHRWU, ANC leaders and the organisation's armed wing. According to Molefe and Mamphaga, the following catch-phrases were the most popular:
Ka railway si thweli kanzima (on the railway we carry a heavy load).Basenzi hlangemeni SAHRWU ke kgopano ya basensa (Workers are united. SARHWU is the union of the workers).Oliver Tambo thetha no Botha akulule Mandela (Oliver Tambo talk to Botha and release Mandela).Botha u ya loya mama ka Botha u gibeli mvene (Botha is a witch, his mother rides on baboons).U ya Baleka Botha ne zinja zakhe (Botha is running with his dogs).Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthulezi ke mpimpi (Buthulezi is a collaborator).(Molefe, Reinterview, 26/2/91; Mamphaga, Reinterview, 26/2/1991)These declarations would often take place while the strikers performed the toyi-toyi, a dance associated with the collective acknowledgement of privations, the upliftment of morale, and battle. These pronouncements and songs are likely to have acted as reminders of the Eight's experiences of persecution and suffering and of the need for continued resistance. In so doing these vocalisations probably served to maintain a high level of anger amongst the Eight and other strikers. In the context of such an angry atmosphere, prompts for the Eight to participate in violence are likely to have been much easier to act upon.
4.2 The Psychological and Social Benefits of Committing Violence
The final considerations in an understanding of the Eight's choice to engage in violence are the numerous psycho-social benefits - such as power, social status and validation of their masculinity - that they may have assumed they would obtain through violent acts. I will not detail these rewards here, as chapter seven is largely devoted to this subject.
4.3 The Choice of Targets of Violence
4.3.1 Non-Strikers
In chapter two, on the basis of Dollard et al.'s (1939) theory of displacement, I asserted that the target of violence is not always the primary source of deprivation, discontent and frustration, because these sources are often inaccessible and extremely powerful. As a result, the preferred targets are those who are more accessible to the offenders and have less social, political or economic power.
This theory was partly validated by the Eight's violence towards the non-strikers. Although the Eight perceived the non-strikers to be traitors who had caused much of their hardship, it was SATS, and not the non-strikers, who were the real source of the Eight's deprivation and frustration. Furthermore, the non-strikers too were black workers who endured appalling work and living conditions and many had at some stage, supported the strike. Nevertheless, it was the non-strikers and not SATS management or its representatives, that were subject to injury and murder. Neither the court evidence, nor any of the interviews with the Eight, evidenced even one reported incident of violence by the Eight or any other striker against any member or representative of SATS management. With respect to the police, the only casualties they suffered were on the 22nd April, and even on this occasion only modest spontaneous violence was directed at them and their casualty count was relatively small - only four or five police personnel were injured (see chapter two and section 5.1.1).
Earlier in this chapter, I indicated that one factor that fostered the Eight's violence towards the non-strikers was that realistically, and according to the Eight's perceptions, they did not represent a substantial physical threat. Compared to SATS and the police, non-strikers were the quintessential soft targets. They were also accessible, as they generally used the same transport and lived in the same areas as the strikers. The confidence that their attackers may have derived from being familiar with the locales - hostels, depots, and railway stations - from which the non-strikers were abducted probably also contributed to the confident targeting of non-strikers.
There was also another more obvious reason, related to power, for the targeting of the non-strikers. Because they were black, the non-strikers' lives were accorded less value by the South African government. Their victimisation was thus unlikely to engender intense government reprisals, as would the victimisation of white managers and white police. It is worth noting that four non-strikers had to be murdered before the Eight and other strikers were arrested and charged for violence against non-strikers; whereas the mere suspicion of habitual abductions of and attacks on white managers in COSATU House is likely to have produced an immediate armed invasion of the building.
4.3.2 SATS Property
While the vast majority of the strikers' violence was directed against non-strikers, SATS property was also targeted. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the Eight were implicated in this violence, they wholeheartedly endorsed the destruction of SATS property. This support may have stemmed from the symbolic function of this violence - because there was fear attached to attacking SATS managers, SATS property became the symbolic target of much of their anger. However, the primary reason for the Eight's endorsement of this violence was their belief that it would enhance the strike by increasing the costs of the dispute to SATS. Muangedzo commented:
I thought that the railway (SATS) would feel a pressure. Through our violence they would know they were losing a lot of things because of strikers. (Reinterview, 26/2/1991)SATS' financial costs as a result this violence were high. From the 13th April, the date of the first of the violent attacks on train carriages, to the 17th April, when the final attack took place, 75 carriages were destroyed or damaged through arson. The estimated cost of this violence was approximately 25 million rand (Finance Week, April 30-May 6, 1987).9 These attacks were finally halted because of the massive deployment of military and police personnel at railway stations.
5. Phase Eight: Frustration Despite the Use of Violence
By the 21st April, neither the violence directed at non-strikers and SATS property nor the consumer boycott appeared to have impacted on SATS' stance on negotiations. In the absence of the desired change, it is assumed that the Eight's frustration increased even further. In addition, SATS' decision not to pay wages and their threats to dismiss the strikers (see chapter three, Strike Diary) meant that the Eight, as the interviews and their court evidence revealed, had become increasingly concerned that they and their dependents faced destitution. In spite of their increasing despair about their situation, however, the Eight were still hopeful that the strike could be resolved satisfactorily and they still believed that the best way to achieve this success was to ensure that more strikers heeded the call to strike. The fact that neither their violence, nor that of other strikers, was successful in halting the flow of workers returning to work after the 31st March, was probably a source of great frustration for the Eight.
It is evident that as the strike continued, the Eight's commitment to violence not only persisted, but intensified. At this point it is necessary to consider why the Eight favoured violent as opposed to non-violent strike maintenance behaviours, when both of these strategies had failed to achieve the desired results. I did not put this question to the Eight, and so my answer rests largely on the speculation that while violence did not yield the desired results in terms of changing SATS' stance on negotiations, forcing non-strikers to stop working, or improving their occupational conditions, it did provide the Eight with immediate psycho-social benefits.
Essentially, violence provided the Eight with tremendous benefits because they were embedded within a subculture of violence which both sanctioned violence and facilitated a positive association between violence and a host of behaviours and characteristics - such as resistance, status, honour and masculinity (see chapter seven). Furthermore, because violence was normative in this subculture the counter-norm of non-violence was difficult to ass