Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

Thinking Big:
The National Urban Renewal Programme and Crime Prevention in South Africa's Metropolitan Cities

by
Janine Rauch

Research report written for the Centre for the Sudy of Violence and Reconciliation, December 2002.

Janine Rauch is an independent consultant.

Introduction

The government's flagship Urban Renewal Programme contains elements of the crime prevention approaches envisaged in the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy: The Urban Renewal Programme is a comprehensive approach, which emphasises both innovation, and integration of the efforts and resources of a wide range of agencies at local 'nodes' – two of the key elements proposed in the earlier crime prevention policies.

Although the focus on crime prevention has not been maintained throughout the history of the Urban Renewal Programme, it can be viewed as one of the most ambitious crime reduction experiments in South Africa's recent history – an experiment which is still in progress, indeed, in its infancy. The purpose of this paper is to describe and examine the National Urban Renewal Programme (NURP) from the perspective of its potential contribution to urban safety.

This paper focuses only on implementation of the URP in the Metropolitan Municipalities, in line with the scope of the CSVR's City Safety Project.1 There are currently two Urban Renewal Nodes (Mndantsane and Galeshewe) located in non-metropolitan municipalities, which will not be discussed in this report.

Research Methodology

The data for this research report was gathered during the last three months of 2002, through a series of meetings with officials involved in the NURP (both at national and local levels), from documents related to the URP's, and from site visits and meetings at some of the nodes. Information was generously shared by officials involved in the NURP, and the researcher was invited to sit in on numerous meetings, both of the National Urban Renewal Forum and at the nodes.

This is a preliminary investigation into the relationship between urban renewal and crime prevention. Much of this report is devoted to describing the NURP, the nodes, and the nature of the renewal plans at each node. Implementation of renewal plans has not commenced at some of the nodes, and it is still early to assess impact of the programme, especially on crime and safety. It is hoped that this report will provide a basis for future inquiry, and that will provide useful basic information about urban renewal initiatives in South African cities.

Urban Renewal Programme (URP)

Policy and Urban Renewal Strategy

The national Urban Renewal Programme was born in President Mbeki's first speech to Parliament in 1999:

One of the central features of the brutish society we seek to bring to an end is the impermissible level of crime and violence. Acting together with the people, we will heighten our efforts radically to improve the safety and security of all our citizens. This will entail a variety of measures focussed on ensuring the effective implementation of the National Crime Prevention Strategy. … A study conducted by the Co-ordination and Implementation Unit in the Office of the Deputy President has confirmed what surely all of us have known, of the correlation between crime, poverty and race. The areas of high crime concentration, including all crimes of violence, are the black and poor areas of our country. These include such areas as Tsolo in the Eastern Cape, Thabong in the Free State, Katlehong in Gauteng, Inanda in KwaZulu-Natal, KaNyamazana in Mpumalanga, Mafikeng in the North West, Galeshewe in the Northern Cape, Thohoyandou in the Northern Province and Mitchells's Plain in the Western Cape. We will therefore make multi-disciplinary interventions in these areas, starting with a few pilot areas, drawing in all spheres of government and engaging the people themselves in an offensive to ensure that we reduce the levels of crime in these areas which are characterised by a high incidence of crime. Measures will also be taken to strengthen the Community Police Fora to improve their capacity to mobilise the people against crime and to improve co-operation between the people and the law enforcement agencies. As we have said, the partnership between the Government and the people will be one of the hallmarks of the national offensive against crime and violence. (Address of the President, Thabo Mbeki, at the Opening of Parliament: Cape Town, 25 June 1999.)

This initial announcement of the programme located it strongly as a crime reduction programme and a successor to the NCPS. Following the speech, a Task Team was established by the Directors-General responsible for the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), under the auspices of the National Crime Prevention Centre, to propose a bouquet of strategies which would realise the programme envisaged in President Mbeki's speech. Amongst other recommendations made after consultation with various national and provincial government roleplayers, the Task team proposed that a further three urban sites be added to the original list:

Alexandra
Khayelitsha
KwaMashu.

As part of the process of the 1999 Cabinet firming up its policies and restructuring Departments, and once new local government structures had been demarcated and elected, the multi-disciplinary intervention envisaged by the President evolved into two key government programmes, both led by the Department of Provincial and Local Government (whose Minister was previously a Minister of Safety and Security in the Mandela Cabinet). The two programmes are:

The evolution of these two programmes saw the eventual accommodation of all the sites initially identified by the President, and those proposed subsequently by the NCPS Task Team. As the programme developed over subsequent years, its aims were elucidated, making clear the links between crime, poverty and urban under-development:

[O]ur central aim is to conduct a sustained campaign against rural and urban poverty and underdevelopment, bringing in the resources of all three spheres of government in a co-ordinated manner. These programmes will, among other things, entail investment in the economic and social infrastructure, human resource development, enterprise development, the enhancement of the development capacity of local government, poverty alleviation and the strengthening of the criminal justice system.(Mbeki: State of the Nation Address, Opening of Parliament, 9 Feb 2001)

In August 2001, the Minister of Provincial and Local Government announced that the Department had prepared a clear programme of action for the URP, which would lead to the production of a national urban renewal strategy (Mufamadi, Post-Cabinet Lekgotla Briefing, 13 August 2001). This strategy document, however, never emerged, and the programme continued to evolve. In February 2002, the Minister said that "the process of discussing and refining the Urban Renewal Strategy will generate information and experiences which must be shared by municipalities throughout the country", giving the impression that the strategy was still in development. He then laid out some of the key aspects of the URP as it had developed thus far:

The urban renewal framework emphasises three principles:

In discussing the challenges of urban renewal, the Minister pointed to three:

  1. There needs to be far greater urgency within all spheres of government to turn business plans into delivery on the ground;
  2. The need to turn the set of projects that have been identified in each node into an integrated and sustainable programme of urban development. We need to ensure that the individual nodes themselves have been integrated into the municipal Integrated Development Plan (IDP), and are part of the annual prioritisation of financial and human resources, to ensure that they are part of city-wide plans for development and are not isolated `add-ons'. The nodes need to be spatially integrated with the rest of the city, and become part of a city-wide economic growth, poverty reduction and good governance strategy;
  3. The need to review the extent to which intergovernmental co-ordination and integration is taking place, not just in terms of planning committees and processes, but also allocation of budgetary resources. We also need to ensure that inter-sectoral integration is taking place in each of the nodes, for example:
    safety and security; education and skills development; health and welfare; trade and industry; land and housing; transportation; environment; and tourism. (Keynote input by Minister FS Mufamadi to a planning workshop of the South African Cities Support and Learning Network, Spier Village Conference Centre, Stellenbosch, 11 February 2002)

The resonance with the government's 1996 Crime Prevention Strategy was strong, perhaps because both strategies attempted integration of government activity at three tiers, and a more 'social' approach to problems.

The ultimate objectives of the NCPS must be to reduce the levels of crime in South African society through …

By May 2002, the broad objectives of the Urban Renewal Programme were being described as:

(This last point is an example of how crime prevention had fallen off the Urban Renewal agenda over the 2001/2 period; with the programme giving far greater emphasis to economic aspects of urban renewal).

By the end of 2002, an 'advisory team' on development planning appointed by the Minister pointed to the absence of a clear policy framework as one of the weaknesses of the URP, resulting in confusion about the meaning of 'urban renewal' and the nature of urban renewal projects. It recommended a re-conceptualisation of the URP, with an emphasis on two overarching goals:

The Minister's advisory team argued that the URP should focus solely on three aspects:

(Final report of the Development Planning Advisers to the Minister for Provincial and Local Government, Berrisford et al, 29 November 2002)

This recommendation once again places crime prevention at the centre of the urban renewal programme. At the time of writing, it is unknown whether the recommendations of the advisory team will be adopted.

Structures for managing and implementing the NURP

Co-ordination and integration of the activities of the three spheres of government is one of the major challenges for the URP – in fact, the development of new practices in this respect is one of its major reasons for existence.

In 1999, at the time of initiation of the URP, co-ordination was assigned from the President's Office to the then-existing Directors-General Committee of the National Crime Prevention Strategy. The National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) in the Secretariat for Safety and Security convened an initial task team to make recommendations.

That early task team proposed that the following departments needed to be involved:

Safety and Security
Housing
Labour
Health
Education
Public Works
Welfare
Justice
Provincial and Local Government
Trade and Industry
Correctional Services
Environment and Tourism

Short, medium and long-term multi-disciplinary intervention strategies were proposed. The initial NCPC Task Team also recommended that the co-ordination role be moved from the Department of Safety and Security to a more central agency, such as the Office of the President or the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG). (With the demise of the Secretariat for Safety and Security and the National Crime Prevention Centre, this took place).

In 2001, the Minister of Provincial and Local Government announced that his Department would establish a special unit to co-ordinate implementation of both the ISRDS and the URS (Speech by Minister F S Mufamadi in National Council of Provinces, 5 June 2001). An Urban Renewal Unit was established in the Governance and Development branch of the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), staffed by three professionals and one advisor.

At each of the nodes, an Urban Renewal Project Manager and team was envisaged; but the funding and filling of these posts (and progress on the projects) has varied according to resources available at each site. At Alexandra, where Gauteng Province contributed the bulk of funds for the ARP, a full project management team is in place, with clear lines of managerial accountability to the Provincial Government. In Motherwell, by contrast, a Project Manager for the Urban Renewal project will only be appointed in January 2003. In Cape Town, municipal structures for the unified Metro are only now in the process of being finalised, and it is not clear where management of the Urban Renewal project will be located; in the meantime, the Province's Departments of Community Safety and Local Government and Planning take the leading roles in the Cape Renewal Strategy. In eThekwini, a project manager has been appointed but further project staff are required, particularly in the Safety and Security sector. Towards the end of 2002, World Bank-funded consultants conducted a needs assessment of the project management resources required at each node, and their recommendations will likely inform some funding from the DPLG to the nodes for this purpose during 2003. This should speed up planning and implementation of the URP, especially at nodes which have been slow to get their programmes off the ground, such as Cape Town and the Nelson Mandela Metro.

An Urban Renewal Forum (URF) was also established in 2001, comprising representatives from all the nodes, municipalities, provincial and national departments relevant to the URP. It meets approximately monthly.

Funding the NURP

Financing is one of the most complex and problematic aspects of the Urban Renewal programme, and no attempt will be made to deal with it in detail in this paper. The following points should suffice as a basic explanation of the funding system for URP's.

There is no dedicated fund for Urban Renewal at National level, which could make special Urban Renewal grants to agencies at the nodes. (In other words, the 'RDP Fund' model is not repeated in this scheme).

The funding approach for the URP is based on the concept of 're-prioritisation' within existing budgets, at national, provincial and local levels. Local authorities and line departments are required to prioritise allocations to the urban renewal nodes. Problems with this approach have included the different budget cycles used by national, provincial and local governments, inadequate reprioritisation by national and provincial departments, and a lack of discretionary programme budgets.

There are a number of national grants made to local governments:

However, most of the URP's have had difficulties in accessing these grants for activities at the nodes. Problems have related to the lack of local government capacity to access and manage grants, the stringent criteria applied to grant-making by national government, and uncertainty about the amounts available.

The selection of Urban Renewal nodes

The selection of Urban Renewal nodes appears to have been both highly political and quasi-scientific. During the first half on 1999, the Social Sector Chief Directorate in the Office of the President initiated a research project to demonstrate and verify the links between poverty, crime and under-servicing by law enforcement agencies. The project identified nine areas (one per province) which showed a high incidence of crime, low policing resources, high levels of poverty and low economic activity. These areas were identified as useful pilot areas as they showed trends that were generic and could provide learning experiences that could be extended to other areas. The following factors were critical in the selection of sites:

Recorded Crime Rates

With improvements in statistical systems, SAPS crime data began to point to some areas which suffered from extremely high levels of recorded crime. Analysis of national crime data showed that a relatively small number of police station areas (124 stations out of a national total of over one thousand stations) recorded more than half the country's crime. As a result of this analysis, the SAPS began a more geographically-focussed approach to policing in 1999 and 2000, and the selection of Urban Renewal nodes fitted well with this approach.

Of particular importance with regard to the urban nodes is the issue of crime. You know the history of these particular townships; Alexandra, Mitchell's Plain, Mdantsane and so on, and the high incidence of crime in these areas. That is one of the indicators which made us identify these areas as particular areas of focus. This work of urban renewal will include a further strengthening of the crime committees and crime prevention capacity in these areas. (Mbeki: Transcript of media briefing on Cabinet Lekgotla, 26 July 2001)

The police stations in the Urban Renewal Nodes all feature on the SAPS' list of 'priority stations' – the stations responsible for recording most of South Africa's crime:

Inequality and racial disparities

A less formal, and less empirically-demonstrable criteria used in the selection of sites related to the broader discourse of race and inequality which characterised the early speeches of President Mbeki.2

[T]he current disparities, be they between formerly-white areas and black areas or between urban and rural areas, have a deleterious effect on national unity and social stability. The narrowing of the gap between former white areas and black areas, between urban and rural sector - which is the aim of these strategies - will help to develop our country's economy, stabilise rural communities and provide a material underpinning to what, thus far, is a nebulous concept of the 'rainbow nation'. (Minister FS Mufamadi: Provincial and Local Government Budget Vote 2001/2002, 31 May 2001)

The Urban Renewal Strategy would therefore aim to reduce historical inequalities and improve the quality of life in formerly-disadvantaged urban areas. Most of the nodes are former African township areas, which were created as apartheid dormitory suburbs.

Many of the nodes had experienced high levels of political mobilisation and conflict, as well as internecine community violence, in the 1980s and 1990s. This increased the imperative for rehabilitation of those areas, both in terms of physical damage and decay to the urban environment, and in terms of the disruption of the social fabric of the communities.

Poverty
These are not quick-fix solutions, but they are taking off, and they will have a major effect on crime. When the President identified these projects, he did so precisely with the understanding that socio-economic development is the crucial factor in preventing crime. (Tshwete, Safety and Security Budget Vote 2001/2002, 7 June 2001)

The nodes identified for both the Urban and Rural strategies showed high levels of poverty as well as high levels of crime. There is a complex relationship between crime, violence and poverty; whilst it accepted that there is a causal relationship between the poverty of the areas and the high levels crime and violence recorded in those areas, the relationship between poverty and crime is not linear - one cannot assume that if poverty is addressed the crime problem will immediately disappear, or that poverty is the sole contributing factor to the high levels of crime. Indeed, the Urban Renewal Strategy – particularly in its early incarnation as a close relative of the National Crime Prevention Strategy - set out to develop a comprehensive, integrated multi-disciplinary approach in response to this complex causality. It attempted to respond to the historically-specific links between poverty and crime in South Africa, but also to draw on international learning and best practice about urban safety.

The poverty alleviation and urban investments aspects of the URP may be relatively easy to measure in terms of their impact on the economic conditions in the nodes over time; however, demonstrating the relationship between changes in economic conditions and levels of crime and safety will be one of the key tests of the overall urban renewal model.

Politics

The selection of sites was also profoundly political. Politicians and officials who advised the President on the selection of the nodes would have been influenced by a range of other factors, in addition to the three 'empirical' criteria listed above. During the course of this research, some interesting observations were made about the 'political' criteria for node selection.

The political interests of individual politicians or political parties would probably have played a role in the selection of nodes. As an example, one official who was involved in the selection process believed that the Motherwell and Mndantsane sites were selected by former Minister of Safety and Security Steve Tshwete, for political reasons that were related to Tshwete's role in, and knowledge of, the ANC in the Eastern Cape. A local official in Port Elizabeth said that Motherwell was not an obvious intervention site because it was 'not the worst part of Port Elizabeth', and that other parts of the city could have been more deserving of urban renewal interventions. Another national official was of the opinion that Mndantsane was 'quite a nice suburb' and therefore did not meet the poverty criterion for selection, implying that there must have been some other reason for its selection as a node (the same was said about the Mitchell's Plain node).

Politicians would also have wanted to select sites which would generate favourable public opinion and potentially generate votes in future elections. An example cited by one respondent was the Mitchells Plain site, which was selected by the ANC National government in the initial list announced by the President in 199, perhaps with a view to increasing support for the ANC in future local and provincial elections in the Western Cape. A similar motive was attributed to the (National Party / Democratic Alliance) Western Cape Provincial government's lobbying for Khayelitsha to be included as a node, which is subsequently was when the URP was consolidated in 1990 and 1991.

The Urban Renewal Programme is one of the leading strategic programmes of the government; and selection of sites for inclusion would therefore need to have been strategic. Political considerations clearly played an important part in the selection of nodes; and this has created some irrationality and a lack of similarity across the sites, making some aspects of programme design and management difficult. Some officials involved in implementing the programme feel that the 'irrational' choices made by politicians may jeopardise the success of the entire programme; and criteria for node selection is again at issue at the time of writing, with rumours that Cabinet would like to increase the number of nodes involved in the program early in 2003. It is, however, not the responsibility of politicians to please their officials, but to please their electorate and deliver on their election promises; and naïve to assume that the Urban Renewal Programme would be unaffected by political imperatives.

Urban Renewal Nodes in the Metropolitan Municipalities

This section of the report attempts to describe the Urban Renewal nodes for readers not familiar with them. The information is taken directly from a range of reports and documents provided by the UR Unit at the Department of Provincial and Local Government in Pretoria, by the local authorities and project teams at the nodes, and from the websites and business plans of the various UR projects. Many of these documents were compiled by the local authorities at the nodes, or by consultants – such as the Overview of Urban Renewal Strategy Nodes (May 2001) by MCA Urban and Environmental Planners, on which we rely heavily for the following sections:

Johannesburg Metro: Alexandra

Established in 1912, Alexandra is a former African freehold township located in the north of Johannesburg, fundamentally a dormitory area. A decision was reached in the early 1960s to demolish all properties in Alex and to rebuild the area as a "hostel city'. Family accommodation was to be eliminated and 25 hostels, each housing about 2500 'single' people, were to be built. Alex experienced high levels of political conflict and mobilisation during the apartheid era. In the late 1970s, after decades of community resistance, evictions, removals and the expropriation of properties were halted. In 1979, Alexandra was granted full status as a residential area. In the 1980s, the number of people moving into Alexandra increased substantially. This was not taken into account nor was suitable alternative land made available to accommodate those who were displaced. A new area, known as the East Bank, was built during this period. New infrastructure was insufficient to cater for the demands of the population, proper maintenance was difficult and infrastructure quickly deteriorated. The period between 1991 and 1992 was one of communal and political conflict in Alex, during which many people died, were injured, or displaced from their homes.

Most residents have lived in Alex for more than a decade, and this, combined with the political history of the area, combine to provide a strong sense of community and local identity. However, there is a high population turnover, because many people use rental housing in Alex as a transitional stop on entering the city. Since the advent of a democratic government in 1994, the population of Alexandra has increased dramatically. People in search of employment in the city have flocked into Alexandra from rural areas in South Africa and neighbouring countries, dramatically overloading an infrastructure already under strain. Congestion in informal settlements, in the hostels and along the banks of the Jukskei River have made living conditions in Alexandra stressful, unhealthy and dangerous.

The URP area includes 'Old Alex', the East Bank, the Far East Bank, Marlboro Industrial Area, Wynberg (a retail/industrial area), Kew (retail/industrial) Marlboro South (an industrial and buffer area) and Marlboro Gardens. The industrial and retail areas have been declining, and Alexandra is dislocated from the surrounding economy, which includes the Sandton CBD, the Midrand high-tech belt and the Kempton Park manufacturing and warehousing areas.

A survey conducted in 2000 estimated the population of Alexandra at 350 000 people, living in approximately 80 000 households distributed over approximately 800 hectares. In addition to its original reasonably well-built houses, it also has a significant number of informal dwellings or shacks - estimates range from 20 000 upwards. Unemployment is estimated at 60%. The area is densely populated, with more than 10 persons per housing unit estimated in 70% of the units in Old Alex. The rate of HIV infection is estimated to be 10% higher than the national norm.

The police stations which service the Alex UR node are Alexandra, Bramley, Wynberg, and part of the Sandringham station area.

Nelson Mandela Metro: Motherwell

Motherwell is a former African township, 25km from the city centre of Port Elizabeth in the Nelson Mandela Metro on the eastern coast of the Eastern Cape Province. Motherwell is a relatively new area in the city, established in the early 1980s, with part of the area originally allocated to formal housing to accommodate people from dwellings built on the flood plain another part of the city (Soweto-on-Sea), and part to a 'transit camp' providing (what was envisaged to be) temporary housing to people newly-arrived in the city. By the 1990s, the influx population had swelled beyond the capacity of the 'transit camp', and informal settlements were established around it. One of the consultants' reports described Motherwell as 'the prime example of apartheid planning' – a mass housing development located on a piece of farmland outside the city, with poor linkages to the city, and far from other developments. The fact that Motherwell is a relatively new area contributes to a relatively weak – or new – sense of community, because residents have not lived there for long, and it has traditionally been a 'transitional' area in the city.

The area of the Motherwell UR node is approx 25km2, with a population of approximately 360 000 people in 60 000 households. Unemployment in Motherwell is estimated at between 41% and 53%. A socio-economic survey conducted in 2001 found that the average disposable monthly income in Motherwell was R522.

Motherwell is currently made up of 16 neighborhoods, 13 of which are referred to as NU's 1 to 12 and NU 29, plus the areas known as Ramaphosa, Ikhamveli and Tjoks. The neighborhoods range from formal and built-up, to informal and densely shack-populated. The formal area of Motherwell is virtually all residential, with public open spaces, schools and some other community amenities, tarred roads and good services infrastructure. The extensions to Motherwell (the informal areas) have rudimentary services; and the provision of social and 'soft' infrastructure did not keep pace with population growth. As a result there is a lack of service infrastructure to provide health, social, educational, recreational and crime prevention services, as well as a lack of employment opportunities.

Provision was made in the original plan for a 'town centre' in Motherwell, and a shopping centre has been built there. Provision was also made for an industrial area, but this has not been developed.

Motherwell is served by one SAPS police station. (The Nelson Mandela Metro is the only metropolitan city which does not have a municipal police service, leaving policing almost entirely to the SAPS).

City of Cape Town Metro: Khayelitsha & Mitchells Plain

The Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain nodes are quite different and will be dealt with separately.

Khayelitsha is located 26km from the centre of Cape Town, bordered by the N2 national road on the north and the False Bay coast on the south, with Mitchells Plain to the west. It was created in 1983, and the intention was that it should house the overflow of people from nearby Crossroads. The people of Crossroads resisted removal to Khayelitsha and eventually the apartheid government abandoned their plans to clear the old township and relocate 'illegal squatters' from Crossroads to Khayelitsha. However, the available land in Khayelitsha was soon filled up by new arrivals in the city and people who wished to escape the overcrowded conditions of other Cape townships.

A survey conducted in 1995 estimated the population of Khayelitsha at approximately 410 000 people, and it is estimated that this had increased to 600 000 people by the end of 2000. The majority of residents are unemployed and illiterate, and there is a high level of infant mortality, indicating severe poverty. Approximately half the population are younger than 25 years. Khayelitsha experiences high population growth, with constant migration into the city from rural areas. This contributes to enormous pressure on the infrastructure and occasionally results in conflict over access to resources.

The majority of residents live in informal housing, and conditions are extremely over-crowded. Health and personal safety are reduced, and the quality of urban life is poor. People living in informal settlements do not own the land they live on, and there is a severe land invasion problem. The high density of population means that existing community facilities (such as schools, community halls and sports facilities) are inadequate. High densities have also led to widespread disregard for bylaws and other systems which regulate urban life.

Khayelitsha has no business / retail district and is not well-linked to parts of the city providing work opportunities. (A site has been earmarked for development of a CBD). Like most of the URP nodes, it is a dormitory township with no economic base and few employment opportunities for its residents.

According to the 2001 MCA overview report, 'there is a desperate need to restructure Khayelitsha and make it a safe living environment. Unless the basic underlying problems of poverty and the key problem of land ownership are addressed, a stable community will not be created".

Khayelitsha is served by one SAPS station, which records high levels of crime.

References to the Khayelitsha node in the National Urban Renewal Programme tend to refer to the entire Khayelitsha area, whereas the Cape Renewal Strategy targets only one part of the greater Khayelitsha area, known as Site B, identified through SAPS intelligence and crime data as a site where gang-related or organised crime is prevalent, and a 'crime hot-spot'.

Mitchells Plain was planned as a 'coloured' township in the early 1970s, for residents removed from other areas of Cape Town. It is located along the False Bay coast, approximately 30km from the centre of the city, and, like Khayelitsha, is not linked to the transport systems and economic hubs of the rest of Cape Town, so that residents have to commute long distances to places of employment and economic opportunity.

The population of Mitchell's Plein was estimated at over 265 000 in 2000. There are approximately 50 000 dwellings in the area, of which nearly all are formal structures. There is a low population density compared to, say, Khayelitsha.

Although, generally speaking, it is, like other nodes, a dormitory area, it does have a thriving CBD with retail and service facilities. Retail dominates the local economy and there is no significant industrial activity in the area. There is a great deal of vacant land, with a lot of unused public-open space (which can be utilised for criminal activity).

One of the key focus areas in Mitchells Plein is Tafelsig, which has been identified as a node for the Cape (Provincial) Renewal Strategy because of its high crime rate and level of gang activity.

Mitchells Plein is serviced by one SAPS Station. It also houses a Magistrate's court and service points for other agencies in the justice system.

eThekwini Metro: Inanda, Ntuzuma & KwaMashu (INK)

Inanda and KwaMashu were identified by the President as key nodes in his first speech in Parliament in 1999, and adjoining Ntuzuma (which is often described as part of KwaMashu) was added to the UR area by the Municipality. These three adjoining areas, collectively known by the acronym INK, are located in the north of the city. They are located 15-20km from the Durban CBD, with KwaMashu closest to the city. Kwamashu and Ntuzuma are better-serviced than Inanda, but access to services varies considerably in different parts of the node. Although the three areas are similar (especially in that they are dormitory areas, with little economic activity, inadequate physical infrastructure and severe physical degradation), they also exhibit different characteristics and therefore have different renewal needs. Although the entire area is predominantly residential, density and form of dwelling varies across the three sub-areas; as do the demographics of the communities – unemployment and education levels vary significantly between different parts of the node.

Inanda is the oldest area, having been established in the mid-19th century as a reserve for African labour, where a large number of Indian people also settled. In 1936 it was declared an 'African' area. Forced removals and the implementation of influx control in other parts of Durban increased the population of Inanda during the apartheid era. Violence against Indian residents in 1985 was followed by a period of warlordism and then by various conflicts over control of the area.

Ntuzuma was a planned African township built by the City of Durban in the 1970s. It was developed in different sections with different service levels, tenure arrangements and political affiliations, which contributed to high levels of political violence in the area in the 1980s.

KwaMashu was built by the City of Durban between 1957 and 1968 to accommodate African people who were being relocated from other parts of the city. In 1988 it was incorporated into the KwaZulu homeland. High levels of political mobilisation characterised KwaMashu in the 1980s, and it also became notorious for criminal and gang activity in the late 80s and 1990s.

The INK area is approximately 9423 hectares in size, with a population estimated at over 500 000 (18% of the total population of the metropolitan area). The population is predominantly young (approximately 41% are below 20 years of age), with high levels of unemployment, low levels of education, and high levels of poverty. Unemployment averages 55% across the INK area, with higher levels in Inanada (61%) and Ntuzuma (57%). Approximately half the population of the INK node are located in Inanda, with one third in KwaMashu and the remaining 17% located in Ntuzuma.

The INK area is serviced by two SAPS stations: KwaMashu (which also services Ntuzuma) and Inanda. There are satellite stations in Ntuzuma C Section, Amaoti, Newtown and Vela. Serious violent crimes (such as murder, armed robbery, rape and assault GBH) dominate the police priorities in the KwaMashu area, whereas property crimes such as housebreaking and common robbery dominate in the Inanda station area. The entire area has a history of political and community violence, which continues to shape perceptions of safety.

Urban Renewal Projects in the Metropolitan Areas

The Alexandra Renewal Programme (ARP)

The desired outcomes that the Alexandra Renewal Project is aiming to achieve after its 7-year lifespan are:

Many of the activities planned as means of achieving these outcomes (outside of the safety and security-specific plans, which are described in the next section of the report) will contribute to crime prevention, good governance and the reconstruction of the social fabric of Alexandra. For instance

Motherwell (MURP)

The Motherwell Urban Renewal Project seeks to fundamentally improve the quality of life and human development potential within Motherwell.

According to the November 2002 draft of the MURP Comprehensive Integrated Business Plan, the outcomes after five years of Urban Renewal in Motherwell should be:

Khayelitsha & Mitchells Plain (KMP)

The KMP node had not been through a comprehensive UR business planning phase by the time this research was conducted, although various documents have been prepared by the City, and a Khayelitsha Urban Renewal Summit held.

A number of problems, many of them political, in the City of Cape Town administration, have hindered progress on this project. The Urban Renewal Programme did not feature in the city's draft IDP (integrated development plan) for 2002/3; although the City's plans for development in, say, Khayelitsha, are similar to what is needed for the URP. The restructuring of the City administration also contributed to delays in developing a comprehensive URP at the KMP nodes, and, in late 2002, more local government energy seemed to be devoted to developing models for management structures for Urban Renewal than to planning the Renewal projects themselves.

In a report to the NURP in July 2002, five strategic themes (priorities) were identified for the Urban Renewal approaches in both Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain, despite the significant differences between the two areas:

As in Khayelitsha, a number of projects are being implemented in Mitchells Plain, under the auspices of the URP, despite the lack of well-planned UR strategies for these two nodes within the context of the NURP. Two notable projects in Mitchells Plain have been the development of the Mitchells Plain Town Centre, and the anti- graffitti project, which was part of the Cape Renewal Strategy. In Khayelitsha, the first phase development of the 'Look-Out Hill' area is cited as part of the NURP, as is the future development of the CBD.

The Provincial Administration of the Western Cape launched a 'Cape Renewal Strategy' in February 2001, which aims at 'dealing with the underlying causes of crime and criminality' in targetted sites in the city of Cape Town, which were chosen 'because of the acuteness of the gangsterism problem and the associated social, economic and other conditions which breed this form of criminality' (Executive Summary of Seven Precinct Development Plans, Dec 2002). The seven sites are:

The Cape Renewal Strategy is different to the NURP (which is often referred to in Cape Town as 'the Presidential UR Project' to differentiate it from the local renewal initiative). Its geographic area of activity differs, and its emphasis differs – the Cape Renewal Strategy (CRS) is more focussed on reducing crime and improving safety through a comprehensive urban renewal approach, whereas the NURP aims at urban renewal, with urban safety as just one sub-component of that. According to a recent document (Executive Summary of Seven Precinct Development Plans, Dec 2002), the 'goal of the CRS is to combat the influence of gangs in a three-pronged approach:

The CRS is described as a joint effort by the City and the Province, which is led by the Provincial Department of Community Safety and supported by the City.

The selection of CRS sites was informed by official crime data and by police intelligence assessments. Most of them were characterised by high levels of gang-related crime; with the exception of Nyanga, which was included in the programme for a variety of reasons in addition to its high crime rate, such as the reconstruction and development effort under way there, with high levels of community mobilisation.

High-impact 'lead projects' were implemented early in the life of the CRS, with R0.5 – R3.5Million being spent at each pilot site on high-visibility activities that would win community support for the overall renewal initiative. At the time of conducting this research, 'Precinct Development Plans' (or PDP's) were being produced for each of the seven pilot sites. The total value of projects contained in these PDP's is R305 Million.

The PDP prepared at the end of 2002 for the Site B area within Khayelitsha found that the community (in that area) were unaware of the CRS, but aware of the City/'Presidential' initiatives for renewal in Khayelitsha more broadly, perhaps because of good community participation (through the Khayelitsha Urban Renewal Summit) in needs assessment processes for that programme.

Inanda, Ntuzuma & KwaMashu (INK)

The INK Urban Renewal strategy is relatively well-advanced, with Business Planning in a second phase at the end of 2002, and a number of projects already under way.

The overall vision of the INK Urban Renewal Project is:

to fundamentally improve the quality of life of citizens living in Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu by:

Summary comparison of the metropolitan UR strategies

 Alex Motherwell KMP (Site B and Tafelsig) INK
Key goals /
objectives
  • Reduce unemployment
  • Effective & paid-for services
  • Reduce crime
  • Effective local administration
  • Healthy environment
  • Effective housing
  • Sustainable community
  • Civic pride
  • Reduce unemployment
  • Appropriate & sustainable services
  • Safe & secure environment
  • Healthy environment
  • Effective housing
  • Sustainable community
  • Civic pride
  • Skilled labour
  • Well-managed physical infra-structure
  • Improved safety & security
  • Local economic development
  • Social development
  • Improved physical Development
  • Improved governance
  • Reduce unemployment
  • Reduce poverty
  • Reduce crime
  • Improve the public environment
  • Increase access to social services
  • Improve housing
  • Stronger economic relations with metro area
  • Increased skills base

From this summary, it appears that the key elements of urban renewal in South Africa's metropolitan cities are:

Urban Safety aspects of the Urban Renewal projects:

In this section, we examine the URP business plans at the metropolitan nodes for aspects dealing with safety and crime.

Alexandra (ARP)

The ARP sets out a 'functional area' of its plan, dedicated to Public Safety and Security. This seeks to substantially reduce levels of crime and violence, so as to provide an environment which will create safe and secure conditions for all residents and facilitate better quality of living conditions in Greater Alexandra. The ARP intends to achieve this through:

To deliver on this, the following projects are planned as part of the ARP's Safety and Security strategy:

The Alex plan leans heavily towards strengthening the law enforcement / criminal justice agencies, with only victim support and community partnerships identified as 'soft' areas for improved safety in the area. Accordingly, the main areas of activity and expenditure to date have been the resourcing and upgrading of SAPS facilities in the area, and the de-densification programme of re-locations. Little attention has been paid to developing and implementing social aspects of the crime reduction plan to date.

Motherwell (MURP)

According to the current draft of the MURP Plan, one of the outcomes that the MURP should achieve after its five-year period should be enhanced safety and security. This is envisaged as the creation of a safe and secure environment with sufficient policing, emergency services and criminal justice machinery; and the capacity to reduce crimes of serious nature, such as thefts, break-ins, rapes, car-hijackings, vandalism and other abuses to manageable levels.

No detailed planning has been done as yet to indicate how these outcomes will be realised.

A SAPS-funded Crime Prevention and Development Programme (CPDP) is under way in the Nelson Mandela Metro, similar to the CPDP in the INK area. It is in the early stages, with the emphasis mainly on community consultation and data-gathering about crime and safety in the area. As part of this, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) is completing a city victimisation survey in the metropolitan area.

Khayelitsha & Mitchells Plain (KMP)

In this section we will focus on the Cape Renewal Strategy initiatives at Site B (Khayelitsha) and Tafelsig (Mitchells Plain).

The Precinct Plan for Tafelsig (produced at the end of 2002) identified key safety problems and possible projects to address them. The bulk of the proposed 'crime and unsafe environment' projects fell into the following three categories:

The approach of the CRS means that all its plans and projects are ultimately focussed on community safety, but some aspects of the Tafelsig proposals could fall within the ambit of 'social crime prevention', such as:

The first priority project proposed in the Tafelsig PDP is:

Other priority projects include:

Strategies and projects identified in the Site B (Khayelitsha) PDP at the end of 2002 were:

These Precinct Plans are in first draft and will be refined early in 2003. A first reading suggests that they are ambitious, often un-prioritised, and that strategic choices will need to be made as to which projects to invest in.

Inanda, Ntuzuma & KwaMashu (INK)

Most of outcomes that the INK UR project aims to achieve within its 7-year duration relate to directly crime and safety: (from INK Draft 2 Business Plan, p27)

The core (goal) of the functional strategy for Community Safety in INK is to improve safety by developing a comprehensive crime prevention and community safety programme, encouraging participation and involvement by all key roleplayers, and supporting citywide crime-prevention initiatives. Key characteristics of this approach are its emphasis on crime prevention and on partnerships and community participation. In the Phase 1 business plan, the following key programme areas were identified in respect of Community Safety:

Other functional areas of the INK strategy also contain elements that are relevant to crime prevention:

In parallel, and linked, with the UR Project in INK, the Durban Safer Cities office in the eThekwini Municipality, together with the SAPS, is implementing a 'Crime Prevention Development Programme'. This programme grew out of the Durban Safer Cities initiative of the late 1990s and is supported by the Social Crime Prevention component of the SAPS Head Office and implemented by a partnership of Durban- based NGO's. The CPDP has emphasised youth crime prevention and has selected the INK area as its area of geographical focus. Although there are some problems of coherence, scale and integration with the INK approach; there are strong working relationships between the CPDP partners (SAPS, Safer Cities office of the Municipality and NGO's) and the INK team. The CPDP is one of the most advanced crime prevention initiatives being managed at municipal level in South Africa, thus providing the INK team with some local capacity and expertise on crime prevention (or at least on some aspects of crime prevention), as well as with links to useful national and international resource agencies on urban crime prevention. It remains to be seen how it will be integrated with / survive alongside the INK URP.

Summary and comparison of the nodal safety strategies

As with the original NCPS, the 'public safety' or 'crime prevention' sections of the Urban Renewal business plans alone do not tell the whole story of how urban renewal initiatives will impact on crime:

The National Crime Prevention Strategy represents one component of the Growth and Development Strategy. The four pillars of the NCPS do not represent all government activities which will contribute to crime prevention … [but] emphasise areas of crime prevention not covered elsewhere. Many other components of the Growth and Development Strategy, such as job creation, the provision of welfare safety nets and the meeting of basic needs, will eventually impact on crime prevention. There is [also a] need to link crime prevention to capacity-building and to development programmes among the most vulnerable groupings.(NCPS p51)

It is therefore not sufficient to merely examine the crime prevention sections of the urban renewal plans (as we have done in section Urban Safety aspects of the Urban Renewal projects above); the crime reduction approach is only visible when the entire plan is scrutinised (as in Urban Renewal Projects in the Metropolitan Areas above). However, the description of the crime prevention components of the plans adopted at each node is useful insofar as it depicts the current state of crime prevention policy and practice in South Africa. The following table attempts to summarise and compare the safety strategies being adopted in the urban renewal plans:


 Alex Motherwell KMP (Site B and Tafelsig) INK
Key elements of the plans for reducing crime or improving safety in the nodes
  • Improving physical resources for policing & emergency services
  • Improving human resources for policing & emergency services
  • Enhanced community participation in safety issues
  • Public education
  • Provision of victim support services
 No detailed plans
  • Upgrading of public spaces
  • Increase police capacity
  • Improve quality of police service (esp investigation)
  • CCTV
  • Traffic calming
  • Enhanced community participation in safety issues
  • Strengthen CPF's and Neighborhood Watch
  • Public education about crime, criminal justice etc
  • Provide sports & recreation facilities
  • Provide youth services and ('soft') youth development activities
  • More victim support services
  • Build capacity of criminal justice and emergency services
  • Improve the public environment
  • Mobilise, educate & capacitate community against crime
  • Build capacity of community structures for safety eg CPF's
  • Support youth clubs, teach life skills, develop programmes that divert young people from crime / criminality

The Urban Renewal plans are generating precisely the types of 'social' crime prevention envisaged in the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security:

A new phase of crime prevention policy in South Africa?

Common elements of the Urban Renewal Projects' approaches to reducing crime in the nodes appear to be:

These trends indicate progress in government agencies' thinking on crime prevention since the NCPS was developed in 1995-6. At that time, concepts like 'crime prevention through environmental design' (CPTED) were unfamiliar, and the NCPS's emphasis on victims was seldom taken seriously. Its attempt to tackle social reconstruction through 'community values and education' was weak. Partnerships in crime prevention were narrowly understood as Community-Police Forums. By contrast, today's Urban Renewal strategies recognise the interdepence of local economies and crime patterns, the complex relationship between being a victim and being a perpetrator, and the reality that state agencies cannot deal with crime alone. These ideas were considered fairly radical by the crime-combatting establishment in 1996.

In 1998/9, the National Crime Prevention Centre in the Department of Safety and Security reviewed progress and learning from the initial three years of the NCPS. This review identified some dominant features of South Africa's crime problem:

The Urban Renewal Programme provided a new opportunity for government to address these profoundly social factors, in a consolidated and integrated manner. Reflecting on the origins of the URP, a senior Safety and Security official said it was seen within the Crime Prevention Centre and the SAPS, at the time of its launch in 1991, as "the 'new social crime prevention approach', linked to investment in poverty alleviation, the creation of jobs and economic opportunities, and targeted policing" (interview). Today, the urban renewal programme is increasingly being described as "economic, social and psychological re-generation" (interview), with a growing realisation that the main challenges for this regeneration lie in the 'soft' and 'social' spheres, beyond the delivery of houses, infrastructure and improvements to the physical environment. Similarly, in respect of crime prevention dimensions of the urban renewal programme, there is a growing realisation at the nodes that once the police stations are built, the planned streetlights and cameras installed and the parks upgraded, as envisaged in the 'hard' side of the crime prevention plans, the youthfulness of urban populations, and the prevalence of alcohol abuse, violent masculinities and broken families will still combine to generate high levels of violent crime.

Most of the officials who lead implementation of the URP's are planners or engineers by training, with little experience in community development. Municipalities, even those with police agencies, have little or no expertise in crime prevention, especially the 'social' types of crime prevention proposed in the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security as the key role for local government. In most of the metropolitan nodes referred to in this report, urban renewal managers and city authorities have had to solicit the assistance of NGO's or specialist consultants to developing their public safety strategies. This is positive to the extent that it entrenched partnerships between UR project teams and independent experts at the outset, but also reflects poorly on the capacity of government (at all three tiers) to build its own expertise in crime prevention, especially since the 1998 White Paper. It also reflects the unwillingness of the UR projects or cities to rely solely on the SAPS for crime reduction expertise, or, perhaps, the inability of the SAPS at local node or city level to provide the kind of strategic input required. The sustainability of effective crime prevention projects in South African cities depends on capacity being built within city administrations, and the urban renewal projects could provide a useful training ground for a new generation of crime prevention practitioners.

On paper at least, the crime reduction plans in the more advanced urban renewal nodes look good. They reflect the dominant global thinking on crime prevention, thus demonstrating the rapid pace of South Africa's 'catch-up' with the international community in little-more than a decade since international isolation of police and universities. There are a number of challenges ahead:

Hard infrastructure and 'soft' social interventions

The Urban Renewal projects provide an unprecedented opportunity to access a range of government funds for urban safety projects. Some of the easier funding can be found for 'hard' infrastructure investment – such as new or upgraded police premises – and so it is likely that this type of expenditure will feature significantly in the Urban Renewal projects, in the early phases at least. Project designers will need to ensure that the ongoing running costs of these structures are secure, or the sustainability of safety infrastructure will be at risk. Funding for the 'soft' aspects of crime prevention, especially for activities in the realms of 'community participation' and 'youth development' will probably be harder to come by, as the outcomes and benefits of such activities are harder to demonstrate. With national and local elections scheduled to take place within the projects' lifespans, there will be increasing pressure to demonstrate the success of the Urban Renewal Programme, and hard infrastructure is significantly easier to show than, say, improved quality of family relationships. Urban renewal managers will need to bear in mind one of the key learnings from a review of government-funded crime prevention programmes in the United States, which is even more relevant in the South African context:

Communities are the central institution for crime prevention, the stage on which all other institutions perform. Families, schools, labor markets, retail establishments, police and corrections must all confront the consequences of community life. Much of the success or failure of these other institutions is affected by the community context in which they operate. Our nation's ability to prevent serious violent crime may depend heavily on our ability to help reshape community life, at least in our most troubled communities. (Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising Ch 3)

Urban renewal is as much about community renewal as it is about the renewal of the urban environments. The Urban Renewal Programme provides a unique opportunity to develop and test new social forms of crime prevention. The Programme will need to guard against over-investment in physical and environmental forms of crime prevention, at the cost of community-based and developmental approaches.

Prevention and enforcement

Similarly, the urban safety strategies at the nodes will have to find a balance between creative and appropriate law enforcement, and prevention.

Much of the energy in the current urban renewal plans is dedicated to establishing a sound, basic level of service delivery by the criminal justice and municipal law enforcement agencies (for instance through the SAPS' Service Delivery Improvement Plans – SDIP - implemented at most of the nodes). This is entirely appropriate, given the poor state of these services in the nodes. The URP provides a 'kickstart' of resources and scrutiny for these services, and should thus help overcome the various legacies of apartheid which shape poor policing and justice provision.

In the Alexandra plan, there is an innovative emphasis on the enforcement of planning schemes, building regulations and bylaws, as part of the strategy for de-densification of housing. While this demonstrates creative thinking about local law enforcement (enforcement of bylaws has been neglected in the metropolitan cities for many years), it does raise the perennial spectre of an over-emphasis on law enforcement as a perceived solution to problems of safety and disorder. It was precisely this legacy which the NCPS and the White Paper attempted to overcome, by emphasising other forms of crime prevention.

The weakness of law enforcement and criminal justice has allowed for various other forms of crime-control to emerge in South Africa's recent past – in public-private partnerships, community crime prevention initiatives, and in vigilantism. Although not unproblematic, it would be a pity to abandon these new forms of social control and merely return to the notion that 'a good police force is all we need'.

Escalating expenditure on measures which are designed to protect us from victimisation can only be curtailed if we begin to shift towards long-term investment in those spheres which may prevent offending. (NCPS page 5)

Social forms of crime prevention are in their infancy in South Africa, and the urban renewal programme must continue to support prevention alongside improved enforcement – at least, because prevention will ultimately reduce the burden on the criminal justice system, as well as reducing the social costs of crime to marginalised urban communities.

Poverty, unemployment and crime

The relationships between poverty, unemployment, crime and renewal are complex, and the URP provides a great opportunity to observe and understand these relationships. At the most superficial level, perceptions of crime and fear will have a direct relationship to levels of private investment (and potential job creation) in the nodes; but the problem of perceptions is not unique to the urban renewal nodes:

Areas of high crime are unattractive for investment. Both property and personnel are at risk; goods are stolen, premises damaged, employees assaulted and customers intimidated. Attracting capital requires a reduction in crime, so as to allay the legitimate concerns of investors/employers. On the other hand, crime reduction on a large scale may require the creation of employment opportunities for the large numbers of young adults that are the source of so much of the crime in the area. At the same time, many offenders lack the skills needed to obtain and retain attractive jobs, that is positions that pay enough to avoid poverty (ie well above the minimum wage for a two-parent, two-child household with only one wage earner) and which offer potential progress and a sense of accomplishment. Thus, improving their work force skills may be essential, even when capital can be attracted into the community. (Labor markets and crime risk factors by Shawn Bushway and Peter Reuter, in Sherman et al, 'What Works …' Chapter Six).

There is a naïve assumption in many of the business plans that job creation will result in reduced levels of crime, or improved levels of community safety. This view was recognised (and problematised) in the original NCPS:

The perceived centrality of poverty and relative deprivation to escalating crime in South Africa has given rise to the obviously-important perspective that the solutions to the problem reside in investment, economic growth and the creation of jobs for the unemployed. However, whilst development is seen as presenting a solution to the problem of crime, at one and the same time, the magnitude of the crime problem is undermining developmental initiatives. In fact, it is ironic to note that inadequately managed or under-regulated economic development itself often services particular forms of crime and even generates new forms of criminal behaviour. It is internationally recognised that although development reduces crime in the long term, in the interim, as development increases (as measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita), so do crimes against property.(NCPS)

Approaches to job-creation-as-crime-prevention in South Africa have generally been conceptualised crudely. It is worth noting that, in the US, two different types of approaches have been identified:

Most of the approaches to job-creation as crime-preventive in the Urban Renewal Plans tend to fall into the first category, and it may be worth planners giving some thought to testing the 'demand-side' approach in the nodes too.

The actual nature of the relationship between employment, poverty and various forms of crime (particularly interpersonal violence, which is the largest crime problem at most of the nodes) is unknown. While, on conclusion of the URP, it might be relatively easy to count the number of jobs created in the nodes, and to measure improving levels of household income, it would be a grave mistake to attribute a causal link to those factors in sites where levels of criminal victimisation also decline. There needs to be far more sophisticated thinking about the possible effects of job creation on crime trends in these sites (including, for instance, impacts on household relations, gender equality, access to alcohol and firearms). The Urban Renewal Projects provide a great opportunity for research on these questions.

Conclusion: Measuring safety and fear

Most of the urban renewal plans define their public safety outcome as 'reduced levels of crime and violence' – with the exception of the Cape Renewal Strategy which envisages similar outcomes but is more explicit about its focus on gang-related crime and the factors which give rise to gangsterism as a social phenomenon on the Cape Flats. One of the looming challenges for the crime reduction component of the Urban Renewal plans is how to measure success.

Some of the nodes intend using SAPS crime data as an indicator of change and success. This is an extremely risky approach, for two reasons. Firstly, SAPS crime data is historically unreliable, and, although efforts have been made to improve the quality of the data, it is unclear whether the system has actually been improved; also, viewing crime data in historical context (to assess trends over time) is problematic because the older data is unreliable, and methods of recording statistics have changed numerous times in the last decade, making time-trend-comparison very difficult. Secondly, levels of reported crime tend to go up when police services improve and become more accessible, and when police-community relations improve – likely outcomes of the urban renewal strategies. Therefore, if police services at the nodes are rehabilitated, reported crime figures are likely to increase (in the short term at least) rather than decrease. This is not to suggest that SAPS crime data is without value – indeed, it can be used to demonstrate a number of trends in policework, criminal justice performance and reporting rates – but that it needs to be used with caution and verified by other data.

Some of the URP's are using community surveys as a way of gathering baseline quality of life information about the nodes. The inclusion of crime and safety questions in these surveys should be standard practice. At some of the nodes (eg Motherwell), the SAPS budget allocation for the Crime Prevention Development Programme at the node will cover the costs of a 'Safety Audit' or 'crime survey', to gather baseline data at the commencement of the project. (This development follows the experiences of other areas such as INK and some parts of Cape Town, where local community safety audits were conducted during the first phase of strategy development). Perception data about safety and fear, as well as data on experiences of victimisation, can complement police crime statistics and paint a more realistic picture of the crime and safety issues in the nodes. This kind of data is particularly important where the business plans set 'feelings of safety' as an indicator of impact. For instance, in the Second Phase Business Planning process in INK, one of the key debates is how to frame and measure the Community Safety outcomes of the plan. Various options are being debated – the outcome of a successful community safety strategy could be defined variously as:

The selection of either one of these outcomes will have important implications for which types of activities are prioritised, and for methodologies used in future for monitoring and evaluation.

The definition of the project outcome in terms of safety also raises the important issue of fear of crime. Many crime reduction strategies in the developed world include 'reduction in fear' as one of their objectives, in addition to 'reductions in crime'. The issue of fear reduction was first raised in the 1996 NCPS, which then described as one if its aims, to

Create a sense of confidence that crime will be successfully reduced. It is essential to reassure a traumatised and victimised public and rebuild their confidence in government's ability to counter the crime problem. This is regarded as a vital contribution to the Growth and Development strategy, as it is this optimism which will underlie a successful growth path - and underpin longer term strategies to prevent crime. (NCPS page 5)

A strategy which aims to increase feelings of safety (such as the INK Urban Renewal Plan) inherently aims to reduce fear of crime. In order to achieve this, we need to understand what people fear. In line with the 'dis-aggregation' approach advocated in the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy, we need to appreciate that different people have different fears, and that different strategies for fear reduction might have different results for different people, in different places, at different times. At the outset, this poses a challenge to any strategies (whether the police's or a city's) that aim broadly to 'reduce fear' and 'improve feelings of safety'; especially when they might have a specific gender focus or want to prioritise safety for, say, women, children or the elderly …

The 'broken windows' paradigm of thinking about crime and safety had its origins in US research (Biderman, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Crime, 1967) which showed that fear of crime was strongly related to the existence of "disorderly" conditions in neighborhoods and communities - "In its broadest sense, disorder is incivility, boorish and threatening behaviour that disturbs life, especially urban life. Urban life is characterised by the presence of many strangers, and, in such circumstances, citizens need minimum levels of order." (Kelling and Coles p14-15). In deprived urban South African contexts, this 'disorder' may well include violence, because of prevalence of firearms and the culture of violence. (In the US, by contrast, disorder is generally thought of as 'minor' or non-violent).

Testing the 'broken windows' thesis, criminologist Wesley Skogan's research into the causal links between disorder and fear (Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods, 1990), produced three major findings:

The experience of 'disorder' in the US cities is probably far removed from the dire consequences of social fragmentation that manifest in social life at the Urban Renewal nodes; but Skogan's findings are intriguing and should certainly inspire comparative South African research. Skogan found that citizens want attention paid (by the state) to disorder problems, as well as to serious crime. This may explain one of the key challenges now apparent even in South Africa (and already well-established elsewhere in the world) – that "even though the incidence of serious crime may level-off or decline, fear of crime may not abate, and may even continue to rise where disorder is not addressed" (p27). (Perhaps one of the implications of thinking about 'disorder' as a major contributing factor to fear in our cities is the need for more thinking about the role of city-level law enforcement – the enforcement of bylaws, health regulations and planning schemes. This is an area which has not received much attention in the National Crime Prevention initiative, nor in most of the Urban Renewal initiatives - except at Alexandra - to date).

In South Africa, the issues of fear and safety are made even more complex by the fact that much, or most, violent crime occurs between people who know each other, and much of it takes place within private, domestic spaces, rather than in public spaces. Thus we need to understand what it is that people fear – do women fear walking down a dark street, (or crossing an unkept piece of veld) as much, or more, than they fear going home to an abusive family situation - and what would make them feel safe. Even where victimisation surveys have been conducted (eg the Stats South Africa Crime Survey, the ISS surveys conducted in five major South African cities), they have failed to provide the depth of knowledge required to develop effective fear-reduction strategies.

Undoubtedly the histories of violence in many of the urban renewal nodes contribute to perceptions of 'un-safety', and it remains to be seen whether the urban renewal strategies will be able to impact on this. Baseline research into perceptions of fear and safety (as proposed in some of the URP nodes) is therefore essential, as is courage in trying out new strategies and the willingness to learn about fear-reduction in South African cities from mistakes as well as successes. The urban renewal projects offer an unprecedented opportunity for innovation and learning in many aspects of crime prevention and fear reduction.

Bibliography

Urban Renewal Forum (various dates) Minutes of URF meetings

MCA Urban and Environmental Planners (May 2001) Overview of Urban Renewal Strategy Nodes

National Urban Renewal Programme: Final Report of Development Planning Advisors to the Minister for Provincial and Local Government (November 2001) Berrisford et al, DPLG, Pretoria

Overview Report on the Urban Renewal Programme (May 2002) DPLG, Pretoria

Kelling G and Coles C (1996) Fixing Broken Windows New York, Free Press

Skogan W G (1990) Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods, New York, Free Press

Sherman L et al (1998) Crime Prevention: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising Report to the US Congress

Cape Renewal Strategy (2002) Consolidated Precinct Development Plans

Cape Renewal Strategy (2002) Tafelsig Precinct Development Plan

Cape Renewal Strategy (2002) Khayelitsha-Victoria Mxenge (Site B) Precinct Development Plan

EThekwini Municipality (2002) Inanda, Ntuzuma, KwaMashu Urban Renewal Business Plan Stage 1, 2nd Draft

South African Police Service (2001) Presidential Pilot Project in the areas of KwaMashu and Inanda: Crime Prevention and Development Programme, Draft Report of the first phase – 2001

Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (November 2002) Motherwell urban renewal programme, Comprehensive integrated business plan

Notes:

1 The aim of the CSVR's City Safety Project is to work with the metropolitan councils in South Africa's six metropolitan cities - Johannesburg, Tshwane, eThekwini, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni and the Nelson Mandela Metro, to build capacity and improve effectiveness of both law enforcement and crime prevention strategies in the major cities, and thereby contribute to improved safety in those cities.

2 Mbeki's 'two nations' speech in 1999 is the hallmark of this discourse

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