

Research Report



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FORMER COMBATANTS' INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME AND CRIME PREVENTION

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INTRODUCTION

...former combatants ended up engaging in violent crime in order to better their situation. A number of them were convicted for cash-in-transit heists and are serving long prison sentences. While we may all be in agreement that there is no excuse for criminality, we all must, to some extent, stand indicted for probably not having done enough to ensure the socio-economic stability of our military veterans and their dependants.¹

The African National Congress (ANC) suspended the armed struggle in August 1990 and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), its military wing was formally disbanded in 1993.² Due to the peaceful nature of the transition, South Africa is rarely understood as a post-conflict country. Consequently, there has never been any serious attempt to identify or effectively address the wide range of needs of the different former combatants' groups, especially former members of the guerrilla forces and paramilitary formations.

In 2001, seven years into democracy, Rocky Williams a former MK combatant argued that the government lacked a strategy to help demobilised former guerrilla combatants come to terms with the harsh realities of a high unemployment rate and poverty.³ It took almost ten years for politicians to realise that without proper planning and adequate funding, there is the real possibility that former combatants would recommence fighting or resort to crime. This is evident in the 2004 speech by the Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr Mluleki George quoted above.

It is thus important to understand the extent and nature of former combatants' involvement in criminal activities; the motivations and means for criminality among former combatants; the initiatives that have been undertaken to address the problem of former combatants' involvement in crime; and the extent and nature of former combatants' involvement in crime prevention activities.

Methodology

This paper is based on nine interviews with people who work/have worked with former combatants or are involved in crime prevention. Participants were selected using a purposive sampling technique.⁴ The following people were interviewed: Queen Riba, the Chairperson of the Diepkloof Community Policing Forum;⁵ Almon Mpanyana, the Demilitarisation Project Co-ordinator, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department (EMPD); Mbulelo Raymond Fihla, Chairperson of the Azanian People's Liberation Army Military Veterans Association (APLAMVA); Strike Thokoane, a former Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA) combatant; Jennifer Ntlatseng, the Deputy Director: Crime Prevention, Gauteng Department of Community Safety; Sobhuza Dlamini, Chief Executive Officer of Jikeleza Mkhonto, Monnaesi Monosi, a former Self Defence Unit (SDU) member⁶; Doris Mathebula, a Senior Manager, Community Relations, Limpopo Department of Safety, Security and Liaison; and Phala Sehoane, an unemployed former community constable. The study further used a focus group discussion with five unemployed former community constables.⁷ A survey of newspaper accounts of former combatants' involvement in crime as well as previous studies on the reintegration of former combatants into civilian society was also conducted.

This report also draws on a Policy Dialogue Workshop on Former Combatants' Role in Crime and Crime Prevention hosted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) in Cape Town on 11 October 2007. Participants at the workshop included representatives from local and national veterans' associations; Non-Governmental Organisations; Western Cape Community Police Board; Western Cape Department of Community Safety and the Western Cape Provincial South African Police Service (SAPS).

Conceptual Framework

The involvement of former combatants in crime is analysed within the context of South Africa's failure to successfully reintegrate former combatants into civilian society. Reintegration refers to the process of facilitating the transition of former combatants to civilian life, which allows them to adapt economically and socially to productive civilian life.⁸ Reintegration is meant to provide an enabling environment for transition to civilian life. Demobilized combatants are responsible for making choices and determining their destiny within an enabling environment.⁹

The reintegration of former combatants into civilian society consists of three dimensions: social, political and economic. Social reintegration refers to the process through which former combatants are made to feel part of and accepted by the community.¹⁰ This involves a psychological adjustment in which former combatants stop seeing themselves as a social group associated with weapons and the skills of war.¹¹ An indicator of the successful social reintegration of former combatants into civilian society is when they stop seeing themselves as a distinct social group that is entitled to special benefits.

Political reintegration refers to a process through which ex-combatants learn to participate fully in the political life of their communities.¹² Political reintegration includes participation in structures such as local government councils, school governing bodies, and local security committees.¹³ The last form of reintegration, economic reintegration, refers to a process through which former combatants build their livelihoods through production, service provision and/or other forms of gainful employment.¹⁴ It is generally agreed that former combatants who have no other means of earning a living have the potential to destabilise post-conflict societies especially through armed criminality. Despite this danger, the reintegration of former combatants in South Africa was not properly planned and failed to assist most former combatants in their transition to civilian society.¹⁵

This report uses the concept 'former combatants' as opposed to 'former soldiers'. It is common to refer to members of a statutory force as soldiers and those of a guerrilla or paramilitary group as combatants. A soldier is a person who has enlisted with (or has been conscripted into) the armed forces of a sovereign country and has undergone training and received equipment to defend that country or its interests.

In the South African context, former combatants is an inclusive concept used to describe former members of MK, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA), as well as members of the former paramilitary formations that waged the liberation struggle inside the country. The concept is also used in reference to former members of the Self Protection Units (SPUs which were aligned to the Inkatha Freedom Party's (IFP).¹⁶ However, amongst those who were engaged in the liberation struggle the concept remains highly contested. This is because different individuals contributed to the struggle for liberation in various capacities. These included those who assisted and provided support for guerrilla combatants in the form of safe houses, courier work and reconnaissance and those who were responsible for building underground structures.

There has never been any official attempt to define the concept 'former combatants' in post-conflict South Africa. A former APLA commander complained about the lack of a clear definition of 'combatant' within his organisation. 'Who is a combatant?... We have no doubt that a number of people were excluded because the concepts were not clearly defined'.¹⁷

The exclusion of some former combatants was more evident in the manner in which interventions designed to address their plight were conceived. For example, the Special Pensions grant was not conceived as a strategy to comprehensively address the reintegration aspirations of all former combatants. Serving to illustrate this point is the fact that within MK only two detachments (Luthuli and Madinoga) could rightfully benefited from this intervention, given the age-based conditions applicable. The majority of members of other detachments (June 16, Young Lions, Green Mamba,

Mbarara, Underground and Self Defense Units) were excluded from one of the very few interventions of the post-1994 government interventions aimed at reintegration of former combatants into society.¹⁸

In the context of this study the concept 'former combatants' refers to former members of APLA, AZANLA, MK, SDUs, SPUs and other lesser known armed formations that operated within South Africa prior to 1994.¹⁹ These include the Bonteheuwel Military Wing and many yet unidentified armed formations. The concept 'former combatants' is used with the acknowledgement that its definition is highly contested within the South African context.

1. FORMER COMBATANTS' INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME

As early as October 1994 Laurie Nathan, then head of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), cautioned that former guerrillas who felt betrayed could resort to banditry and arms-trading if they were not integrated into the national defence force.²⁰ Similarly, Bill Sass then a senior researcher at the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP), argued that there was a possibility that disgruntled former MK combatants could turn to crime.²¹ However, there has never been any comprehensive study to determine the involvement of former combatants in criminal activities. Most of the information is in the form of anecdotes from studies focusing on the reintegration of former combatants into civilian society.

The media, which has a tendency to sensationalise these issues, has carried a number of reports on former combatants' threats to embark on violent crime or incidents of violent crime involving former combatants. An example of the of this relates to some former MK combatants who had walked out of Wallmanstahl military base during the integration process to form the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). They were quoted as threatening to start a campaign to cripple the economy if their demands were not met.²² Accounts of the involvement of former combatants in crime included allegations in 1998 of the existence of a criminal gang called 'the ANC Select',

operating with the supposed blessing of top-ranking ANC members of the Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) legislature.²³

Perhaps the two most prominent media stories on former combatants' involvement in crime were those on Colin Chauke Bandile and Emmanuel Botya, both former MK combatants. Chauke was identified as the kingpin of a syndicate that engaged in cash-in-transit robberies while it was reported that Botya was hired by taxi owners to shoot at Golden Arrow buses.²⁴ However, some of the threats of crime have been a bluff designed to extract government attention. An example is the recent claim by Plaatjie Mashego, a founder member of the Malamulela Social Movement of the Unemployed (MSMU), who claimed that former MK combatants were involved in training members of his organisation including the training of criminals to bomb Automatic Teller Machine (ATMs) 'to draw government's attention to their plight'.²⁵

The problem with media reports is that most are not based on any in-depth research and analysis. Thus, such reports present a simplistic picture based only on a few anecdotal accounts. They tell us very little about the extent and nature of former combatants' involvement in crime, or the reasons why they might have become involved. Most importantly, the identity 'former combatants' is highlighted as if violent crime is statistically the exclusive domain of the former combatant community. The study endeavoured to address these issues through interviews with former combatants and government officials from the Gauteng and Limpopo provincial departments of Safety and Security.²⁶

1.1 Former Combatants' Criminality: Views from Interviewees

Jennifer Ntlatseng, the Deputy Director: Crime Prevention, Gauteng Department of Community Safety, argues that the view that former combatants are involved in crime is speculation. She argues that the speculation is based on the manner in which crimes such as armed robbery are planned and executed.²⁷ Ntlatseng is not the only person to deny the disproportionate involvement of former combatants in criminal activities. Doris Mathebula of the Department of Safety and Security in Limpopo Province argues that there is no proof that former combatants are involved in crime:

*I don't think so, I don't think that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, those are just suspicions probably in the manner in which these crime are committed because they are professionals but one thing for sure there is no proof that ex-combatants are really involved or are partaking in these types of crime.*²⁸

While government officials argued that there is no evidence that some former combatants are involved in criminal activities, former combatants who were interviewed conceded that some of their comrades were involved in different types of crime. Strike Thokoane, a former AZANLA combatant, argued that the evidence is out there, but requires someone to collect it.²⁹ Similarly, Sobhuza Dlamini reported that a number of former MK combatants are currently serving sentences in KZN prisons for various crimes.

*... I know in Kwa-Zulu Natal, in two big prisons in the province, one is Durban-Westville Prison the other one is Pietermaritzburg Prison, there is a noticeable presence of ex-combatants such that... the official that was responsible for administrating the MKMVA Provincial office in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Mr. Dumisane Gumede during the beginning of this year, 2007, he reported to us the MKMVA leadership that he had been conducting visitations in prisons... My understanding is that the aim was to ensure that when these comrades, these ex-combatants come out of prison we could have a way of ensuring that they are integrated into our structures and interventions. So from that I would say that its one evidence that there is a number of ex-combatants in prison...*³⁰

The current Chairperson of the Azanian People's Liberation Army Military Veterans' Association (APLAMVA), Raymond Fihla, also conceded that some former combatants are involved in criminal activities. Furthermore, APLAMVA has evidence that point to the involvement of former combatants in crime:

Yes on APLA Military Veterans' [Association] side we do have evidence in that regard, because we do have some of our own ex-combatants that are currently in prisons for criminal activities... We have a list of all our combatants that are in prison and we have details in terms of the offences for which they have been convicted. We still have combatants that are still in prison for the activities that they engaged in pre-1994 but we do have others that went back to prisons for criminal activities that took place post-1994.³¹

The involvement of former combatants in criminal activities was further confirmed by Strike Thokoane's report that he had recently visited a former AZANLA member serving a sentence at Grahamston Prison. He further revealed that there are some former AZANLA members in the Free State Province who have been recently released from prison while others are still serving their sentences. Furthermore, he revealed that in Johannesburg Prison a number of former combatants are serving prison sentences for criminal offences. Some of these former combatants were reportedly in the AZANLA High Command and committed crime as late as 2003.³²

Former combatants are associated with violent crime mainly due to their possession of military skills. However, while it is perfectly plausible to argue that some former combatants have turned to crime, it is important to note (as the following section will show) that violent crime is not the only option.

1.2 Crime of Choice among Former Combatants

The 2006/2007 crime statistics released in June 2007 revealed that cash-in-transit heists have increased steadily since 2003. They jumped from 192 in 2003, to 220 in 2004, to 383 in 2005 and to 467 in 2006. The past two years have seen increases of 74.1 percent and 21.9 percent.³³ The steady increase in the number of cash-in-transit heists has taken place in the context of the termination of integration and demobilisation.³⁴ Given the fact most of the people who served in South Africa's guerrilla groups did not get an opportunity to acquire marketable skills, it is tempting to link an increase in incidents of cash-in-transit heists to demobilised former combatants. However, there is no data indicating the number of former combatants involved in cash-in-transit heists.

In 2005, Superintendent Martin Aylward, spokesman for Director Bushie Engelbrecht's special investigations unit, reported that of the more than 80 people who had been arrested on suspicion of involvement in cash-in-transit heists then, only two had been positively identified as former MK combatants. Against that, five policemen had been arrested. Possibly, this is because it is far easier to identify people who are employed as policemen than former guerrilla combatants because the data base of serving policemen is complete while that for former combatants is non-existent.³⁵ Senior Superintendent Manentsa from the office of the Western Cape SAPS Provincial Commissioner also revealed that his office does not keep such statistics.³⁶ Thus, to argue that former combatants are responsible for cash-in-transit heists is to assume that a repository of skills used in this form of crime reside mainly within the former combatants. However, without statistics on the number of former combatants who are involved in criminal activities, it is impossible to disaggregate the types of crime in which they are involved.

While some informants pointed to the involvement of former combatants in crime, none of them identified certain forms of crime as an exclusive specialty of former combatants. Informants made reference to a number of former combatants who were involved in different forms of crime, some of which

cannot be directly linked to the possession of military skills or access to weapons. These include car theft, shoplifting, house-breaking, credit card fraud and the theft of bank cards at ATMs³⁷

The involvement of former combatants in non-violent crime such as the theft of parked and unoccupied cars indicates the extent to which former combatants rationalise about their actions. Monosi observes that those who steal and sell motor vehicles (sometimes for as little as R3 000 per car) or various parts thereof, chose car theft above car-jacking because the prison sentence for car-jacking is tougher than that of an ordinary motor vehicle theft. Another reason for choosing less violent form of crime is to minimise the risk of being arrested. As one informant argues, some former combatants realise that being arrested for armed robbery using an AK47 is more likely than for robbing a neighbour or committing housebreaking.³⁸ However, this is not to deny the involvement of some former combatants in violent crime.

In his autobiography Letlapa Mphahlele, a former APLA Director of Operations (now the President of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)), observes that in the early 1990s some APLA cadres were starving and that the PAC was not taking care of them. Instead, the organisation encouraged APLA cadres to commit robberies to survive.

When they refused to do that, they were called cowards who were beaten by mere criminals who had not been given military training abroad. It's a sad record that during the nineties APLA suffered more casualties on "repossession missions" than on combat with the enemy.³⁹

While Fihla concedes that APLA did sanction armed robberies during the liberation struggle, he argued that the organisation never encouraged crime for personal gains.

Whilst we did not have as much money as MK had, we didn't encourage people to engage in crime to feed themselves as individuals. Because, remember, once you do that you lose control over your forces. There is no

way that you can lead a bunch of criminals, it is impossible, that is not true [that the PAC encouraged people to engage in crime to feed themselves]. What we did for instance, we created a structure which we called a Repossession Unit. That structure was responsible for deciding which operation and where, which could be interpreted as criminal activities, but we called them our structure of repossession. For instance, we had clear targets like banks, for instance, any financial institution that we could target. The farmers, for instance, some of whom we knew kept a lot of money in their houses, they were targets for us. We were clear, CIT, cash-in-transit vehicles – those we targeted.⁴⁰

Some former combatants have been blamed for their involvement in taxi violence. For example, in 1997 a press report identified a suspected hitman who was involved in a series of attacks on taxis in North West province as a former APLA member. However, police officers could not confirm this.⁴¹ As late as June 2007, following taxi violence in Johannesburg and the surrounding areas, a press report revealed that taxi associations hired former combatants as hitmen to attack members of rival associations.⁴²

While Fihla admits the involvement of some former combatants in taxi violence he points out that in some cases they are not directly involved in the actual violence. He cites an example of a former APLA combatant who was not directly involved in the taxi violence, but trained taxi drivers and owners on the use of unfamiliar weapons.⁴³ This indicates that violent crime is not an exclusive specialty of former combatants.

Crime in general should be understood as an indicator of a social crisis in contemporary South Africa, 'one of whose manifestations is the erosion of social relations of caring and responsibility'.⁴⁴ According to Jacklyn Cock, perpetrators of gun violence display an extreme form of this indifference. Understood in this sense, it becomes easy to recognise that there are different participants (including former combatants) who are involved in various forms of crime including armed robberies and cash-in-transit heists. Since there are

currently no statistics on the number of former combatants who are involved in crime, their association with violent crime remains speculation.

Former combatants are commonly associated with violent crime because of their military training as well as their access to small arms, a legacy of the thirty years of war in the South African region. However, in so doing, analysts ignore the fact that former combatants are humans who confer meaning and purpose to their actions. Bob Mabaso argued that MK combatants were taught about how to use a gun for political purposes. 'They know that when holding a gun you do not simply choose easy targets to make easy war'.⁴⁵ Propaz, a peacebuilding organisation in Mozambique, also argues that part of the training for both sides during the war in Mozambique involved using restraint when employing a weapon. Thus, 'without denying the violent acts that have been committed during the war, the chances of a former soldier going on a path of violent crime after the war, are much smaller than generally believed'.⁴⁶ The point is not to deny the involvement of former combatants in criminal activities, but to argue against the simplistic association between former combatants and violent crime.

Human beings confer meaning and purpose to their actions. Thus, predicting human behaviour is a complex and very often unattainable task for social researchers. This is especially the case when studying a social category (such as former combatants) that has been affected by and is emerging from violent conflict. However, understanding why former combatants could be attracted to crime is essential to formulation of evidence-based and appropriate policy. A thorough understanding of the complex array and interplay of factors is central to the design of appropriate interventions to influence attitudes to crime. A thorough analysis of the motivations and means for criminality amongst former combatants' would help move beyond narrow and deterministic explanations.⁴⁷

Motivations as used here refer to factors that influence former combatants to engage in criminal activities. The motivations are dynamic and wide-ranging, from a concern to feed one's family, to the pursuit of social status in the

context of a culture of consumerism. Means refer primarily to the relative opportunities for committing crime, the existence of a 'culture of criminality', and the relatively easy access to small arms for the purpose of committing crime.⁴⁸ This would also help us understand how former combatants could become drawn into criminal activities. The motivations and means approach can potentially account for the attraction of former combatants to certain types of crime.

1.3 Motivations for Criminality among Former Combatants

Those who concede that some former combatants are involved in criminal activities generally explain this phenomenon in terms of the lack of economic opportunities and the possession of military skills. It is argued that since former combatants lack the skills for jobs in the civilian society, 'there is a danger that they will fall back on what is seen as the only skill they have – the use of weapons, which would result in increased crime and possible insurrection'.⁴⁹ Jennifer Irish-Qhobosheane and Neo Moshe are some of the proponents of this argument. They argue that many South African former combatants who had received training in weaponry and how to plan and execute offensive operations found themselves unemployed in the post-1994 period. 'Not surprisingly, in a context of limited work opportunities, some of these people chose to use the skills they had acquired for their own personal benefit and some were recruited into criminal networks'.⁵⁰

All the informants who conceded that some former combatants are involved in criminal activities used the lack of economic opportunities to explain the tendency. For example, Mpanyana observes that most of the former combatants who are involved in criminal activities are people who are not economically active. This is mainly due to their lack of formal education, which many blame on the lack of effective reintegration programmes.⁵¹

Former combatants have also adopted the lack of economic opportunities and the possession of military skills as a convenient explanation for their

involvement in criminal activities. For example, Phala Sehoane, a former community constable argues:

*... the main thing is to put food on the table for your own kids because we are old enough now – some of us are 40, 45 even some are 50 [years old] and then all **di post ha di hlaha** [when vacancies become available] they say 18 to 33 [years old] and then qualifications we don't have those things... if you are [unemployed and have pressures to provide for your family] there must be an alternative on how you are going to maintain the family. Then you need money now, you need a car now, you have to pay the school fees for the kids now, then where are you going to get that money?⁵²*

Former combatants often use the threat of crime to draw the attention of politicians. For example, one study cites a former combatant saying: 'The reason is that some of us know nothing except military skills, therefore it is difficult to get employment. The [Special] pension will help some of us survive before we end up being engaged in criminal activities'.⁵³ A female former MK combatant was also cited in the same study saying: 'We need a special pension irrespective of our age so that we don't think of crime or shoplifting. For us women, stealing clothes is our main crime'.⁵⁴

It is worth noting that politicians have uncritically adopted the approach of linking former combatants' involvement in criminal activities to the lack of economic opportunities. The speech by Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr Mluleki George, MP, cited in the introduction, is illustrative of this. George's predecessor adopted a similar approach. On 3 May 2001 Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, then Deputy Minister of Defence said: 'Because it has happened that those people who have trained militarily, who do not have other forms of skills, do tend to crime from the point of view that they have the skill of using the gun (*sic*). So as part of our programme we are ensuring that they do not get into these anti-social activities'.⁵⁵

The lack of economic opportunities seems a plausible reason to explain the involvement of former combatants in crime when one considers the

unemployment rate and the deep economic inequalities in South Africa. In June this year, Joel Netshitenzhe, head of policy in the South African Presidency revealed that almost half of all South Africans (43 percent) live in poverty (defined as anyone earning less than R3 000 a year). Furthermore, according to the narrow definition of unemployment, 25,5 percent of people do not have jobs, while 37,3 percent are without work according to the broad definition.⁵⁶ In addition to this, in 2005, the chief executives (mostly white men) of South Africa's 50 largest and most influential companies were each being paid on average more than R15-million a year. They made more than 700 times the minimum wage.⁵⁷

However, the lack of economic opportunities is not sufficient to explain people's involvement in crime. It cannot help us explain the involvement of employed people in violent crime. A former SDU member from Thokoza revealed that there are some former MK and SDU members who are employed in either the public or private sector but continue to engage in criminal activities.⁵⁸ Their participation in crime is either direct, for example stealing cars, or indirect, as when they place orders for spare parts (or complete motor vehicles) with criminals who are involved in car theft. Thus, more complex explanations are required in order to understand the involvement of former combatants in crime.

A previous study has shown that political disgruntlement is another possible cause of crime. The study cites a former combatant from the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality who confessed that he was involved in criminal activities such as car hijackings, muggings and house breaking in his community. This was a form of revenge against the ANC which had tortured and detained him on suspicion that he was a spy while in exile, before he was 'converted' into an MK cadre.⁵⁹ Another former MK combatant from the same area reported that he working with white political organisations which helped crime syndicates to be strong in order to blame former MK combatants and the ANC government for the increase in crime.⁶⁰

The study by CSVR revealed that some former combatants used their past military experiences in their explanations of their current criminal activity. According to Sasha Gear, many former MK combatants understood criminal behaviour amongst some former combatants to be informed by the sacrifices that they made, and the betrayal many of them now feel.

Gavin Robertson, one of the eco-trail facilitators for former combatants, who works with the National Peace Accord Trust (NPAT), also observes that former combatants feel that they had made a contribution to freedom in South Africa. Furthermore, they feel that in order to do this they had to make sacrifices, for example, they sacrificed their education or family stability or other lifestyle choices. Consequently former combatants entered the transition period with an expectation of rewards for their contribution to the liberation of the country.⁶¹ However, even when their expectations were not met the military veterans continued to wait for rewards, and ultimately became resentful. This approach has a long-term negative impact:

“Blame” is inversely proportionate to “power” – the more one blames something outside of oneself, the more powerless one feels to change the situation. As more and more blame is heaped on political leaders and current circumstances, the ex-combatants experience more and more powerlessness⁶².

An interesting observation made by Robertson is that a combination of a sense of powerlessness to change circumstances and a feeling of being entitled to rewards creates a climate for crime – ‘if they won’t give me rewards, I’ll take them’.⁶³ Robertson describes this sense of taking something without earning it as an element of criminal activity. He concludes that former combatants with this mind-set spend years trapped in a stagnant waiting period, resorting to criminal activity to take that which is not being given.

Sasha Gear also found that a minority of former combatants draw attention to militarised strategies and discourses employed in previous armed conflict in

their explications of current crime. 'For example, some liberation movement members explain that these discourses and strategies included the sanctioning of armed robbery, theft and other criminal activities for the purposes of resourcing the struggle'.⁶⁴ Fihla of APLAMVA admits that the fact some of these former APLA combatants were encouraged to commit armed robberies, they are likely to engage in criminal activities due to the lack of economic opportunities.⁶⁵ However, motivations alone cannot explain why former combatants turn to crime. It is also important to focus on the means for criminality amongst former combatants.

1.4 Means for Criminality among Former Combatants

Former combatants who commit crime operate within a conducive environment in the form of a culture of criminality. This refers to the extent to which crime has infiltrated different sectors of the South African society. This is evident in the involvement of members of parliament in the travel voucher fraud, the involvement of politicians in irregular tender procedures, the acceptance of a bribe by a traffic police officer who should be issuing a traffic fine, the high levels of corruption at the Department of Home Affairs offices and the country's ports of entry, the involvement of civil servants in social grants fraud and many other illegal financial transactions. Crime seems to be a way of life and former combatants are only a sub-set of a larger group of people involved in criminal activities. Thus, in some cases, former combatants become involved in crime such as armed robbery after being recruited into existing criminal gangs because of their military skills.

There are some instances where former combatants recruit people without military skills whom they train in the use of various weapons. This is because some former combatants were in the high command of their various armed forces including intelligence divisions. Their skills in gathering information, planning and execution of offensive operations come in handy. Those who were involved in the political education departments are said to have an added advantage because they can persuade and mobilise ordinary people

who are struggling to make ends meet in a poverty-stricken contemporary South Africa. As Monosi put it:

I am telling you... I won't lie [former combatants from exile] are capable of manipulating your mind very easily. Many several times they have tried in terms of engaging me into... business and whatsoever and some friends around Gauteng Province who, also even tried to say "man lets get into this, we will get so much money" and I said thanks my man I will come back to you. They can even easily tell and motivate you politically to see where are you standing now, what have you been doing now and what happened to your family. Is your family still supporting you the way you want?⁶⁶

In other instances some former combatants belong to gangs formed, and consisting exclusively of, former guerrilla combatants. For example, on 6 August this year nineteen alleged gang members were arrested and seventeen firearms, including seven AK-47s, were confiscated. It is believed the men were planning to rob a business later in the day.⁶⁷ A former MK combatant reveals that all of the members of the gang were former MK combatants.⁶⁸

However, even when former combatants are not directly involved in gangs they might service the gangs by supplying or renting weapons, servicing the weapons, etc. Thus, former combatants, whether as members of criminal gangs, or as 'service providers' to gangs, are part of a sophisticated social network. While the official position from the ANC is that guns were collected at the end of the armed struggle as late as 2005, Africa Khumalo of the South African Police Services (SAPS) admitted that some of the weapons were used in cash-in-transit robberies.⁶⁹ In 2006, media reports revealed that former APLA and MK cadres were involved in gun-running. According to a report in the *Mail and Guardian*, gun dealers on the streets of Sharpeville in the Vaal Triangle agreed to lease a journalist an AK-47 for a day for R2 000.⁷⁰

Corrupt soldiers and police officers are also part of the multi-billion rand criminal economy. For example, in November 2006 a press report revealed

that bullet-proof jackets from a military supply store sold for R500 each to use in cash-in-transit heists.⁷¹ On 10 September 2007 Constable Richard Msibi of the EMPD, who is in his 50s, was allegedly caught red-handed selling ammunition at the Wattville/Actonville hostel. He was in full Metro Police uniform at the time and was travelling in his own car. He was allegedly found with 103 9mm rounds and 122 AK-47 rounds, an AK-47 magazine as well as counterfeit R50 notes hidden in the back of his bakkie.⁷²

Due to the proliferation of small arms, South Africa remains a heavily armed society.⁷³ South African civilians own 3.7-million firearms, while the police and the army have 567 000 guns between them. South African civilians thus have more than six times as many firearms as those held by the state security forces.⁷⁴ While not the cause, the availability of small arms increases the potential for violent crime not only by former combatants but by other members of society as well. As stated above, violent crime is not the exclusive terrain of former combatants and it is not the only type of crime they are drawn into. Violent crime is used to illustrate the culture of criminality and not to imply that it is the only crime that attracts former combatants. A culture of criminality and the involvement of former combatants in crime have implications for the social integration of former combatants into civilian society.

1.5 Crime and Former Combatants' Social Reintegration

As stated earlier, social reintegration refers to the process through which ex-combatants are made to feel part of and accepted by the community. The attitudes of communities towards former combatants are important and depend on the history of the war and the degree of general reconciliation. In Uganda, Ben Kazoora notes those former combatants who did not receive a warm welcome were usually those who were known to have had some sort of problem (such as alcohol, stealing or other criminal activities) before joining the army.⁷⁵ In the South African context, there was a general consensus amongst interviewees that, while former combatants might be involved in

crime, they conducted themselves in such a way that they were not alienated from society, but rather integrated into local communities.

There are various factors which enable South African former combatants to reintegrate into local communities irrespective of their possible criminality. First, as Thokoane observed, guerrilla combatants are people who are skilled, who are trained, who are political and who can mobilise society to support them. They do this by presenting themselves as philanthropists. For example, Thokoane observes that some former combatants who are involved in crime would use various strategies to bolster their popularity. These include buying blankets for all the elderly women in a particular street, supporting a particular poor family, coming to the rescue of children who can't go to school because there is no one to fend for them, they would stop to offer elderly people a lift, and when there is a problem at a particular home they are the first ones to go there and give some money. Consequently, the local community accepts them.⁷⁶

Jennifer Irish-Qhobosheane observes that one of the factors that influence perceptions of crime is whether community members believe that they benefit from or are victims of crime.⁷⁷ This relates to the second factor, which is that, due to the high unemployment rate most community members benefit from former combatants' criminal activities. This is because most people find it easier to buy stolen television sets from criminals than through the formal market.⁷⁸ Monosi, a former SDU member also reported how community members are often encouraged to remove goods from a stolen car before the 'owner' takes it away.⁷⁹ However, apart from the benefits, Phala argues that most communities are unlikely to ostracise former combatants who are currently engaged in crime because they understand the problems faced by this group:

Well, I think the people of this country more especially our neighbouring communities that they know who I am, how did I suffer, where I come from with the struggle now the government is doing this and this and I am doing

*this. I don't see they've got a problem with that because they can see what the government is doing to us.*⁸⁰

However, the cordial relations between former combatants who are involved in crime and their communities should not be exaggerated, because within one geographic area there could be strong views both in support of and against perpetrators of crime.

The third factor that facilitates former combatants' social reintegration into local communities irrespective of their criminality is the type of crime as well as the location of the crime. In the vocabulary of criminals and their sympathisers a distinction is made between 'just' and 'unjust' crime. The latter refers to crime committed within local communities. This includes muggings, mobile phone snatching and house-breaking. In a recent interview, a former MK combatant, revealed that he had decided to become a member of the local Community Policing Forum (CPF) because people engage in unjust crime. He defined 'unjust crime' as criminal activities committed within his community. He argued that his focus is not on people who commit crime in affluent suburbs. If anyone steals from white people the act is regarded as a just form of crime because they are taking what rightfully belongs to them.⁸¹

Sobhuza Dlamini provides a different analysis of the relationship between types of crime and criminals' social reintegration:

*I think if you are a rapist, a murderer indiscriminately communities generally would want to isolate you and I think if ex-combatants were involved in such criminal activities [those] communities would respond very negatively... if for example they were engaged in child sexual molestation battering of women and those type of indiscriminate killing and murder of community members it's likely that they would be ostracized based on the form of crime that they are engaged.*⁸²

The South African society currently applauds the material manifestation of wealth and success irrespective of how these were acquired. This is the fourth

factor that facilitates former combatants' social reintegration into local communities irrespective of their criminality. The majority of South Africans are now preoccupied with lavish lifestyles and consumerism. Thus, Dlamini observed that:

*... very well-known criminals who would steal cars and have a lot of money to flash around would attract beautiful girls in the township and generally there was this perception that Eish!, they are well off, and people would positively regard them, generally the youth would positively regard these kind of elements. And I think that if then ex-combatants were involved in such criminal activities that would expose them to flashy cars and being seen with beautiful woman it's likely that [eh] many people within communities may even want to be like them...*⁸³

However, this does not imply that the relationship between former combatants who are involved in criminal activities and their communities is always a healthy one. Thokoane observes that community members choose not to report criminals to the police either because they benefit from such activities or are intimidated.⁸⁴ Monosi concurs with Thokoane and argues that some of the community members fear that if they try to reprimand criminals, the latter might point a gun at them, which happens many times. *'They have no choice and someone will say if you have a problem with staying here why don't you go and stay [in the white] suburbs because you cannot tolerate what is happening around you'*.⁸⁵

As argued above, there were no comprehensive programmes to reintegrate former combatants into civilian society. A few non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have become the only source of assistance. However, most of these programmes do not directly address the problem of former combatants' involvement in crime. It is generally assumed that by having access to economic opportunities, former combatants would turn away from crime and become responsible citizens. For example, Mpanyana admits that the EMPD's Demilitarisation Project does not directly address the problem of former combatants' involvement in crime. The aim of the project is to provide all

former combatants with life skills and vocational qualifications so that they can be absorbed into the formal job market or set up ventures of their own.⁸⁶ The project involves education (vocational training and Adult Basic Education and Training), skills development (basic life skills which includes basic financial management, computer literacy and driver licenses), job placement and Small Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) development.

It is hoped that once economic opportunities exist, former combatants would have no reason to resort to crime. However, there is not sufficient evidence showing that the demilitarisation project turns former combatants away from crime except in one case. Almon Mpanyana reveals that a former combatant who was previously involved in crime, reported that after attending a few ABET lessons offered by the EMPD he found a purpose in life. 'He voluntarily confessed his previous involvement in crime and said that as a result of his involvement in the ABET programme he had decided to quit crime'.⁸⁷ The only project that comes closer to addressing the problem of former combatants' involvement in crime is the eco-therapy programme, also known as the Heroes' Journey of the National Peace Accord Trust (NPAT).

2. ADDRESSING FORMER COMBATANTS' CRIMINALITY

In June 1995 NPAT unveiled a R10-million plan to rebuild community values in KZN, on the East Rand and in Alexandra township. NPAT began a therapeutic intervention, 'Kathorus Wilderness Therapy Project' in 1996. The aim of the project was to deal with the trauma experienced by the youth in these areas and to reduce their participation in criminal activities. The project included eco-therapy wilderness trails in the Drakensberg Mountains for traumatised youth leaders from East Rand townships. The results of a research project conducted over a period of eight years showed that of 125 youth leaders who persisted in violent criminal activity in East Rand townships after the political transition, more than 80 percent had turned their backs on crime as a result of NPAT interventions.⁸⁸

Currently the NPAT conducts eco-therapy wilderness trails at *Matlapeng* – Place of Stones at Magaliesberg located about 25 kilometres outside Rustenburg in the North West Province. Eco-therapy is a transformative, therapeutic process that takes place in the wilderness. The model involves an attempt to assist people to find balance, connection, guidance and healing by deepening their relationship with the natural environment. Group processes, individual reflection, symbols and rituals are used in an accessible wilderness setting to heighten peoples' awareness of the connection between themselves, other people and the natural environment.

The most important part of the eco-trail is the solo-fast process in which all distractions are removed from the individual. Participants are required to enter into the wilderness on their own, away from other participants and choose a spot in which to spend 24 hours alone. During the 24-hour solo fast, participants have no access to food and can only drink water. They are not allowed to take books (except note pads on which to write their thoughts). Cigarettes, newspapers, mobile phones, portable radios or any other daily conveniences are not allowed.

In April 2007, the NPAT commissioned an independent study to evaluate the impact of the eco-trails on the lives of former combatants. Some preliminary findings reveal that the NPAT's eco-therapy model has the potential to address a number of social ills, such as crime. For many participants the solo-fast experience is the highlight of the eco-therapy journey. They enjoy the solitude and the rebirth that is brought about by being in touch with the environment. This was reflected in participants' individual written reports, during post-solo circle discussions and in the post-trail interviews.⁸⁹

During the pre-trail focus group interviews participants justified crime as a solution to unemployment amongst people who possess military skills. However, during a post-trail interview a former SDU member who had confessed his previous involvement in crime reported that the eco-trail helped him abandon crime. He further reported that due to this change he had approached some of his victims and apologised for his deeds.⁹⁰ The ability of

a former criminal to take some initiative to apologise to his victims indicates that the solo-fast gives power back to the participants. The NPAT eco-trail facilitators note that it is common for former combatants to denounce crime before they leave Matlapeng for home. It is not yet clear whether such individuals would readily participate in crime prevention.

3. FORMER COMBATANTS AND CRIME PREVENTION

A Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) study found that 83 percent of former combatants belonged to community and/or political organisations, 75 percent of those who belonged to organisations reported that they were actively involved in community/political organisations, which were predominately ANC or PAC structures and/or Community Police Forums (CPF).⁹¹ Participation in these organisations took either the form of being a dedicated member of an organisation or holding leadership positions at different levels. These ranged from being a chairperson at a street committee level, to being a chairperson of an ANC or PAC branch office. Respondents indicated that they had different reasons for belonging to these organisations. In some cases former combatants became involved so as to keep themselves busy given their unemployed status.

In his recent study David Everatt found that more than 80 percent of former combatants in Gauteng belong to a political organisation and that former combatants are also likely to belong to a neighbourhood watch or CPF, in considerably greater numbers than the general population. According to Everatt many of them are active members of civil society organisations (CSOs), are registered voters, believe that being politically engaged is important, trust parliament and the Constitution, and show many of the characteristics of 'engaged' and informed citizens. 'Their positive attitudes and CSO membership are important in many ways, not least for outreach and accessing ex-combatants'.⁹² However, despite these positive attitudes, there was no strategy to involve former combatants in local crime prevention except as community constables.

3.1 Community Constables

In the early 1990s the Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus (KATHORUS) townships were engulfed in violent armed conflict which involved the ANC-aligned SDUs and the IFP's SPUs. While the ANC and the IFP started cooperating in their efforts to end the conflict, 'hostilities among the SDUs and SPUs diminished hopes of lasting peace... They fought among themselves, attacked the police and harassed the community'.⁹³ A draft peace agreement was signed by the commanders of the SDUs and SPUs in Kempton Park on 5 May 1995, bringing an end to hostilities. Both parties agreed to redirect their energies to crime prevention and the development of the youth. The units from the opposing groups were disbanded and under the Special Presidential Project their members were integrated into the SAPS as community constables.⁹⁴ The SAPS provided four weeks of basic training, focused on arrest procedures, the use of firearms and opening a docket.⁹⁵ Some of those who were integrated felt that the training did not prepare them adequately for their policing functions.⁹⁶

Former community constables who participated in a focus group discussion for this study contradicted each other on the nature of the integration process. Some former community constables noted that they understood that their employment in the SAPS was guaranteed irrespective of their level of education. Others argued that they were all informed that the integrated individuals had to develop themselves to such a level that they would qualify to join the SAPS as permanent members. To this end, former SDU and SPU members were sent to Technikon SA to study four courses in policing. According to the former community constables' understating the arrangement was that all those who successfully completed their courses would be integrated as permanent members and those who had failed would be retained in their Community Constable positions until such time that they had completed all the courses.⁹⁷ However, as early as 1996 senior police officers confirmed that community constables without matric (Grade 12) would not be employed as permanent members of the SAPS.⁹⁸

Thulare, in an assessment of the community constable initiative, observes that the contractual time frame of the services of former community constables was not planned.⁹⁹ Former community constables who saw themselves engaged in a long-term career in the SAPS hold the same view and further argue that they were shocked when suddenly they were told that those without matric would be discharged from the service. One of the former combatants who was affected by this arrangement recalled his experience in the following way: *'On 21 March 2000, I still remember the date, I reported to work as I was supposed to, only to be told that my employment contract had expired and that I had to hand in the service firearm'*.¹⁰⁰ The process of discharging community constables began in 1998. Those who opted for voluntary discharge in 1998 received R21 000 severance packages while those who left in 2000 received R13 000. According to the former community constables, the reason given for their discharge was that the Department of Defence did not budget for their continued employment in the SAPS.

3.1.1 The Performance of Community Constables

Participants argue that while they were unfairly treated in the SAPS they managed to reduce crime. Unfair treatment refers to the fact that they wore police uniforms and carried pistols, but were discriminated against in a number of ways. First, they were given force numbers that began with 200 while force numbers of other police officers begin with 061. Secondly, they received only four weeks of training which they all felt was inadequate, given their lack of formal police training. Third, they were never allowed to drive police cars unaccompanied by a permanent member of the SAPS.

Fourth, only community constables were deployed in no-go areas especially during the armed conflict between the ANC and United Democratic Movement (UDM) in Tambo, Mandela and Holomisa (TAMAHO) areas in 1996. *'We were deployed in areas without a shelter and used local shacks to hide from the rain. However, we managed to control the situation and arrested a number of suspects. We do not know what happened to them after the arrest'*.¹⁰¹

Thulare observes that crime prevention and peacekeeping became easier, and because of community constables' vast knowledge of the area and of some of the wanted criminals, crime investigation was also served. Former community constables echo the same sentiments. They argued that as members of local communities, they were able to deal with crime effectively. One former community constable explained their success thus:

*I know all the streets in Thokoza, unlike a police officer who was born in Kuruman, received his police training at Hammanskraal and then deployed in Thokoza. If they report a crime to him he has to rely on a map and it would probably take him three hours to reach the crime scene even though it is a short distance from the police station.*¹⁰²

Former community constables argue that they were more effective than the members of the SAPS because they were working even when off-duty. They said if police were struggling to locate someone suspected of crime, they would meet while off-duty and use the opportunity to track the suspect down. *'We would never go to bed until the suspect was arrested and handed over to the police on duty'*.¹⁰³ Former community constables noted that being isolated from other police officers and deployed mainly in satellite police stations, most of which were caravans worked to their advantage. First, it brought them closer to their communities since the satellite police stations were easily accessible to people who had to travel long distances to reach the local police stations. Second, working in satellite police stations (which were less pressured environments) gave them an opportunity to learn how best to perform police duties. Consequently they became so effective that when deployed in main police stations community members insisted on being served by community constables.

Thulare holds a different view, which is that the community complained to station commanders about the poor quality of service rendered by community constables. Complaints ranged from failure to write a docket, to failure to make arrests. Furthermore, Thulare observed that community constables

often did not adhere to accepted police conduct while off duty, with service pistols being used to threaten drunkards in shebeens or to harass the community for their own pleasure.¹⁰⁴ While former community constables concede that some of their colleagues were harassing community members, they argued that the main problem was that they were not adequately prepared for integration into the SAPS.

*As a community constable you came from a situation in which you used illegal guns and operated informally in your work. We were integrated without any form of counselling. Many of our comrades committed suicide and we concluded that the community constable system was designed to frustrate us. You are integrated into a formal structure without any counselling and proper training.*¹⁰⁵

Another problem identified as a weakness was a strong criminal element among community constables, with some being feared criminals, while others were awaiting trial. 'The community [had] questioned police logic in allowing known criminal elements to conduct searches and man roadblocks'.¹⁰⁶ Thulare further observed that among community constables there were former SDU and SPU members who had dual affiliations, performing normal police duties during the day, while taking orders from their old unit commanders when they were off duty. 'In Katlehong community constables were instructed to use their service pistols to execute two women who were tried and found guilty by a kangaroo court.'¹⁰⁷

According to Thulare, it was not clear how many community constables were involved in kangaroo courts or had dual affiliations. In some parts of the country, former combatants were involved in what some observers viewed as vigilantism. The concept 'vigilantism' as used here refers to actions by 'individuals in a community taking the law into their own hands and dispensing their own punishment on alleged criminals, who they see not being caught, convicted and sentenced'.¹⁰⁸ This is not about the maintenance of law and order or of upholding any vision of community justice. The Peninsula Anti-

Crime Agency is an example of a group of individuals engaged in vigilantism as defined here.

3.2 The Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA)

The Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA) was formed on 4 October 1997 by former APLA, AZANLA, MK, SDU and SANDF members. It is generally believed that PEACA was formed in response to the high rate of crime and the Criminal Justice System's inability to deal with crime¹⁰⁹. Nelson Nkomana a founder member of the organisation revealed that it was conceptualised as a strategy to contain the poor and unemployed former combatants from the liberation forces.¹¹⁰ There was a concern that if not checked, there was a possibility that former combatants could turn to crime. Thus their mobilisation under PEACA was in itself a crime fighting strategy.

They now find themselves in a situation of unemployment, so they create activities to keep themselves busy. Unfortunately the high rate of crime makes it possible for them to engage in such activities. Being trained soldiers who are unable to render their services within the country's military structures, they try to create a platform for themselves so that they can get some recognition and make a living as well.¹¹¹

Boyane Tshehla identifies a number of features that distinguished PEACA from other community structures. First, unlike other community structures PEACA does not restrict itself to non-criminal cases, thereby leaving criminal cases to the police and courts. PEACA further distinguishes itself from other community structures in that they charge disputants for services rendered. According to Tshehla, PEACA members justify this by arguing that they use the money to buy food and pay the phone bill. Thus, if there is no case, the organisation has no money.¹¹²

However, one feature that makes PEACA similar to other vigilante groups is that members are vested with significant discretion regarding the procedures to be followed in handling of cases. PEACA members 'handle the case from

the beginning to the end with no allowance for review or appeal'.¹¹³ Nkomana's comments that PEACA's detective unit performs police functions such as crime investigation on its own without formal accreditation. Second, he reported that when members confiscate guns from criminals, they do not hand them to the police. A further indicator of lack of respect for the rule of law is the reported kidnapping and illegal detention of a police officer accused of stealing a car¹¹⁴.

In November 2000, *City Press* reported that a group of about 100 former APLA and MK combatants marching under the name of PEACA threatened to block tourists, target government buildings and cars, and evict government employees in the Western Cape's black townships if the government did not respond to their demands for employment. They further threatened to join the Western Cape vigilante groups, Qibla and People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)¹¹⁵. However, PEACA had been trying hard to boost its image by attempting to forge a working relationship with many other institutions and organisations. Among others they tried to join the Khayelitsha Community Policing Forum (KCPF), and had approached the CCR.¹¹⁶ On 17 July 2000, PEACA was given observer status during a meeting to resolve the Western Cape transport conflict.¹¹⁷

An in-depth analysis of PEACA's activities reveals that it is independent of all other organisations and is accountable to none. It is also an attempt to transfer military skills to policing in a context where no policy exists for such a programme. Consequently PEACA has become one of the institutions which compete with the state over the legitimate use of violence. While the transfer of military skills to policing is desirable, it should take place within the framework of a comprehensive human resources conversion strategy. Human resources conversion 'refers to the practical and normative conversion of specific skills possessed by military personnel into capabilities that can be used in a non-military environment'.¹¹⁸ Local crime prevention initiatives such as Community Policing Forums are some of the areas in which these capabilities can be used.

3.3 Community Police Forums

Section 221 of the *Interim Constitution* (Act No. 200 of 1993) made provision for community policing and the *South African Police Service Act* (No. 68 of 1995) gave effect to the provision. One of the innovations was the creation of Community Police Forums (CPF) at each police station. The CPF were established to improve police-community relations. '*They are supposed to play an oversight role to ensure that police officers provide feed-back on cases and discuss crime prevention strategies with local communities*'.¹¹⁹

Interviewees who are currently involved in CPF noted that the strength of the CPF is that they have managed to mobilise communities against crime. In both Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces interviewees argued that members of the CPF are committed to helping police in the fight against crime. The second strength of CPF is that they have managed to bridge the gap between the SAPS and the communities by bringing back community confidence in the SAPS.¹²⁰ This is a departure from the adversarialism that characterised the police-community relations during apartheid. However, CPF face similar challenges, one being their inability to retain members. The majority of people who participate in the structures are unemployed and work in CPF on a voluntary basis. It is common for them to leave CPF due to disillusionment from the lack of gainful employment.¹²¹ Meanwhile the participation of former combatants in CPF is very low.

3.3.1 Former Combatants' Involvement in Community Police Forums

Government officials interviewed for this study reported that in establishing CPFs they worked with organised groups and unless former combatants belonged to a CSO or NGO (at the time when CPF were established), they were unlikely to be drawn into CPFs. Thus, former combatants are largely absent from local crime prevention activities.

There is a general consensus that, due to high levels of unemployment among members of the population in general and former combatants in

particular, members of the latter social category are unlikely to participate in local crime prevention initiatives without economic benefits.¹²² However, this is not the only reason why former combatants would distance themselves from crime prevention. Three of the five former community constables who participated in a focus group discussion for this study vowed that they would never participate in the CPF or help the police officers in the execution of their duties because they (former community constables) felt that they were used by the SAPS and later dumped.

*I will never help them [the police] with information because they would benefit while I would be in trouble for identifying the criminal. However, if I am employed on a full-time basis as a police officer I am prepared to die while fighting crime, because it would be my job to fight crime. At least even after my death, my family would reap the benefits.*¹²³

However, two former community constables who were involved in CPF stated that they were involved because crime affected them directly. 'Crime affects me as an individual. I am not free to walk around with my cell phone'.¹²⁴ All participants agreed that former community constables have some skills and experience to contribute to crime prevention. This is because as former members of the SDUs and SPUs they have an experience of working amongst communities and their previous work as community constables afforded them an opportunity to learn the work of police officers.

Due to the absence of a clear policy and/or human resource conversion strategy, the participation of former combatants in CPFs is questionable. Former community constables who reported that they served in local CPFs argued that they would report criminals to the police irrespective of where the crime was committed. However, it emerged that some of the former combatants do not want activities that would attract uninvited police officers to their communities. They argued that chances are that while looking for criminals, police officers might come across 'innocent' people smoking dagga, and thus arrest them. It is thus plausible to argue that the participation of some former combatants in CPFs is a strategy to monitor the movement of

police officers. This seems to justify the concern of some community members (as discussed in subsection 3.1 above) about the involvement of some criminal elements in crime prevention initiatives such as community constables.

It is generally agreed that given the high rate of unemployment in South Africa, former combatants are likely to be attracted to crime prevention initiatives that bring them income. Some have joined the private security industry as owners of companies or security officers. However, the exact number of former combatants who are involved in the private security industry is unknown.

3.4 Former Combatants in the Private Security Industry

Following the suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC, the media reported on the participation of former combatants in crime prevention through private security companies. In 1993, *The Star* reported that about 200 MK combatants, who had organised themselves under the name Alexandra Returnees' Support Committee, were planning to set up a non-political R500 000 security company. Its aim was to patrol the Marlboro, Alexandra, Wynberg and Kew area to protect residents and industrialists from increasing crime, violence and vandalism.¹²⁵ It seems the idea never took off because the former combatants were never heard of again. Other private security companies which were reportedly established by and employing former guerrilla combatants included Sibuyile Security Services, Sinqobile Security Services, Thuthuka Security Services and Amadelakufa Protection Services. In 1995, it was reported that Sibuyile also installed electronic security systems and had ten clients nationwide, including the ANC. Competing against top security firms, in 1995 the company won a R5-million contract with Spoornet in Kwa-Zulu Natal.

Some of the former MK combatants who owned private security companies included Parker Mamabolo, the former Director of Operations at Trans-Sizwe

Security Company. By the end of 2005, Trans-Sizwe employed 1 000 security officers. The company won a contract to guard Metro-rail property (including train stations). However, only ten per cent of all security officers employed by Trans-Sizwe came from APLA and MK including former SDU members. Steven Corry, former co-director of Trans-Sizwe Security Company argued that most former APLA and MK combatants suffered from severe psychological problems and that some of them were beyond rehabilitation. Thus, he argued, they could not be employed as armed guards.¹²⁶

Trans-Sizwe Security Company which was making a turnover of R1.5-Million every month was liquidated in 2004. According to Corry, the company was never meant to make its originators rich. Thus, prices were low so as to attract more work and some of the money was invested in community projects. However, the staff salaries were so low that when the government intervened in the private security industry and called for the provision of a provident fund and later a thirteenth cheque, the company could not consistently make a profit. 'One month we were making some marginal profit, the next month we were losing R75 000. I was also tired of the industry because I felt like I was in a war zone. In a period of ten years the company buried fifty four men. Some were killed for their weapons, other shot each other, others fell under the train and so on'.¹²⁷ Hence, the decision to liquidate the company.

Another example of a former combatant led security company is that of a 47-year old former MK member from Pretoria who had opened his own private security company. The company which guarded commercial and residential properties throughout Gauteng netted approximately R3-million per year and employed about 300 people.¹²⁸ An interesting feature of the profile of the staff of the company is that it does not rely on the skills of former combatants; the guards are young men in their 20s and 30s recruited from the townships around Pretoria. 'Very few of them were formally involved in the liberation struggle'.¹²⁹

Most of the companies owned by former guerrilla combatants collapsed soon after being established. A former MK combatant, then businessman,

explained the constraints involved in starting a security firm in the context of a proliferation of such firms. He argued that the problem with starting a security firm was that the market had shrunk. As he put it, 'You are dividing the cake that has always been there. Thus, in order to make it, you have to push hard'.¹³⁰ He noted that the major obstacle was that white companies did not trust black security firms and thus it was difficult to obtain contracts. However, Dumi Matabane a former General Secretary of MKMVA in Limpopo Province provided two main reasons behind the collapse of private security firms. These were the lack of business management skills and the extravagant lifestyles of some former MK company owners.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Former combatants are not the cause of crime. However, they are vulnerable to being drawn in as role-players because of their skills, their social and economic exclusion and their political alienation. While this report has pointed to the involvement of some former combatants in criminal activities, it is important to note that others have often taken initiatives to transform their lives and that of the communities in which they live. An example is a 50-year-old former MK combatant from Thokoza whose highest educational qualification is Standard 8 (Grade 10). He is a trained HIV/AIDS counsellor and is currently doing voluntary work in Thokoza but feels that he needs more training, especially around HIV/AIDS. He is also passionate about working with mentally-challenged people. He reported his frustration after his attempt to open a shelter for the mentally challenged people in the township failed because some government officials sent him from pillar to post.¹³¹

Another example is Mandla Hlatshwayo, a former MK combatant from Orange Farm. On his return from exile in Zambia he established the now defunct Orange Farm Anti-AIDS Club which ran a number of campaigns in the 1990s.¹³² Former combatants should not be treated as a threat, but rather as a resource to be maximised. Some of them have not only engaged in activities

to uplift themselves, but have also taken on roles as peace-builders in their own communities and more broadly in society. They have been involved in, among other things, formal and informal efforts to protect communities against crime.¹³³ It is worth noting that while they may lack certain technical skills relevant to civilian life, many of the experiences of former combatants can be converted for use in a civilian context.

Many former combatants have strong leadership experience, which includes planning, organising and motivational skills; self discipline and respect for a clear system of authority.¹³⁴ Some of these skills may, if not converted for civilian use, be employed in negative activities such as mobilizing people for a criminal gang or crime syndicate. It is therefore important to involve former combatants in crime prevention, more so because:

Ex-combatants are far more than simply fighters; they are often social activists with a strong understanding of the nature and causes of social injustice. They are often the carriers of a social memory of struggle, taking on the role of preserving the history of the struggle against injustice. This history of struggle and its relevance for education around individual and collective rights is critical in society's attempts to make sense of its past. It is also the key in interpreting lessons for a society that has not shed the burdens of inequality and impoverishment.¹³⁵

However, in order to draw on the experience and skills of former combatants it is important to begin by developing a clear human resources conversion strategy. This can be achieved by accreditation of skills learned in the military by governmental and business sectors, or through their recognition and integration into broader educational and training courses. The existence of Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) at institutions such as the University of South Africa can facilitate the process. RPL is a way of recognising any skill, competency, knowledge or qualification of the learner, and assessing learning that has taken place outside the formal education and training systems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- There is no formally accepted definition of 'former combatant', thus the first challenge is to clearly define 'former combatant' in such a way that the concept is free of all ambiguities. This would help in identifying former combatants with the skills that are relevant for crime prevention.
- The challenge facing policy makers is that all the three liberation armies in South Africa never kept any comprehensive membership records, thus, no one knows exactly how many former combatants are still alive. The first step is to empower military veterans' associations to identify and mobilize former combatants in order to identify those with skills in crime prevention.
- There is a need to develop a comprehensive policy for the involvement of former combatants in crime prevention. Such a policy should take into consideration the socio-economic inequalities between different communities.
- It is important to involve former combatants in the policy formulation process as their views and opinions on how they would participate in crime prevention initiatives are important for the success of policy implementation. Imposing a policy on former combatants without their involvement might lead to resentment and a lack of interest in crime prevention initiatives.
- There is a need to address the mindsets and perceptions which influence people's unwillingness to report crime (irrespective of the crime scene). To achieve this would require setting up programmes that help people to understand that the reporting of crime is an essential civic duty which should be developed by all members of society, irrespective of their social and economic standing.
- Also important is the need to address economic hardships and create an alternative economic market to the criminal (economic) market, which affords people opportunities to access goods and services at lower than market prices. This should be accompanied by programmes to educate people on the longer-term impact of crime on society and the economy.
- It is also important to draw on former combatants' skills acquired in civil society organisations. Former combatants who had previously held leadership positions

should be identified and deployed in positions of responsibility. Their previous leadership roles have the potential to draw their former subordinates to any project.

- Given the poverty and unemployment rates in South Africa, it is unlikely that many people including former combatants would volunteer for crime prevention initiatives. In order to draw former combatants into crime fighting initiatives, there is a need to mobilize resources to at least provide them with a stipend.
- There are former combatants who are currently serving prison sentences and others have been recently released from prison where they were incarcerated for criminal activities committed in the post-1994 period. These individuals require reintegration into society, first as former combatants and then as former offenders. While it is impossible to use them in some crime prevention initiatives such as the police reservists programme, they could be used as ambassadors in the fight against crime. Their marginalisation might turn them into repeat offenders.

Issues for Further Research

- ❑ The main reasons why former combatants engage in crime and the kinds of crime in which they engage remain unknown. The best way to find out why former combatants engage in crime is to interview former offenders, current criminals and those still serving prison sentences.
- ❑ The relationship between former combatants who are involved in crime and their communities (including families) is a field worth studying. It is important to understand how families and communities relate to this social category as well as their views on the role that former combatants can play in crime prevention. This will help in the development of an evidence-based policy to engage former combatants in crime prevention, but more importantly in the involvement of former combatants in local crime prevention initiatives.
- ❑ Most studies which focus on the marginalisation of former combatants focus on APLA, AZANLA, MK, SDU and SPU. There is need to conduct an investigation

into the various paramilitary formations which existed within South Africa prior to 1994.

- It is also important to conduct a study on former combatants who were once involved in and those who are currently part of the private security industry. Such a study should have three main objectives: to identify the extent to which former combatants are involved in the private security industry and their experiences, to investigate the kinds of skills and experience they bring to the industry, as well as analyse challenges they face in the industry.

ACRONYMS

ABET	Adult Basic Education and Training
AK-47	Avtomat Kalashnikova 1947
ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
APLAMVA	Azanian People's Liberation Army Military Veterans Association
ATM	Automatic Teller Machine
AZANLA	Azanian National Liberation Army
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CIT	Cash-in-Transit
CPF	Community Policing Forum
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CSV	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
EMPD	Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department
IDP	Institute for Defence Policy
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
KATHORUS	Katlehong, Thokoza, Vosloorus
KCPF	Khayelitsha Community Policing Forum
KSIPP	Kathorus Special Integrated Presidential Project
KZN	Kwa-Zulu Natal
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans' Association
MP	Member of Parliament
MSMU	Malamulela Social Movement of the Unemployed
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NP	National Party
NPAT	National Peace Accord Trust
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
PEACA	Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency
RPL	Recognition of Prior Learning
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPS	South African Police Services
SDU	Self Defence Units

SMME	Small Medium and Micro Enterprises
SPU	Self Protection Units
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TAMAHO	Tambo Mandela and Holomisa (townships)
UDM	United Democratic Movement
UNISA	University of South Africa

NOTES

¹ Opening Address of the Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr Mluleki George, MP, on the Occasion of a Symposium on Military Veterans, University of South Africa, (Florida Campus), 25 August 2004 <<http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04092208451006.htm>>.

² ‘Spear of the Nation Laid to Rest’ in *Saturday Star* 18.12.1993.

³ ‘Was the War of Liberation Really Won?’, *City Press*, 10.06.2001.

⁴ Purposive or judgemental sampling involves selecting sample units on the basis of the researcher’s own knowledge of the population, its elements and the nature of the research aims (Babbie, and Mouton, 2001). Through purposive sampling, sample units are chosen because they have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes and puzzles which the researcher wishes to study.

⁵ Queen Riba is a former Secretary of the Soweto Community Police Forum Area Board. She reported that they have decided to do away with the Area Board and now focus at police stations.

⁶ Not his real name, his current occupation cannot be revealed as this would be giving away his identity.

⁷ The aim of a focus group discussion is to enable the facilitator to access the opinions and elicit expression of views, feelings and experiences of the participants in their own social worlds. A focus group provides a friendly research method that is respectful and not condescending to the target audience. By creating and sustaining an atmosphere that promotes meaningful interaction, focus groups convey a humane sensitivity, a willingness to listen without being defensive, and a respect for opposing views that is unique and beneficial in emotionally charged environments (Morgan and Krueger, 1993).

⁸ J.L. Mashike, ‘Down-Sizing and Right-Sizing: An Analysis of the Demobilization Process in the South African National Defence Force’ (University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg, unpublished PhD Thesis, 2005).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ K. Kingma, ‘Demobilisation and Reintegration: An Overview’ in Gebrewold, K. (ed.) *Converting Defense Resources to Human Development*, Proceedings of an International Conference, Report, 12 October (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1998), pp.12 – 20.

¹¹ A social group refers to a collection of individuals who interact in systematic ways with one another, irrespective of size it is a defining feature of a group that its members have an awareness of a common identity [A. Giddens, *Sociology*, Fifth Edition (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006)].

¹² Kingma, ‘Demobilisation and Reintegration’

¹³ While some former combatants might get involved in national politics, this is not a good indicator of political reintegration as in some cases party policies impose candidates on voters. Thus, participation in local structures such as school governing bodies and local crime prevention initiatives where former combatants are elected/nominated through a popular vote and accept such an election/nomination is a true sign of political reintegration. The participation of former combatants in military veterans’ structures is not an indicator of political reintegration because such organisations represent exclusive interests. More importantly, they might serve as obstacles towards social reintegration as former combatants use them to fight for special attention. However, it is worth noting that the lack of political reintegration manifest itself even within a political organisation. If some former combatants can find their names in the candidate list for an election, it is plausible to argue that, this may indicate a level of political reintegration that is generally absent.

¹⁴ Kingma, 'Demobilisation and Reintegration'.

¹⁵ See for example, T. Motumi and P. Mckenzie, 'After the War: Demobilisation in South Africa', in Jacklyn Cock and Penny McKenzie (eds.) *From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1998), pp.181-203.

¹⁶ The latter were formed in response to the African National Congress (ANC) SDUs.

¹⁷ Colonel Lucas Sigela cited in Mashike, 'Down-sizing and Right-sizing', p. 176.

¹⁸ The input of Sobhuza Dlamini on this point is hereby acknowledged.

¹⁹ The *Military Veterans' Act* (No. 17 of 1999) does not use the concept former combatant, but rather "war veteran". While the legislation provides a clear definition of "war veteran" in relation to former statutory forces, the definition as it relates to former members of APLA and MK is as remains as ambiguous as it was during the process of integration to form a new national defence force. The Act defines "war veterans" (as it related to APLA and MK) as 'any person who served as a member of any non-statutory force as defined in section 1 of the *Demobilisation Act*, 1996 (Act No. 99 of 1996)'. The latter defines "non-statutory forces" as 'the armed forces not established by any law and known or formerly known as the Azanian People's Liberation Army and uMkhonto we Sizwe'. This leaves it up to the two groups to come up with a precise criteria of who qualifies to be classified as 'war veterans', however as noted above this has never been successfully done.

²⁰ 'Superfluous Soldiers "Betrayed" ', *Weekend Star*, 15 October 1994.

²¹ Ibid. The IDP is now known as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

²² Former Comrades Threaten to use Struggle Tactic on Govt', *Saturday Star*, 15.10.1994.

²³ 'Robberies: The MK Link', *The Natal Witness*, 19.02.1998.

²⁴ 'Hang my attacker, bus driver tells court' *Independent Online*, 07.12.2000, <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=ct20001207104008967B350434>. This was in the context of the transport (route) conflict between the mini-bus taxi operators and Golden Arrow buses in the Cape Peninsula. The press reported that Botya had agreed to payment of between R50 to R100 for each attack.

²⁵ 'We Bomb ATMs', *Sowetan*, 13.08.2007. Mashego was arrested by the police for questioning but was released after they realised that his statement was a bluff designed to extract government attention.

²⁶ The department of Safety and Security is used as a generic term to refer to the departments responsible for policing at a provincial level. Each province has a different name for such a department.

²⁷ Interview with Jennifer Ntlatseng, the Deputy Director: Crime Prevention, Gauteng Department of Safety and Liaison, Johannesburg, 29 August 2007.

²⁸ Interview with Doris Mathebula, Senior Manger, Community Relations, Limpopo Department of Safety and Security, Polokwane, 21 September 2007.

²⁹ Interview with Strike Thokoane, an AZANLA representative, De Deur (Johannesburg), 31 August 2007.

³⁰ Interview with Sobhuza Dlamini, Chief Executive Officer of Jikeleza Mkhonto, Johannesburg, 24 August 2007.

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- ³¹ Interview with Mbulelo Raymond Fihla, Azanian People's Liberation Army Military Veterans Association (APLAMVA), Johannesburg, 4 September 2007.
- ³² Interview with Strike Thokoane, an AZANLA representative, De Deur (Johannesburg), 31 August 2007.
- ³³ *City Press* also revealed that cash-in-transit heists created at least 46 millionaire gangs in 2006 ['Heist millionaires', *City Press*, 08.09.2007].
- ³⁴ The process of forming the SANDF and the demobilisation of some former guerrilla combatants were terminated on 31 December 2002 in terms of the *Demobilisation Amendment Act* (No. 43 of 2001) and the *Termination of Integration Intake Act*, (No. 44 of 2001).
- ³⁵ The Helen Suzman Foundation, 'Scapegoats for the country's ills' *Focus*, 10, April 1998 <http://www.hsf.org.za/%23articledatabase/article_view.asp?id=269>.
- ³⁶ Input by Senior Superintendent M.J Manentsa during the Policy and Advocacy Workshop held in Cape Town, 11 October 2007.
- ³⁷ This came out during the interview with both Sobhuza Dlamini and Strike Thokoane.
- ³⁸ Interview with Strike Thokoane, an AZANLA representative, De Deur (Johannesburg), 31 August 2007.
- ³⁹ L. Mphahlele, *Child of this Soil: My Life as a Freedom Fighter* (Cape Town, Kwela Books, 2002), p.144.
- ⁴⁰ Interview with Mbulelo Raymond Fihla, Azanian People's Liberation Army Military Veterans Association (APLAMVA), Johannesburg, 4 September 2007.
- ⁴¹ 'Former liberation movement members used as hitmen in taxi violence', *Independent Online*, 13.01.1997, <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=arch12433be541739d689>.
- ⁴² 'Hitmen behind taxi wars', *Independent Online*, 09.06.2007 <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=181&art_id=vn20070609083228677C324462>
- ⁴³ Interview with Mbulelo Raymond Fihla, Azanian People's Liberation Army Military Veterans Association (APLAMVA), Johannesburg, 4 September 2007.
- ⁴⁴ J. Cock, 'Guns and the Social Crisis' in J. Daniel, A. Habib, R.Southall (eds) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006* (Human Sciences Research Council, Cape Town, 2006), p.333. According to Jacklyn Cock the social crisis is multi-faceted and includes, 'criminal violence, HIV/AIDS, substance abuse, vehicle accidents, one of the highest rate of rape in the world and other forms of gender-based violence such as femicide...It is also manifest in media reports of the nurse whose patient dies while she chats to the driver in the front of the ambulance, the builder who erects sub-standard Reconstruction and Development Programme houses, irregularities in the tendering procedures, corruption in the arms industry, the police officer who takes bribes, the currency speculator whose concern for profit obliterates any concern for the well-being of fellow citizens, the public servant falsifying pension claims, the teacher who abuses or neglects his pupils, as well as the owners and drivers of minibus taxis who are indifferent to the safety of their passengers' (ibid.).
- ⁴⁵ Bob Mabaso, then the General Secretary of MKMVA cited in L. Mashike, 'Beyond the Armed Struggle: A Sociological Profile of ex-MK Soldiers', unpublished Research Report (Braamfontein, Group for Environmental Monitoring), p.21.

⁴⁶ NIZA, ProPaz and CSVR, 'A Final Word' in Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, *Struggles in Peacetime: Working with Ex-combatants in Mozambique: their work, their Frustrations and Success* (Amsterdam, Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, 2006), p. 46.

⁴⁷ The motivations and means approach is borrowed from R. Muggah, 'Diagnosing Demand: Assessing the Motivations and Means for Firearms Acquisition in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea', State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion paper 2004/7 (Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University).

⁴⁸ As Robert Muggah observes, motivations and means are seldom either/or but are rather both/and.

⁴⁹ Motumi and Mckenzie, 'After the War', p.181.

⁵⁰ J. Irish-Qobhosheane and N. Moshe, 'A Booming Trade: Vehicle Hijacking in South Africa' in J. Irish-Qobhosheane *Gentlemen or Villains, Thugs or Heroes?: The Social Economy of Organised Crime in South Africa* (Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2007). pp.115 – 146.

⁵¹ Interview with Almon Mpanyana, The Demilitarisation Project Co-ordinator, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department (EMPD), Bedfordview, 13 August 2007.

⁵² Interview with Phala Sehoane, former Community Constable, Katlehong, 1.10.2007.

⁵³ L. Mashike '“Some of us know nothing except military skills”: South Africa's former guerrilla combatants' in Sakhela Buhlungu; John Daniel; Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (eds) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2007* (Human Sciences Research Council, Cape Town, 2007), p.365.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ 'Frustration among South Africa's War veterans', Radio Netherlands, 3 May 2001
<<http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/southafrica010503.html>>

⁵⁶ 'Presidency Records Progress on Poverty', *Business Day*, 22 June 2007
<<http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/national.aspx?ID=BD4A499164>>.

⁵⁷ A. Crotty and R. Bonorchis *Executive Pay: Who Gets What and Why* (Cape Town, Double Storey, 2006).

⁵⁸ Interview with Monnaesi Monosi, former SDU member, Thokoza, 31 August 2007.

⁵⁹ Mashike, 'Down-Sizing and Right-Sizing'.

⁶⁰ Ibid. It is worth noting that as early as December 1997, Nelson Mandela, then president of the ANC, told delegates to the ANC's 50th national conference that some people were using crime to discredit the ANC. In his presidential address, Nelson Mandela accused various elements of the former ruling group of being involved in a campaign that used crime to subvert the economy and erode the confidence of South Africans and the international community in the ability of the ANC to govern and fulfil its election pledge of reconstruction and development.

⁶¹ G. Robertson, 'Ecotherapy with Ex-combatants: The Mechanism of Change' (undated),

⁶² Ibid., p.1

⁶³ Ibid.

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- ⁶⁴ Gear, S. *Wishing us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-Combatants in the New South Africa, Violence and Transition Series*, Volume 8 (Johannesburg, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2002), p.64.
- ⁶⁵ Interview with Mbulelo Raymond Fihla, Azanian People's Liberation Army Military Veterans Association (APLAMVA), Johannesburg, 4 September 2007.
- ⁶⁶ Interview with Monnaesi Monosi, former SDU member, Thokoza, 31 August 2007.
- ⁶⁷ 'Police Pounce on Gang', *Independent Online*, 07.08.2007
<http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=vn20070807015639289C163990>.
- ⁶⁸ Telephonic interview with a former MK combatant, 07.08.2007.
- ⁶⁹ Dzinesa G.A 'Post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Southern Africa', *International Studies Perspectives*, 8, (2007), pp. 73 – 89.
- ⁷⁰ 'We (almost) hire an AK-47', *Mail and Guardian Online*, 29.09.2006
<http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=285341&area=/insight/insight_national/>.
- ⁷¹ 'Army flak jackets sold to cash heist gangs', *Witness*, 06.11.2006.
- ⁷² 'Metro officer held over gun-running', *Cape Argus*, 11.09.2007
<<http://www.capeargus.co.za/?fSectionId=&fArticleId=vn20070911032507691C526610#>>.
- ⁷³ A. Kirsten, J. Cock., L. Mashike. and R. Matshediso, 'Islands of safety in a sea of guns: Gun Free Zones in Fothane, Diepkloof and Khayelitsha' (Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2006).
- ⁷⁴ C. Gould. and G. Lamb, *Hide and seek: Taking account of small arms in Southern Africa*. (Institute for Security Studies, Centre for Conflict Resolution, and Gun-Free South Africa, Pretoria, 2004).
- ⁷⁵ B. Kazoora, 'The Ugandan Reintegration Experience' in Kiflemariam Gebrewold (ed.) *Converting Defence Resources to Human Development*, Proceedings of an International Conference, 9-11 November 1997, (Bonn, Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1998) Report 12, pp 31 – 39.
- ⁷⁶ Interview with Strike Thokoane, an AZANLA representative, De Deur (Johannesburg), 31 August 2007.
- ⁷⁷ J. Irish-Qobhosheane, 'Conclusion and Recommendations' in J. Irish-Qobhosheane *Gentlemen or Villains, Thugs or Heroes?: The Social Economy of Organised Crime in South Africa* (Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2007), pp.211 – 217. While Jennifer Irish-Qobhosheane was writing about organised crime, her observation is relevant for crime in general.
- ⁷⁸ Interview with Strike Thokoane, an AZANLA representative, De Deur (Johannesburg), 31 August 2007.
- ⁷⁹ Interview with Monnaesi Monosi, former SDU member, Thokoza, 31 August 2007.
- ⁸⁰ Interview with Phala Sehoane, former Community Constable, Katlehong, 1.10.2007.
- ⁸¹ Telephonic interview with a former MK combatant, 07.08.2007.
- ⁸² Interview with Sobhuza Dlamini, Chief Executive Officer of Jikeleza Mkhonto, Johannesburg, 24 August 2007.

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- ⁸³ Ibid.
- ⁸⁴ Interview with Strike Thokoane, an AZANLA representative, De Deur (Johannesburg), 31 August 2007.
- ⁸⁵ Interview with Monnaesi Monosi, former SDU member, Thokoza, 31 August 2007.
- ⁸⁶ Interview with Almon Mpanyana, The Demilitarisation Project Co-ordinator, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department (EMPD), Bedfordview, 13 August 2007.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ The National Peace Accord Trust website, <<http://www.peaceaccord.org.za/stories1.htm>>.
- ⁸⁹ L. Mashike, ““My life has changed for the better””: the impact of Eco-therapy on the lives of the Militarised and Criminalised Youth”, Preliminary Research Report submitted to the National Peace Accord Trust.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid.
- ⁹¹ L. Mashike, and M. Mokalobe, ‘Reintegration into Civilian Life: The Case of former MK and APLA Combatants’, *Track Two* 12, (1 and 2), 2003, pp. 6 – 36.
- ⁹² D. Everatt (ed.) *Only useful until Democracy?: Reintegrating ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa with lessons from Kosovo & Zimbabwe* (Johannesburg, Atlantic Philanthropies, 2007).
- ⁹³ P. Thulare ‘Policing and Security on the East Rand - Katorus Area’, *African Security Review*, 5, 2 (1996).
- ⁹⁴ The Kathorus Special Integrated Presidential Project (KSIPP) was one of seven high profile urban regeneration projects launched by South Africa's newly elected post-apartheid government in 1994. Straddling three African townships, accommodating an estimated one and a half million people, the Kathorus project provided infrastructure, housing and community facilities to Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus. (‘A Decade of Change: Celebrating ten Years of Democracy in Gauteng’ <<http://www.gpg.gov.za/frames/decade-f.html>>).
- ⁹⁵ Thulare ‘Policing and Security’
- ⁹⁶ Focus Group discussion with former Community Constables, Katlehong, 1 October 2007.
- ⁹⁷ *ibid.*
- ⁹⁸ Thulare ‘Policing and Security’
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁰ Focus Group discussion with former Community Constables, Katlehong, 1 October 2007.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Thulare 'Policing and Security'.

¹⁰⁵ Focus Group discussion with former Community Constables, Katlehong, 1 October 2007.

¹⁰⁶ Thulare 'Policing and Security'.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ A. Minnaar, 'The new vigilantism in Post-April 1994 South Africa: Crime Prevention or an Expression of Lawlessness?', Institutes for Human Rights and Criminal Justice Studies, Technikon, SA, May 2001, <www.crimeinstitute.ac.za/reports/vigilantism.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ See for example, B. J. Tshehla, 'Non-State Ordering in the Post-Apartheid South Africa – A Study of Some Structures of Non-State Ordering in the Western Cape Province' (University of Cape Town, unpublished ML Thesis, 2001).

¹¹⁰ Input by Nelson Nkomana during the Policy and Advocacy Workshop for former combatants held in Cape Town, 11 October 2007.

¹¹¹ An executive committee member of the Khayelitsha Community Policing Forum cited in Tshehla, 'Non-State Ordering', p.40.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid, p.39.

¹¹⁴ K. Gottschalk, 'Vigilantism v. the State: A case study of the rise and fall of Pagad, 1996–2000', ISS Paper 99, (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, February 2005).

¹¹⁵ "Give Us Jobs or..." in *City Press*, 26.11.2000.

¹¹⁶ Tshehla, 'Non-State Ordering'.

¹¹⁷ 'Record of Decisions, Meeting on the Western Cape Transport Conflict held on 17 July 2000 at the Centre for Conflict Resolution', <<http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/transport/transport20000717.html>>. The meeting was attended by the MEC Transport (and senior officials, including traffic officials); the MEC Community Safety (and senior officials); the Attorney General's Office; the taxi associations, Codeta and Cata; Golden Arrow bus company and drivers' union; the SAPS; and community police forums (Khayelitsha, Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu). The aim was to resolve the conflict between the taxi operators and the Golden Arrow bus company. During the conflict one bus passenger and two bus drivers were shot dead while 36 passengers were wounded in six incidents in the Cape Peninsula townships.

¹¹⁸ R. Williams, 'Demobilisation and Reintegration in Society: Human Resources Conversion', in J. Cock and P. Mckenzie (eds) *From Defence To Development Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa* (Ottawa and Cape Town, IDRC/David Philip 1998), pp. pp 208 – 221.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Jennifer Ntlatseng, the Deputy Director: Crime Prevention, Gauteng Department of Safety and Liaison, Johannesburg, 29 August 2007.

¹²⁰ This came up during interviews with Jeniffer Ntlatseng, Queen Riba and Dorris Mathebula.

¹²¹ The point was raised by Ntlatseng, Mathebula and the former community constables. For example, while most people initially joined the CPF with a lot of enthusiasm, Riba observes that people

participating in some of the 11 CPF in Soweto are no longer as active as they used to be. The CPF in Limpopo Province have also been affected by the exodus of members. Mathebula also reported that some members of the CPFs leave without notifying others.

¹²² This was the view held by almost all the informants for this study.

¹²³ Focus Group discussion with former Community Constables, Katlehong, 1 October 2007.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ 'At last – Action: Former MK men Plan to Guard Suburbs', *The Star*, 25.08.1993.

¹²⁶ Mashike, 'Down-sizing and Right-sizing'

¹²⁷ Telephonic interview with Steven Corry, former Co-director of Trans-Sizwe Security Company, 18 September 2007.

¹²⁸ S.E Cook, 'Veterans of peace in post-conflict South Africa', *Conflict Trends*, 1, 2006, pp. 40-44. <http://0-journals.sabinet.co.za.innopac.wits.ac.za/WebZ/FETCH?sessionid=01-52976-2137574970:recno=11:next=ej/ej_nfbrief.html:bad=ej/ej_badfetch.html:entitytoprecno=11:entitycurrecno=11:resultset=1:numrecs=10:format=B>.

¹²⁹ *ibid*, p.41.

¹³⁰ Thomas Matlaila cited in Mashike, 'Down-sizing and Right-sizing', p.333.

¹³¹ This is part of the finding of the ongoing study to evaluate the impact of the NPAT's eco-therapy programme.

¹³² See for example; 'Valentine's Day Message for Youngsters is to Practise Safe Sex', *The Star*, 15.02.1999; 'Condom Drive Taken to the Streets', *The Star*, 3.09.1999; and 'Dedicated Man Drives Locals to be HIV-aware', *City Press*, 26.09.1999.

¹³³ H. van der Merwe and R. Smith, 'Ex-combatants as Peacebuilders: Opportunities and Challenges' in Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, *Struggles in Peacetime: Working with Ex-combatants in Mozambique: their work, their Frustrations and Success* (Amsterdam, Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, 2006).

¹³⁴ *Ibid*.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.15.